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Preface
As of July 26, 1994, employers with 15 or more employees have been
subject to the labor market provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). Employers with 25 or more employees became subject to the provisions in 1992. For people with disabilities, the ADA gives civil rights protections similar to those provided to individuals on the basis of race, color, sex,
national origin, age, and religion. It guarantees equal opportunity in public
accommodations, employment, transportation, state and local government services, and telecommunications. This book focuses exclusively on the labor
market provisions of the ADA. Its goal is to provide a comprehensive analysis
of the current labor market experience of American workers with disabilities
and an assessment of the impact the ADA has had on that experience.
The ADA prohibits discrimination in all employment practices, including
job application procedures, hiring, firing, advancement, compensation, training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. It applies to
recruitment, advertising, tenure, layoff, leave, fringe benefits, and all other
employment-related activities. It is hoped that, by breaking down the labor
market barriers that Americans with disabilities have faced in the past, we will
all benefit from an untapped source of productivity, the resulting increase in
purchasing power, and a simultaneous savings on disability payments.
Most previous studies have either focused on only one dimension of the
labor market experience (e.g., wages or employment levels), evaluated that
experience at only one point in time, or focused on the labor supply impact of
disability policies. However, one’s labor market experience has many dimensions; this research explores the labor market experience across those dimensions and across time. The result is a more complete picture of what
Americans with disabilities can expect as participants in the labor market and
of whether this experience has been affected by the passage of the ADA.
Given that policies such as the ADA are designed to affect the lives of groups
of individuals, the experience of disabled workers as a whole is evaluated
rather than the experience of any one person.
Much of the earlier research on workers with disabilities relates to issues
of labor supply, such as policies that shape workforce participation decisions
of the disabled, circumstances that improve the chances of injured workers
returning to work, or details of the special needs of the disabled (e.g., access
to health care, personal assistance) that might hinder their entrance into the
workforce. While the analyses contained in this book do not ignore labor
supply issues, the focus is on more direct evidence of the existence of and
changes in barriers to a positive labor market experience. Barriers are de-
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fined here as parts of the labor market experience controlled by the employer,
which are the aspects directly addressed by the ADA and can be considered
demand-side factors.
When a policy such as the ADA finally comes to fruition, there is often a
question as to whether any observed changes in the experience of those affected by the law can be attributed to the law itself or whether changes in
experience merely reflect the environment in which the law was passed. If
the latter were true, this would not be to say that the ADA was unnecessary,
just that it did not have the dramatic impact some opponents probably feared
because the changes were already occurring. It is also possible that no change
in experience of the disabled will be seen leading up to the passage or following implementation of the ADA. If this is the case and if the experience of
disabled workers in the labor market remains inferior to that of the nondisabled, then we clearly have to look beyond the ADA to improve that labor
market situation.
The analyses in this book show that while disabled workers are making
progress in some dimensions of their labor market experience, the ADA does
not seem to have had a striking impact in either a positive or negative direction. Expanding or strengthening incentives to enter the labor force, providing
training focused in high-growth and high-earnings occupations, and assistance
in screening and matching workers with appropriate jobs are policies that
would capitalize on the recent progress made by disabled workers and move
them in the direction of greater labor market gains.

xiv

1
Introduction
DISABILITY LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES
The excitement, fear, and general controversy surrounding the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990 might lead
some to believe that this was the first time the United States had ever
confronted the issue of potential discrimination against or differential
treatment of people with disabilities. To the contrary, the nation has
demonstrated some concern through legislation for individuals with
disabilities since the 1920s. Not until the ADA, however, was there as
sweeping a mandate, theoretically touching multiple dimensions of a
disabled person’s life.
The National Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation Act became law in
1920, was amended several times, then became the Vocational Rehabilitation Act in 1954. Public Law 93-112 transformed it into the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (sections 503–504), which prohibits discrimination
against the disabled by any program receiving federal assistance and
requires federal agencies to take affirmative action to employ handicapped individuals. In addition, the act dictates that companies having
contracts of a certain size with the federal government ($10,000 or
more, as of 1998) publicly state that the organization takes affirmative
action to employ and accommodate workers with disabilities. Executive Order 12086 in 1978 reassigned enforcement of the act to the U.S.
Department of Labor. This strengthened the position of disabled and
veteran workers by placing the regulation enforcement in line with
protection from discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.1 So, while nondiscrimination against and employment
of disabled workers have been of concern for firms doing business with
the federal government for some time, it was not until the passage of
the ADA that all firms in the United States (employing 15 or more
people) would be held to the same standard regarding employment and
accommodation of individuals with disabilities.
In many ways individual states have taken the lead in providing
workplace opportunities for the disabled. By 1990, all states had
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passed antidiscrimination legislation covering employment by state
agencies and often employment by any firm doing business with the
state.2 In addition, nearly all states by that time covered private employers in some form or another, and many states covered all employment, including that by very small firms (fewer than 15 workers).
Common exclusions from the discrimination legislation included religious organizations, social clubs, family members, American Indian
tribes, and farm or domestic workers. Details of when each state
passed legislation related to treatment of the disabled in the workplace
and the exclusions of those laws are in Appendix D.
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the concern already expressed
at the state level about the employment opportunities of disabled workers, culminated in the passage of the ADA in 1990. This act was unlike
others before it, in that it provided for the civil rights of people with
disabilities in the same way that all citizens are protected against discrimination based on race, color, sex, national origin, age, and religion.
The ADA requires that employers treat workers, and potential workers,
with disabilities identically to those without disabilities, with regard to
hiring, compensation, and other aspects of employment. In addition,
employers must make reasonable efforts to accommodate the nature of
the worker’s disability in connection with the performance of the worker’s job. Owners of places of public accommodation are required to
provide facilities (e.g., entrances, elevators, bathrooms) fit for the disabled, and to provide services in such a way that people with disabilities are not restricted from receiving those services (e.g., requiring a
driver’s license as the only way to provide proof of identification discriminates against the vision impaired). Public accommodation also
includes equal access through telecommunication, such as access to the
Internet. While admittedly only a small part of the entire legislation,
the implications and impact of the labor market provisions (Title I) of
the ADA provide the focus of this book.
Any interpretation of the effect of the ADA or recommendations
for enhancements must take into account policies already in place that
may or may not influence a disabled worker’s labor market experience.
The Social Security Administration manages two cash payment programs for Americans with disabilities. Such programs are of great
concern regarding labor market analyses for two main reasons. First,
cash payment programs might crowd out labor market activity, and
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second, they may be structured in such a way that labor market participation is discouraged. The Social Security Disability Insurance Program (SSDI) provides benefits to workers who have been able to make
enough contributions through the social security Federal Insurance
Contributions Act (FICA) tax paid on their previous earnings. The
Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI) is available to disabled
Americans who have limited income and resources. The eligibility
rules for payments from these two programs differ, but they both require the applicant to be either not working or earning less than some
specified amount. Both programs include incentives to get recipients
back into the labor force. These incentives include a trial work period
where some or all of the payments are retained for a certain period of
time; continuation of Medicaid or Medicare even if cash payments have
ended because of high earnings; reimbursement of impairment-related
work expenses; exclusion of certain income from the earnings test if
set aside for future self-sufficiency, such as education or starting a
business; and referral and payment for vocational rehabilitation. Many
of these incentives were only adopted recently as part of the Ticket to
Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 (Public Law 106170).
The goals of the Ticket to Work initiative complement the goals of
the ADA. Whereas these work incentive programs are designed to
encourage the disabled to seek jobs and become self-sufficient, the
ADA is intended to provide an environment in which these efforts are
met with support and reasonable assistance.

POLICY ISSUES
The United States has a history of enacting legislation with strong
social content, expressing society’s ethics and morals. Child labor
laws and other civil rights legislation fall into this category. One could
argue that such laws are grounded in economic concerns. For example,
discrimination against workers with disabilities or against African
Americans robs our economy of the efficient allocation and use of
valuable resources. Also, with the prohibition of child labor, children
really have no other option but to attend school, raising the human
capital of our economy overall. While these arguments have merit in
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fact, it is also true that as a society we support these laws from an
emotional and moral level. For example, the 1991 Harris poll on Public
Attitudes toward People with Disabilities demonstrated that while most
people were not even aware that the ADA had been passed (62 percent),
they felt overwhelmingly (95 percent) that ‘‘Given how many difficulties disabled people face in their daily lives, the least society can do is
make an extra effort to improve things for them.’’3 In addition, 81
percent of those surveyed thought that there should be an affirmative
action program for people with disabilities. These are responses not
entirely driven by economic concerns.
When legislation is propelled by an evolution of ethical and moral
concerns, we must face the question of whether it serves as a statement
of where we (as a society) are rather than as a prediction of where
we are going.4 For example, the establishment of a minimum age for
employment (child labor laws) has been shown to have had little impact
on the decline of child labor in the early part of the 20th century
(Moehling 1999). The implication is that legislation of strong social
content, rather than precipitating social change, is often actually a response to social change. In other words, the ADA might merely serve
as a reflection of our moral and ethical beliefs rather than as a tool with
which to improve the condition of a segment of society. Some argue
that the ADA is ‘‘feel-good legislation that promises more than it delivers’’ (Jay 1990, p. 23). A major criticism is that the ADA is absent of
specifics necessary for effective compliance, particularly on the subject
of what constitutes ‘‘undue hardship,’’ which serves as the measure
of whether a firm must make the physical environment, service, or
employment ‘‘accessible.’’ Some interpret the refusal of Congress to
tackle the difficult issues that were sure to arise as indication that the
ADA’s primary function was merely to be a statement of our morals.
In addition, an amendment to the ADA that would have disallowed jury
trials and punitive damages for disabled victims of discrimination (an
amendment that would have been a clear sign that the ADA was not
meant to have any teeth), was only narrowly defeated (Jay 1990).
The implication, if the ADA serves merely as a statement of where
we are, is that no impact of the law will be detected because, for the
most part, we have already adopted the principles and practices laid
out by the legislation. This outcome, then, begs the question of
whether the ADA or child labor laws are necessary, or whether such
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legislation is simply an expensive declaration of our morals. Even
though one could argue that these laws might merely be statements of
something we already knew, an even stronger argument might be made
that public acknowledgment of a collective moral foundation serves an
important purpose, one beyond quantification in economic terms.5
These laws strongly proclaim our social values and provide a legal
mechanism with which to arrest the activities of those who have not
yet adopted those ethics.
In order to address whether the ADA merely serves as a statement
of where we are rather than as a prediction of where we are headed,
the analyses in this book will focus on two basic questions. First, how
are disabled workers faring (relative to nondisabled workers) at any
given point in time, and is their relative experience in the labor market
improving? Second, did the ADA have any discernible impact on the
relative experience of disabled workers? These questions will be asked
in relation to as many dimensions of the labor market experience as
possible.
The questioning does not stop with the analyses, however. If it is
discovered that the ADA has had or is having a positive impact on the
labor market experience of disabled workers, then the ADA is accomplishing what it was designed to do. If the ADA has not had a measurable effect on the relative labor market experience of disabled workers,
and if their experience still falls short of that of nondisabled workers,
then we may need to look toward additional or different legislation,
specifically targeted at improving those dimensions identified as the
most lacking.

FOCUS AND STRATEGY OF ANALYSES
This book is concerned with the labor market implications and
impact of the ADA. In addition to the multiple dimensions of the
potential effect of the ADA on disabled workers, there are at least as
many more ways in which the ADA influences the lives of all disabled
Americans; these other outcomes are not the subject of the present
discussion, but may in fact amount to a much greater overall impact
than that felt by the disabled in the labor market. The strategy of
analysis followed here for documenting the impact of the ADA on the
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labor market experience of disabled workers has been to assemble as
much information on as many dimensions of that experience as possible. The major contribution of the analyses that follow is the wideranging coverage and synthesis of a massive amount of information in
such a way as to make recommendations for policy. The emphasis has
not been on developing new ways to examine the labor market experience of the disabled, but to broaden that examination.
The focus is on labor demand issues, defining the environment that
the disabled might face. As a result, the analyses of employment and
wages, for example, will correspond to what a disabled person might
encounter upon entering the labor market. The conclusions will not be
conditional on the labor supply decisions of the disabled, but will take
those decisions into account in presenting unconditional results that
apply to the population of the disabled, instead of merely to the sample
(of workers) on which the estimates are obtained. Other analyses, such
as the incidence of voluntary part-time employment, job separation, or
job search experience, will be generalizable only to that population for
which the issues are relevant: the part-time employed, the employed
only, or the unemployed only. These sample limitations are legitimate
and logical given the population for which such questions are relevant.
It is important to remember that the purpose of the labor market
provisions of the ADA was to break down barriers to the disabled and
to improve their experiences in the labor market. Although perhaps
expected, the alteration of various voluntary behaviors (such as labor
force participation) was not the goal of these provisions. A fair analysis of the ADA should only involve an evaluation of what it was designed to do. Regardless of its intent, however, any policy can have
unintended consequences that should also be addressed.
Outline of the Book
Chapter 2 explores employment outcomes among the disabled.
Both joint labor force and employment and unconditional employment
probabilities are examined for the entire sample of disabled individuals, controlling for selection into the labor force. The availability of
firm size and the phased-in nature of the ADA are exploited in a differences-in-differences analysis. Results by type of disability are also
presented. The joint labor force participation and employment proba-
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bility for disabled persons declined relative to this joint outcome
among nondisabled individuals after the ADA was implemented. However, the unconditional (i.e., controlling for selection into the labor
market) employment probability did not change post-ADA, relative to
the experience of the nondisabled. The source of the deteriorating joint
outcome is explored in some depth. In addition, employment among
the disabled was found to shift more toward larger firms than did employment among nondisabled workers, suggesting that implementation
of the ADA and the financial ability (of larger firms) to accommodate
workers’ disabilities mattered in the employment experience of disabled workers.
Chapter 3 looks at the wages earned by disabled and nondisabled
workers. A pooled, cross-sectional analysis suggests that wages among
disabled workers fell post-ADA, relative to wages among the nondisabled. In addition, a standard decomposition of the wage differential
observed between disabled and nondisabled workers is performed. The
availability of benefits is also explored through a simple probit analysis. While the overall compensation experience of disabled workers is
found to be deteriorating relative to nondisabled workers (in both
wages and availability of employer-sponsored fringe benefits), the degree to which discrimination might be used to explain this differential
is also declining. It is found, however, that wages of disabled workers
explicitly covered by the ADA (based on the size of their employers)
have not changed post-ADA, relative to their noncovered counterparts,
suggesting the overall lower wages among the disabled are being driven
by more than accommodation costs.
A number of job quality issues are addressed in Chapter 4. First,
hours of work and the incidence of part-time employment and type of
part-time employment among disabled and nondisabled workers are
explored. Second, the distribution of workers across occupations and
industries is compared using a popular distributional index. Third, the
representation of disabled workers in high-growth and high-wage jobs
is evaluated. This chapter presents evidence that while the incidence
of part-time employment is increasing for disabled workers, relative to
nondisabled workers, the incidence of voluntary part-time employment
is driving that increase, particularly among workers with mental disorders. The degree of dissimilarity and the growth in dissimilarity in
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occupation and industry distributions of disabled and nondisabled
workers over the 1981–2000 period are striking. While showing some
improvement since 1992, this is of concern since disabled workers also
appear to be concentrated in low-growth, low-wage occupations.
Job separation and unemployment experiences of the disabled are
explored in Chapter 5. Results from a multinomial logit find that,
among individuals who have separated from their job, disabled workers
are more likely to have separated voluntarily and less likely to have
separated involuntarily than nondisabled workers. A similar analysis
then finds that, among the unemployed, disabled workers are more
likely to be reentrants and new entrants into the labor market than
nondisabled workers. A duration analysis shows that disabled job
seekers are searching on average three weeks longer before finding a
job than similar nondisabled persons, and that most of the difference
in observed search length is explained by differences in individual
characteristics. Taken together, these results suggest that while the
endowments or characteristics of disabled and nondisabled workers appear to be valued equally, employers may be going to greater lengths
to discern the fit of a disabled worker’s skill set with a particular job,
thus leading to longer searches, a better match, and less chance that a
separation is for involuntary reasons.
Chapter 6 explores the impact of state-level legislation on wages,
employment, and hours of disabled workers in different states. The
analyses in this chapter exploit the differential timing of protective
legislation across a number of states. The results are consistent and
support the findings from Chapters 2, 3, and 4 on these same issues.
Namely, wages decline and overall employment probabilities are unchanged among disabled workers, post-legislation, relative to nondisabled workers. In addition, part-time employment among disabled
workers increases post-legislation. These results suggest that the wage
and part-time employment effect of the ADA may have been much
greater if the state legislation had not already absorbed some if its
potential impact.
Chapter 7 synthesizes the results of the previous chapters around
policy implications and recommendations. It is suggested that three
directions be followed to further enhance the labor market experience
of disabled workers: 1) provide incentives to the disabled to enter the
labor force and relief to employers for the cost of accommodating these
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individuals; 2) expand the support of resources available for disabled
workers to increase their general human capital and ability to move
into high-paying occupations; and 3) provide mechanisms by which
employers and disabled workers can find each other and determine the
appropriateness of the employment match.
Data Details and Estimation Issues
The combined Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Earnings
files for the months of March, April, May, and June, for the years 1981
through 2000, were used to obtain demographic data, employment
status, earnings, details related to the respondent’s job, and location
information to control for local labor market conditions. These CPS
Annual Earnings files were matched with the March CPS survey for
each year to obtain data on disability status, other sources of income,
and labor market information available for the previous year. This
strategy resulted in a sample four times larger than any single month
of current labor market statistics, yielding greater confidence in the
precision of the results.
Some have questioned whether self-reported disability status (as in
the CPS) suffers from endogeneity (e.g., Parsons 1980; Haveman and
Wolfe 1984). For example, it may be the case that someone less likely
to enter the labor market or to be employed is also more likely to report
the presence of a disability (i.e., the disability indicator and error term
of the regression are not independent). Stern (1989) finds that ‘‘any
bias due to potential endogeneity is small’’ (p. 363). Of course, endogeneity may be more of a concern since the passage of the ADA. As
will be addressed in Chapter 2, endogeneity among the population as a
whole may be a greater problem than among only labor force participants (also see Kreider 1999). Additional criticism has been lobbed at
the use of the traditional ‘‘work disability’’ measure contained in the
CPS for drawing conclusions about the overall experience of the disabled or the effectiveness of the ADA. Some argue that requiring a
disability to be ‘‘work limiting’’ can be too narrow (Kruse and Schur
2002; McNeil 2000). Others contend that not appropriately defining
what a work-limiting disability is results in too broad of an inclusion
of respondents (Hale 2001 and Kirchner 1996). Yet, others provide
evidence supporting the representative nature of the CPS for monitor-
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ing outcomes among the disabled (Burkhauser, Daly, and Houtenville
2001). It is because of this controversy that confirmatory evidence of
the CPS results is sought from an additional data source. Regardless,
the reader should be aware that this book makes use of ‘‘work-limiting
disability’’ as the identifier of a disabled person. In addition, it is
expected that when focusing on labor market outcomes, those who
report a work-limiting disability are the most likely to feel the greatest
impacts of the ADA, should they exist.
Table 1.1 reports the potential sample sizes for each year obtained
from the CPS. Actual sample sizes for each analysis may differ because of missing data or the use of specific subsamples (e.g., the unemployed only).6 While the sample sizes vary somewhat from year to
year, the proportion of disabled to nondisabled remains fairly constant,
and most analyses benefit from roughly 1,500 disabled workers and
50,000 nondisabled workers.
Table 1.1 Sample Sizes for Merged CPS Data Files
Disabled
Year

Total

All

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

100,291
94,351
93,720
94,683
95,075
90,341
88,507
85,371
85,224
93,625
92,958
90,520
90,056
88,674
77,674
77,188
78,322
77,583
77,487
79,242

9,818
9,617
9,119
9,654
9,832
8,931
8,513
7,811
7,913
8,745
8,681
8,547
8,842
9,709
8,654
8,396
8,418
7,796
7,625
7,917

Nondisabled

Labor force
participants Employed
2,022
1,962
1,788
1,922
1,931
1,848
1,805
1,697
1,713
1,919
1,833
1,913
1,950
1,810
1,507
1,535
1,609
1,468
1,392
1,488

1,744
1,661
1,490
1,661
1,648
1,581
1,560
1,493
1,533
1,692
1,598
1,614
1,684
1,602
1,336
1,379
1,456
1,332
1,266
1,358

All
90,473
84,734
84,601
85,029
85,243
81,410
79,994
77,560
77,311
84,880
84,277
81,973
81,214
78,965
69,020
68,792
69,904
69,787
69,862
71,325

Labor force
participants Employed
60,873
57,006
56,606
57,591
58,111
55,604
54,829
52,258
53,364
58,896
58,172
56,617
55,926
55,341
48,217
48,356
49,437
49,403
49,406
50,825

56,656
52,015
51,114
53,507
54,192
51,935
51,591
49,625
50,789
56,005
54,558
52,779
52,316
52,246
45,775
45,892
47,112
47,370
47,542
48,999
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Since the ADA (and similar legislation) was designed to improve
the labor market conditions of a group of workers, the analyses presented here will be almost purely cross-sectional. The result is a comprehensive comparison of the labor market experiences of one group
of workers (the disabled) with that of another group of workers (the
nondisabled). When making comparisons across groups of people,
there will surely always be exceptions to the norm. It is important to
recognize, however, that policy is rarely designed around exceptions.
The use of individual data in the analyses does allow for control of
identifiable individual characteristics (other than the group-defining
characteristic of being disabled) in the determination of workers’ experiences. The premise, of course, is that identical disabled and nondisabled workers should have the same labor market experience. This
presupposition, which holds in making any comparisons across groups
of workers (i.e., men versus women, or blacks versus whites), is more
problematic in making comparisons across disability status; there are
likely more unobservable characteristics across disability status than,
for example, across gender. In addition, since most of the analyses
consider the experience of those in the labor market, or at least control
for selection into the labor market, no restriction is imposed on age.7
For each of the analyses, it is important to distinguish any changes
in outcomes that might have resulted from the enactment of the ADA
from any long-term trend. In other words, changes in the labor market
experiences of workers with disabilities may reflect an evolving social
awareness that culminated in the passage of the ADA, rather than the
other way around. Consequently, this book documents labor market
outcomes from 1981 through 2000.8 In addition, since a major overhaul of the CPS questionnaire was undertaken in 1994, care is taken to
differentiate any ADA impact from a potential statistical artifact (see
Polivka 1996).
Also, due to the complicated matching across one to four months
of the CPS, all analyses have been performed unweighted. According
to Wooldridge (1999), ‘‘stratification based on exogenous variables
does not cause any problems: estimators that ignore the stratification
are consistent and asymptotically normal, and the usual variance matrix
estimators are consistent’’ (p. 1386). Since stratification in the CPS
sampling design is based on exogenous variables (geographic and demographic), and the attrition that results from the matching procedure
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is likely unsystematic, weights should be unnecessary (for further evidence on this point, see DuMouchel and Duncan 1983; Manski and
McFadden 1981). In addition, any effect of stratification on the estimation can be accounted for by including indicator variables that correspond to the strata (Ginther and Hayes 2001), so demographic variables
(such as disability status) should control for any observable effect sampling based on those characteristics might have (either initially or
through attrition of matching). Any systematic attrition or sample loss
due to unobservables will not be accounted for, but also cannot be
corrected using weights.

DISABLED AMERICANS
As a first look at the data used for the analyses in the following
chapters, Figure 1.1 depicts the percentage of the sample in each year
and the percentage of workers in each year indicating a work-limiting
disability.9 The vertical lines correspond to the phase-in years of the
ADA. It is of interest to know whether there is any noticeable change
Figure 1.1 Percentage of Sample and of Workers in the CPS Data Set
Indicating a Work-Limiting Disability, 1981–2000
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in the reporting of having a work-limiting disability, particularly on
the part of workers.
Over the time period from 1981 to 2000, an average of 10 percent
of the entire sample indicated having a work-limiting disability.10
There is a significant 1 percentage point difference between the averages prior to and including 1991, and 1994 and later.11 Kreider (1999)
finds evidence of substantial overreporting of limitations by nonworkers, a behavior which may be enhanced in the presence of protective
legislation. It has also been found that the passage of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)
in 1996, which essentially put a time limit on welfare payments, resulted in a movement of qualified recipients from the welfare rolls to
SSI (Lewin Group 1999). The Lewin Group found ‘‘a very substantial
flow of program participants from AFDC to SSI during the pre-reform
period’’ (p. ES-3). The ‘‘pre-reform’’ period would coincide with the
rise in the percentage reporting being disabled between 1993 and 1995
in Figure 1.1. However, the percentage has been declining fairly steadily since 1995. This issue of increased reporting of a work-limiting
disability among the entire population is taken up in greater detail in
Chapter 2, and again points to the potential endogeneity problems inherent in using a self-reported disability classification.
The proportion of workers indicating a work-limiting disability has
remained fairly constant at about 3 percent across the entire time span;
there is no significant difference in the 1981–1991 and 1994–2000
periods. So, while heightened awareness of the ADA and other program changes may have increased the reporting of work-limiting disabilities among the population, the primary individuals of focus for
this study, i.e., workers, do not seem to have changed their reporting
behavior in a way that might be expected to bias the analysis. In addition, given that the reporting percentage of the population has begun to
decline again, and that the share of workers seems unaffected, it is safe
to say that CPS survey design changes that occurred in 1994 do not
seem to have impacted the reporting of those with work-limiting disabilities.
Comparing raw averages of disabled and nondisabled workers
across the time period, one can see that there are some significant demographic differences among these categories of workers. Table 1.2
reports averages across time for a variety of demographics for disabled
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Table 1.2 Means of Select Demographic Variables for Disabled and
Nondisabled Workers over Entire Time Period, CPS, 1981–2000
Variable

Disabled workers

Nondisabled workers

Hours of work
Female ⳱ 1
Single ⳱ 1
Nonwhite ⳱ 1
College degree ⳱ 1a
Midwest ⳱ 1
South ⳱ 1
West ⳱ 1
Norteast ⳱ 1
Age

33.97
0.47
0.48
0.13
0.10
0.26
0.29
0.24
0.21
43.43

38.01
0.48
0.40
0.13
0.18
0.25
0.30
0.22
0.23
37.49

a

Coding of education changed substantially in 1992; these averages reflect the average
across years 1992–2000.

and nondisabled workers. The distribution of workers across occupations and industries is of interest, as well, but that will be explored in
great detail in Chapter 4. While females and nonwhites seem to be
equally represented among disabled and nondisabled workers, and each
group of workers appears to be equally distributed geographically,
there are some notable differences in demographics. Disabled workers,
on average, work fewer hours, are less likely to have a college degree,
are older, and are more likely to be single. While means across time
give us some idea of the relative differences between worker categories, they tell us nothing about trends.
One trend of particular interest is the change in average hours per
week over time among workers. Figure 1.2 depicts the average hours
of disabled and nondisabled workers for each year between 1981 and
2000. While the average weekly hours of nondisabled workers rise
fairly steadily over this time period from 37.5 in 1981 to 38.7 in 2000,
the hours of disabled workers fall from an average of 34.7 in 1981 to
33.8 in 2000. Since a dramatic part of this decline occurred after 1992,
one might suggest that the ADA was a factor. Full-time jobs may be
less available to disabled workers; the ADA may have induced employers to be more flexible regarding hours of work in accommodating a
worker’s disability; or workers with more serious disabilities, unable
to work full-time, may have begun to enter the labor market (Kaye
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Figure 1.2 Average Weekly Hours of Disabled and Nondisabled Workers,
CPS, 1981–2000
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2002). Issues related to differences in part-time employment across
disability status will be evaluated in greater detail in Chapter 4.

SURVEY OF INCOME AND PROGRAM PARTICIPATION
(SIPP)
Data from the SIPP were used to construct a sample to supplement
the analyses from the CPS. The goal in employing the SIPP is twofold.
First, it provides validation of the results obtained using the CPS. Second, given that the SIPP allows identification of the nature of a respondent’s disability, some questions regarding the importance of the type
of disability can be addressed. The samples from the SIPP have been
constructed to match those from the CPS as closely as possible (e.g.,
regarding variable definitions, etc.).12 While providing more detail related to the respondent’s disability, the SIPP does not provide as long
or as large a data set with which to study labor market experience.
Table 1.3 provides sample size details for the SIPP samples constructed
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Table 1.3 Sample Sizes for SIPP Data Files
Disabled
Year

Total

All

Labor force
participants

1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

18,290
33,884
34,284
16,274
34,010
51,140
76,496
73,831
50,384
23,753
57,625
46,914

2,102
3,939
3,995
1,826
3,788
5,596
8,231
8,112
5,495
2,610
5,865
4,706

759
1,470
1,476
651
1,404
1,998
2,936
2,839
1,881
918
2,049
1,584

Nondisabled
Employed
650
1,297
1,324
579
1,233
1,755
2,570
2,442
1,680
829
1,871
1,470

All

Labor force
participants

Employed

16,188
29,945
30,289
14,448
30,222
45,544
68,265
65,719
44,889
21,143
51,760
42,208

12,036
22,278
22,623
10,949
22,771
34,392
52,105
49,861
34,338
16,313
41,158
33,718

11,191
20,932
21,579
10,505
21,629
32,328
48,582
46,694
32,529
15,550
39,357
32,558

for each year. Due to the sampling structure of the SIPP, the sample
sizes varied from just over 16,000 to over 76,000. However, as Figure
1.3 illustrates, the representation of the disabled within the whole sample and within the working subsample has remained consistent, although slightly declining over the period.13 In addition, there does not
seem to be any shift in the trends during the ADA phase-in period.
The percentages of the sample and of workers indicating a worklimiting disability are slightly higher in the SIPP than in the CPS. This
occurs for two reasons. SIPP respondents are given two opportunities
to answer a disability question positively. In addition, since the sample
came from Wave 2 (the second survey within a panel), the respondent
is reminded if he or she indicated a disability in Wave 1 (the first survey), increasing the chances for a positive response (also see Kruse and
Schur 2002). The percentages reflected in Figure 1.3 are consistent
with those found by other researchers using the SIPP (e.g., DeLeire
2000; Kruse and Schur 2002).
The nature of a person’s disability is placed into one of 30 different
categories (including ‘‘other’’). In order to be able to include controls
for type of disability, these categories were combined to correspond to
the groupings used by the Social Security Administration.14 Aggregation was necessary due to category size limitations; the four groups
included as controls were: 1) musculoskeletal systems and special
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Figure 1.3 Percentage of Sample and of Workers in the SIPP Data Set
Indicating a Work-Limiting Disability, 1986–1997
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senses; 2) internal systems; 3) neurological systems and mental disorders; and 4) other. Figure 1.4 presents the distribution of all disabled
individuals and disabled workers across these categorizations. The
largest group by type of disability contains those with musculoskeletal
and special senses disabilities; the internal systems category is generally the next largest, followed by neurological and mental disorders
(typically), and other. One can observe a slight upward trend in the
Figure 1.4 Distribution of Disabled Individuals across Disability Type,
SIPP, 1986–1997
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neurological and mental disorders classification, while the proportion
for internal systems has declined slightly, and that for musculoskeletal
and special senses has remained fairly consistent over the time period.
These four classifications will be used to determine whether the labor
market experience varies across type of disability, an important consideration when trying to mold policy to impact those most affected.

Notes
1. Further details of the history and provision of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 can
be found in Ellner and Bender (1980).
2. See Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1989).
3. Data provided by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of
Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut. By 1999, 67 percent of those surveyed by the
same polling group had heard of the ADA.
4. This issue has often been raised by historians. For example, see Landes and
Solmon (1972). Donohue and Heckman (1991) also empirically address the subject with regard to civil rights legislation. They conclude that federal civil rights
legislation did play a major role in the progress of blacks beginning in 1965.
5. Some have even suggested that our analyses of the labor market impact of the
ADA are misguided, and that attempts to quantify an impact in the labor market
are merely arrogant efforts to justify our assumptions about how the labor market
should operate (see Schwochau and Blanck 2000).
6. Appendix A contains additional information pertaining to the matching and merging of the CPS files across months and concerning other details learned in the
process.
7. The exceptions are analyses of employment where age is restricted to 15–65
years.
8. Prior to 1981, identification of a disability in the CPS was made only in the
context of why a respondent was not working.
9. See Table C.1, in Appendix C, for percentages used to generate Figure 1.1.
10. The percentages of the entire sample that are disabled are slightly higher than
those reported by Burkhauser, Daly, and Houtenville (2000, 2001). This is likely
the result of the matching technique employed here, allowing for a much larger
sample, and thus greater opportunity to be classified as disabled.
11. The Z statistic corresponding to the hypothesis of equal means over these time
periods is 3.18, leading to a rejection of the null hypothesis of equality at the 99
percent confidence level.
12. Details of the construction of the SIPP samples are contained in Appendix B.
13. There are two check variables in the topical module used to identify a worklimiting disability for the 1986–1993 panels. The 1996 panel has only one check
variable, which may explain the slightly lower incidence of a work-limiting disability in the 1996 and 1997 SIPP samples. Kruse and Schur (2002) make use of
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the functional limitations module (rather than the work disability module used
here) and note a similar decline in disability percentages in later years due to
question placement in that module. These nuances in the survey design among
panels are clearly important and raise, once again, the concerns associated with
using a self-reported disability indicator.
14. The Social Security Administration’s listing of impairments for disability status
purposes can be found on the Internet at ⬍http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/cfr20/
404/404-ap09.htm⬎. The mental disorder category does include those classified
as mentally retarded. The mentally retarded group is not broken out into a separate category in order to be consistent with the classification used by the Social
Security Administration, to correspond with the groupings used by others (e.g.,
DeLeire 2000; Kruse and Schur 2002), and to preserve reasonable sample sizes
within the categories. The employment and wage analyses were reestimated with
mental retardation as a separate category, and none of the results or conclusions
changed.

2
Employment
(Co-authored with Ludmila Rovba)
Employment levels of the disabled are affected by both labor supply and labor demand issues. Individuals suffering from a functional
disability will also experience a larger cost to entering the labor market
as, holding all else constant, greater effort or sacrifices must be made
relative to nondisabled workers. The net result is that the reservation
wage (the wage at which a person is willing to enter the labor market)
for disabled individuals will be higher than for the nondisabled, and
fewer disabled people will choose to enter the labor market, ceteris
paribus. In addition, a person’s functional disability will be more
likely to render him or her less productive than an otherwise identical,
nondisabled person. Consequently, the disabled worker will be less
likely to qualify for a given job and therefore less likely to be hired.
Merely a perception of lower productivity or a greater difficulty of
predicting a disabled worker’s productivity will reduce the likelihood
of the individual being hired. So, for both supply and demand reasons,
the employment levels of disabled workers would be expected to be
lower than those of nondisabled workers.1 Figure 2.1 presents evidence
from the CPS consistent with this prediction.2 The proportion of disabled individuals employed in any given year is at least 44 percentage
points lower than the share of nondisabled individuals employed in that
year. Other observations are worth mentioning in comparing employment percentages. The recession dips of the early 1980s and early
1990s are obvious for the nondisabled, but not nearly as severe (in
percentage terms) for the disabled. In addition, the employment percentage for the nondisabled has made a fairly steady climb over the
entire period compared with the relatively stagnant, then declining, employment percentage of the disabled.
Legislation that potentially affects the costs of either labor force
participation or of hiring a group of workers can be expected to impact
the employment levels of that group. The ADA, through its required
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Figure 2.1 Percentage Employed of Disabled and Nondisabled
Individuals, CPS, 1981–2000
80
70

Nondisabled

60
50
40
30
20
10

Disabled

0
1981

1983

1985

(a) ADA Enactment
(b) ADA Phase I
(c) ADA Phase II

1987

1989

1991
(a)

1993
(b)

1995

1997

1999

(c)

NOTE: Individuals in this figure refer to all people, regardless of labor force participation status.

accommodations, can be anticipated to reduce the cost to a disabled
individual of entering the labor force, thus promoting labor force participation.3 It might also be argued that greater accommodation of a
disabled worker’s limitations will result in enhanced productivity of
that disabled worker, thus increasing the likelihood of employment.
(This will be the case, however, only if employers are able to accurately
predict the cost and productivity gains of such accommodations.) If
those required accommodations, however, are ‘‘binding’’ in the sense
that the employer would not undertake them in the absence of the ADA,
it must be the case that increased productivity of the disabled worker
does not offset the cost of implementing those accommodations.4 In
other words, the value of the productivity gains is not as great as the
cost of accommodation. This may result in decreased employment
probabilities of disabled workers, since the cost of hiring a disabled
worker has increased. Referring back to Figure 2.1, there does not
seem to be any noticeable, or permanent, change in the employment
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percentages for disabled workers around the time of passage of the
ADA, although there is a slight drop around the second phase-in period.
This chapter explores more fully the employment probabilities of disabled and nondisabled workers between 1981 and 2000, controlling for
observable individual characteristics and labor force participation.
The issue of joint versus unconditional employment differences is
explored through estimating a bivariate probit model, controlling for
selection into the labor market. This is followed by an examination of
how employment has changed across size of firm. The analyses indicate that, at worst, employment probabilities of disabled workers have
not deteriorated relative to nondisabled workers, and that employment
of disabled workers has shifted from medium and small firms to large
firms.

UNCONDITIONAL AND JOINT PROBABILITIES
The labor market provisions of the ADA were motivated by a desire to eliminate barriers to disabled individuals that might exist in the
labor market. An appropriate assessment of the success of the ADA in
this endeavor would involve evaluation of unconditional employment
outcomes. In other words, the question to be answered is whether there
has been any progress in employment outcomes for the disabled person
drawn from random, controlling for the likelihood that he or she is
a labor force participant. The resulting probability of interest is an
unconditional probability of employment. An alternative question,
which has been the source of recent condemnation of the employment
impacts of the ADA, is whether there has been any progress in employment among all disabled people. This second question involves evaluation of a joint outcome: what is the probability of entering the labor
force and being employed? While the impact of the ADA on labor
force participation may be of interest from a social, resource, and demographic perspective, the unconditional probability will tell us more
about the barriers disabled workers face, which is the focus of the
employment provisions of the ADA. Consideration of the joint outcome (or, employment among all disabled people) confounds conclusions regarding the employment impact of the ADA with labor supply
decisions.
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When considering the unconditional probability, one must control
for unobservable characteristics that might both affect the labor force
participation decision and the employment outcome. Without controlling for this potential self-selection, any differences measured in the
employment probabilities may actually be confounded by variations
between characteristics that affect the labor supply decision of disabled
and nondisabled persons. If these characteristics change in a systematic way over time, the problem is magnified. A bivariate probit model
with selection will be estimated in order to obtain information on unconditional employment outcomes and to control for selection into the
labor market at the same time. The bivariate specification allows for
the two outcomes (labor force participation and employment) to be
impacted by the same unobservable factors (e.g., motivation). The
selectivity part of the model is merely a recognition that we do not get
to see the employment outcome unless the person is in the labor market
to begin with, and that those we observe in the labor market may have
systematically different employment outcomes than those not in the
labor market. Correcting for selectivity allows us to make inferences
for anyone from the population, not just those found in the labor market; this is what makes the probability unconditional.5
The following model defines the relationship assumed between
labor force participation of person i (lfpi), employment (empi), and
individual characteristics that are believed to affect the labor force participation decision (X1i) and the employment outcome (X2i):
(2.1)

lfpi ⳱ ␣1 Ⳮ ␥1⬘X1i Ⳮ ␤1disablei Ⳮ ⑀1i
⳱

(2.2)

再

1 if person i is in the labor force
0 otherwise

empi ⳱ ␣2 Ⳮ ␥2⬘X2i Ⳮ ␤2disablei Ⳮ ⑀2i
⳱

再

1 if person i is employed
0 otherwise

disablei is equal to 1 if person i is disabled, 0 otherwise, and ⑀1i and
⑀2i are distributed as a bivariate normal with means equal to 0, variances
equal to 1, and correlation equal to . In addition, of course, empi is
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only observed if lfpi ⳱ 1.6 X1i and X2i both include age; age squared;
female, nonwhite, education, and regional dummies; and state unemployment rate. The labor force participation equation regressors (X1i)
also include nonlabor income, marital status, and a worked-last-year
indicator. The employment equation regressors (X2i) also include number of weeks worked last year. The impact of having a work-limiting
disability on employment, then, is determined by calculating the probability of interest for each person (using the estimated parameter coefficients, ␣1, ␣2, ␥1, ␥2, ␤1, and ␤2), varying the disability index between
0 and 1, then averaging the difference across the sample.7 The model is
estimated for each year separately, and the marginal impact of having a
work-limiting disability is calculated.8 The significance of having a
work-limiting disability is determined from the significance of the estimated coefficient. Figure 2.2 reflects the marginal effect of having a
work-limiting disability on the predicted joint probability of labor force
participation and employment in each year.9
The impact of having a work-limiting disability on the joint labor
force and employment probability intensifies (becomes more negative),
rather dramatically, in 1994, corresponding to the second phase of
the ADA. The marginal effect increases from an average of ⳮ15 percentage points prior to 1994 to an average of ⳮ19 percentage points
Figure 2.2 Impact of Disability on Joint Labor Force Participation and
Employment Probabilities, CPS, 1981–2000
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between 1994 and 2000. In other words, having a work-limiting disability decreased an individual’s joint probability of being in the labor
force and employed by 4 percentage points more after 1994 than it did
prior to 1994. This dramatic relative decline in the joint probability
for the disabled is the result on which DeLeire (2000) and Acemoglu
and Angrist (2001) base their warnings regarding the ADA.
Breaking the joint probability into its employment and labor force
participation components, it becomes clear that this salient change in
1994 is driven by decreases in labor force participation among the
disabled. Figure 2.3 plots the predicted (unconditional) employment
and labor force participation probabilities for the disabled alone using
the same parameter estimates that generated Figure 2.2. After increasing fairly steadily, the predicted labor force participation rate declines
in 1994 and stays below 1986 levels. At the same time, and with the
exception of the recession years of 1991–1993, the predicted unconditional employment probability among the disabled has increased fairly
steadily.
Figure 2.3 Separate Predictions of Employment and Labor Force
Participation Probabilities for the Disabled, CPS, 1987–2000
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Again, in evaluating the barriers facing disabled workers, change
in the unconditional employment probability is a more appropriate
measure than the change in the joint labor force and employment outcome. Consequently, the condemnation of the employment impact
of the ADA by DeLeire (2000) and Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) is
misplaced, since both of these analyses confound their evaluation of
employment changes with changes in labor supply decisions. The results in Figure 2.3 show that the decline in employment probabilities
among all disabled people is labor-supply driven and does not reflect
an increase in employment barriers for individuals with disabilities.
One may argue that the disabled have decreased their labor supply
behavior in response to a real or perceived change in employment probabilities (demonstrating a potential ‘‘feedback effect’’), but the predicted unconditional employment probabilities are not consistent with
this view.10
It may be the case, however, that the condemnation of the ADA by
recent studies should be aimed at its apparent impact on labor force
participation. For example, if the ADA resulted in lower wages for the
disabled (their employment has now become more expensive through
required accommodations), it is possible that the wage would fall
below the reservation wage of a significant number of disabled labor
force participants, causing them to drop out of the labor market. It
may also be the case that the severity of disabilities has been growing
over time, resulting in declining labor force participation rates (Kaye
2002). The next section explores this drop in labor force participation
rates among the disabled in greater detail.

EXPLAINING THE DECLINE IN LABOR FORCE
PARTICIPATION RATES
Even if the ADA has not had a negative employment impact but
has inadvertently discouraged the disabled from seeking employment,
there would be a concern worthy of further policy consideration. The
disabled and nondisabled populations can be represented in the following chart:
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In labor
force

Not in
labor force

Nondisabled

A

B

Disabled

C

D

Cells A through D contain a given number of people at any given time
period. A decrease in the disabled labor force participation rate (lfprd)
corresponds to a decline in the ratio C/(CⳭD). This ratio can decline
if C decreases and/or if D increases.11 If C falls, these people must go
somewhere; it is most likely that they either go to A (stay in the labor
force but change their identification to nondisabled), or go to D (keep
their identification as disabled, but leave the labor force). It is this
latter possibility that is of potential concern. Although the ADA was
not designed as a policy to necessarily increase the labor force participation rate among the disabled, a precipitous drop in such participation,
even remotely attributable to the ADA, is considered by many as undesirable. The lfprd may also fall, however, as a result of an increase in
D. Again, the increase in D must come from somewhere; the most
likely candidates are C (disabled leaving the labor force) or B (nondisabled, nonparticipants in the labor force changing their identity to disabled). The latter (movement from B to D) is what might result, for
example, from a shift of (nonparticipant) welfare recipients away from
welfare programs and into disability programs; this movement following the reform of welfare has been documented (the Lewin Group
1999; also see Davies, Iams, and Rupp 2000). Greater effort to be
classified (and identified) as disabled might also result from increased
generosity of the disability programs themselves (see Autor and Duggan 2001; Bound and Waidmann 2002).12 This could be consistent
with the finding by Kreider (1999) that nonworkers substantially overreport a work limitation.
So, the question is, which is it? Are the disabled moving out of
the labor force (from C to D) or are more nonparticipants identifying
themselves as disabled (from B to D)? One way to get an indication
of the movement across these cells is to evaluate the trends in the
percentages represented in each cell. These results are depicted in the
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following chart. The percentage in each cell represents the growth, or
decline, experienced within that cell. The cells exhaust the population,
so the changes sum to zero.13
In labor
force

Not in
labor force

Nondisabled

Ⳮ0.1504**
(A)

ⳮ0.2309**
(B)

Disabled

ⳮ0.0225**
(C)

Ⳮ0.1030*
(D)

** ⳱ significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
* ⳱ significant at the 90 percent confidence level.

The largest net change in the cells was movement of the nondisabled out of the nonparticipant category (cell B). The coefficient indicates that the nondisabled, nonparticipant percentage declined an
average of about 0.23 percentage points per year between 1990 and
2000. Even if the entire increase in cell A (nondisabled labor force
participants) came from cell B, that still means that the overwhelming
bulk of the increase in cell D (disabled nonparticipants) came from cell
B as well, not cell C. In fact, the smallest net cell change was among
the disabled labor force participants. This result provides strong evidence that the observed decline in the lfprd was not the result of the
disabled fleeing the labor force but was most likely due to the reidentification of some nonparticipants from nondisabled to disabled (movement from B to D). While providing an explanation for the decline in
lfprd, this movement from cell B to cell D is a reminder of the criticism of using self-reported disability status in statistical analyses. This
also suggests that endogeneity will be less of a concern for analyses
that focus exclusively on labor force participants in evaluating the labor
market experience of the disabled (using a self-reported measure of
disability). In other words, there is less movement across disability
status among labor market participants than among nonparticipants. In
addition, these results indicate that the observed decline in the lfprd
should not be considered as casting a shadow on the measured impacts
of the ADA on employment.
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POOLED, CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS
Along with cross-sectional analyses, an analysis across time is performed to help quantify any difference in predicted probabilities of
employment between disabled and nondisabled individuals after the
ADA relative to before the ADA. The strategy used to accomplish this
is to estimate a cross-sectional, time-series bivariate probit model with
dummy variables representing whether the observation shows up in the
data pre-ADA or post-ADA and whether the observation is a disabled
or nondisabled person. These dummy variables are also interacted to
determine whether being disabled had any greater impact on employment after the ADA than before the ADA, relative to the experience of
a nondisabled person.14 While this type of pooled, cross-sectional analysis has been applied by many researchers (for example, Card 1992;
Gruber 1994 and 1996; Zveglich and Rodgers 1996; and Hamermesh
and Trejo 2000), the technique also has its critics (such as Heckman
1996). The primary criticism of this approach is that it is impossible
to control for unobserved changes in the environment that occurred at
the same time as the event of interest. For example, the second phase
of the ADA occurred in 1994. This was also when the CPS underwent
a major overhaul, and there is no way to disentangle these two events.
In addition, the economy began its longest-running expansion in recent
history at the same time that the ADA was being phased in, which
could potentially confound any measurable impact of the ADA through
this estimation strategy. One advantage of the analysis here is that the
CPS survey changes should not have a differential impact on the disabled and nondisabled (as the changes did not affect measurement or
classification by disability),15 and general business cycle activity
should essentially impact the disabled and nondisabled in relatively
the same proportions.16 Nonetheless, the state unemployment rate is
included as a regressor in order to capture any general business cycle
influences.
The empirical model looks just like the bivariate probit with selection estimated in one year, except with the additional time-period
dummy variables:
(2.3)

lfpi ⳱ ␣1 Ⳮ ␥1⬘X1i Ⳮ ␤1disablei Ⳮ 1posti
Ⳮ 1disablei ⳯ posti Ⳮ ⑀1i
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(2.4)

empi ⳱ ␣2 Ⳮ ␥2⬘X2i Ⳮ ␤2disablei Ⳮ 2posti
Ⳮ 2disablei ⳯ posti Ⳮ ⑀2i.

Again, lfpi ⳱ 1 if person i is in the labor force, 0 otherwise, and empi
is not observed unless lfpi ⳱ 1. disablei is equal to 1 if person i is
disabled, 0 otherwise; posti is equal to 1 if person i is observed in 1992
or later; X1i and X2i include individual demographic characteristics; and
⑀1i and ⑀2i are distributed as a bivariate normal with means equal to 0,
variances equal to 1, and correlation equal to .
In this framework, the affected group (the disabled) is controlled
for by a dummy variable indicating whether the individual has a worklimiting disability (disable), and the time period is controlled for by a
dummy variable indicating whether the ADA had been implemented
yet or not (post); 1 and 2 are the estimated parameter coefficients
for the time-period dummies. Given the nonlinearity of the bivariate
probit estimation procedure, a single parameter coefficient does not tell
us the additional impact the ADA had on the difference in employment
probabilities between the disabled and nondisabled. The difference in
the impact of having a work-limiting disability on employment across
the two time periods can be calculated by evaluating the probabilities
of interest for each person, varying the disable and post dummy variables, then taking the difference between these probabilities, and averaging this difference across the sample.17 The significance of the
coefficient on the interacted disable ⳯ post (1, and 2) will, however,
yield significance levels of the calculated marginal effects.
The decision of when one would expect the ADA to have its strongest impact (i.e., how to define post) is debatable. One might expect
some impact when the ADA was enacted (1990). However, employers
were not required to respond until 1992 (for employers with 25 or more
employees) and 1994 (for employers with 15 or more employees). The
year 1992 was chosen for defining post since that is the first year of
enforcement of the law. Table 2.1 details the regression results.
The coefficients on disable ⳯ post presented in Table 2.1 are
consistent with the conclusions drawn from Figure 2.2. Namely, labor
force participation among the disabled declined significantly after implementation of the ADA, relative to labor force participation among
the nondisabled. In addition, while all other regressors contribute significantly to explaining employment (all at the 99 percent confidence
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Table 2.1 Labor Force Participation and Employment Bivariate Probit
with Selection Results, CPS, Combined Years 1981–2000

Regressor
Intercept
Age (00)
Age2 (0000)
Female⳱1
Nonwhite⳱1
High school grad⳱1
Some college⳱1
College grad⳱1
Advanced degree⳱1
Central city⳱1
Midwest⳱1
South⳱1
West⳱1
Single household⳱1
Nonlabor income (000000)
Worked last year⳱1
Weeks worked last year (00)
State unemployment rate (0)
disable⳱1

Labor force
participation
equation
ⳮ2.9988***
(0.0152)
13.3928***
(0.0742)
ⳮ16.6844***
(0.0905)
ⳮ0.4651***
(0.0032)
ⳮ0.0176***
(0.0045)
0.2094***
(0.0041)
0.1127***
(0.0046)
0.2754***
(0.0053)
0.3378***
(0.0082)
0.0398***
(0.0051)
0.0530***
(0.0045)
0.0196***
(0.0042)
ⳮ0.0233
(0.0046)
0.2148***
(0.0036)
ⳮ16.6473***
(0.2922)
2.0763***
(0.0035)
—
ⳮ0.0901***
(0.0076)
ⳮ0.7624***
(0.0080)

Employment
equation
0.6421***
(0.0215)
ⳮ1.3265***
(0.1176)
2.2159***
(0.1544)
0.1811***
(0.0047)
ⳮ0.2393***
(0.0058)
0.0762***
(0.0061)
0.2076***
(0.0067)
0.3730***
(0.0083)
0.3479***
(0.0134)
ⳮ0.0321***
(0.0070)
0.0337***
(0.0065)
0.0813***
(0.0064)
0.0218***
(0.0067)
—
—
—
3.2187***
(0.0151)
ⳮ0.6357***
(0.0103)
ⳮ0.2012***
(0.0143)

Employment 33

Table 2.1 (continued)

Regressor
post (year⳱1992 or later)⳱1
disable⳯post⳱1

Labor force
participation
equation

Employment
equation

0.0677***
(0.0035)
ⳮ0.1706***
(0.0120)

ⳮ0.0139***
(0.0051)
ⳮ0.0298
(0.0225)

Rho

0.0371***
(0.0065)
ⳮ596,816
1,359,885

Log-likelihood
Number of observations

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** ⳱ significant at the 99 percent confidence level. Notation of, for example, (00)
indicates regressor has been scaled by dividing by 100.

level), being disabled after ADA implementation is not one of them;
the disabled are no more or less likely to be employed than the nondisabled, post-ADA relative to pre-ADA. In other words, the ADA has
not changed the relative employment probability between disabled and
nondisabled workers.18
Table 2.2 translates the parameter coefficients in Table 2.1 into
marginal effects. These marginal effects indicate that the employment
probability of disabled labor force participants, relative to nondisabled
labor force participants, declines at most 0.6 of a percentage point post-

Table 2.2 Change in Marginal Effect of Disability on Labor Force
Participation and Employment Probabilities
Probability
(lfp⳱1)
Before
ADA

After
ADA

Probability
(emp⳱1)
Before
ADA

After
ADA

Nondisabled
0.7284
0.7397
0.8592
0.8569
Disabled
0.5693
0.5431
0.8233
0.8148
Marginal effect
ⳮ0.1591 ⳮ0.1966 ⳮ0.0359 ⳮ0.0421
Change in
ⳮ0.0375
ⳮ0.0062
marginal effect

Probability
(emp⳱1, lfp⳱1)
Before
ADA

After
ADA

0.6718
0.6798
0.5202
0.4942
ⳮ0.1516 ⳮ0.1856
ⳮ0.0340

NOTE: Probabilities calculated using parameter coefficients from Table 2.1.
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ADA (see column 2, last row). However, this effect is not significantly
different from zero; in a model where all other coefficients are significantly different from zero, this is notable. On the other hand, the labor
force participation rate declined significantly, by nearly 4 percentage
points more for the disabled than for the nondisabled, post-ADA.19

EVIDENCE FROM THE SIPP
The analysis detailed in Equations 2.3 and 2.4 is reestimated using
the sample obtained from the SIPP for the years 1986 through 1997.
Table 2.3 reports the coefficients of interest from estimating the bivariate probit model with selection using the SIPP data. The results reported in Table 2.3 mirror those in Table 2.1, with one difference:
employment among the disabled increased more post- versus pre-ADA
than did the employment of the nondisabled. This positive 0.0768
coefficient on disable ⳯ post translates into a 0.8 of a percentage
point higher employment probability for the disabled relative to the
Table 2.3 Labor Force Participation and Employment Bivariate Probit
with Selection Results, SIPP Combined Years 1986–1997

Regressor
disable⳱1
post (year⳱1992 or later)⳱1
disable⳯post⳱1
Rho
Log-likelihood
Number of observations

Labor force
participation
equation

Employment
equation

ⳮ0.9404***
(0.0105)
0.0293***
(0.0048)
ⳮ0.1360***
(0.0129)

ⳮ0.2435***
(0.0211)
ⳮ0.0348***
(0.0077)
0.0768***
(0.0250)
ⳮ0.4811***
(0.0204)
ⳮ292,341
500,560

NOTE: Additional regressors included age; age squared; state unemployment rate;
female, nonwhite, education, regional dummy variables; an indicator for SMSA residence (employment); and non-labor income and marital status (labor force participation). Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** ⳱ significant at the 99 percent confidence level.
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nondisabled. In addition, the relative decline in labor force participation among the disabled found in the CPS data is also seen using the
SIPP data as well.
Along with the reestimation of Equations 2.3 and 2.4, a specification is estimated in which the impact of having a disability post-ADA
is allowed to vary by type of impairment:20
(2.5)

lfpi ⳱ ␣1 Ⳮ ␥1⬘X1i Ⳮ ␤S1 musculoskeletali Ⳮ ␤I1 internali
Ⳮ ␤M1 mentali Ⳮ␤O1 otheri Ⳮ 1posti
Ⳮ S1 musculoskeletali ⳯ posti Ⳮ I1 internali ⳯ posti
Ⳮ M1 mentali ⳯ posti Ⳮ O1 otheri ⳯ posti Ⳮ ⑀1i

(2.6)

empi ⳱ ␣2 Ⳮ ␥2⬘X2i Ⳮ ␤S2 musculoskeletali Ⳮ ␤I2 internali
Ⳮ ␤M2 mentali Ⳮ␤O2 otheri Ⳮ 2posti
Ⳮ S2 musculoskeletali ⳯ posti Ⳮ I2 internali ⳯ posti
Ⳮ M2 mentali ⳯ posti Ⳮ O2 otheri ⳯ posti Ⳮ ⑀2i

where lfpi is equal to 1 if person i is in the labor force, 0 otherwise,
empi is equal to 1 if person i is employed, 0 otherwise,
Xi is a set of covariates for each person (individual demographic
characteristics),
musculoskeletali is equal to 1 if person i has a musculoskeletal disability,21
internali is equal to 1 if person i has a disability involving the
internal systems,
mentali is equal to 1 if person i has a mental disability,
otheri is equal to 1 if person i has a disability classified as
‘‘other,’’ and
posti is equal to 1 if person i is observed in 1992 or later.
Again, these equations are estimated via maximum likelihood as a bivariate probit with selection, where empi is only observed if lfpi ⳱ 1.
In this framework, the type of disability is controlled for by dummy
variables indicating whether the individual has a musculoskeletal, internal systems, mental, or other disability; and the time period is controlled for by a dummy variable indicating whether the ADA had been
implemented yet or not. The coefficients of particular interest (j1 and
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j2, j ⳱ S,I,M,O), therefore, allow us to calculate the labor force participation and employment changes among disabled workers post- versus
pre-ADA relative to the changes for nondisabled workers. Table 2.4
provides selected estimated coefficients and regression details.
The estimation results presented in Table 2.4 from the SIPP data
set are also consistent with the conclusions drawn using the CPS data:
labor force participation declined more for all classifications of disability, relative to nondisability, post- versus pre-ADA. However, employTable 2.4 Labor Force Participation and Employment Bivariate Probit
with Selection Results by Type of Disability, SIPP Combined
Years, 1986–1997

Regressor
musculoskeletal⳱1
internal⳱1
mental ⳱ 1
other⳱1
post (year⳱1992 or later)⳱1
musculoskeletal⳯post⳱1
internal⳯post⳱1
mental⳯post⳱1
other⳯post⳱1
Rho
Log-likelihood
Number of observations

Labor force
participation
equation

Employment
equation

ⳮ0.8253***
(0.0150)
ⳮ0.9597***
(0.0192)
ⳮ1.2722***
(0.0237)
ⳮ0.8396***
(0.0280)
0.0305***
(0.0048)
ⳮ0.1416***
(0.0187)
ⳮ0.1137***
(0.0247)
ⳮ0.0850***
(0.0282)
ⳮ0.0829**
(0.0360)

ⳮ0.2798***
(0.0281)
ⳮ0.1660***
(0.0409)
ⳮ0.1599***
(0.0487)
ⳮ0.3429***
(0.0508)
ⳮ0.0348***
(0.0077)
0.0542
(0.0348)
0.1693
(0.0532)
0.1187**
(0.0573)
0.1484**
(0.0675)
ⳮ0.4799***
(0.0205)
ⳮ292,164
500,560

NOTE: See notes to Table 2.3 regarding additional regressors. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
*** ⳱ significant at the 99 percent confidence level.
** ⳱ significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
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ment probabilities (controlling for labor force participation) increased
significantly more for the disability classifications of mental and
other than for the nondisabled, post- versus pre-ADA. Relative employment probabilities did not change significantly for those with musculoskeletal or internal disabilities.
While it is difficult to interpret the employment impact for those
with disabilities classified as other, the major role that those with
mental disorders play in explaining the overall relative employment
improvement is not surprising, given the attention paid to and policies
developed for those with mental disabilities in recent years.22 In addition, if we expect costs of accommodation to influence employment
outcomes of the disabled, these results might suggest that accommodating workers with mental disabilities (such as through flexible work
scheduling) has been relatively less expensive for employers than accommodating workers with musculoskeletal or internal disabilities (for
example, through physical modification of the work environment).
EMPLOYMENT PROBABILITY AND FIRM SIZE
The phased-in nature of the ADA yields an additional dimension
across which to examine its impact on employment.23 After enactment
in 1990, the ADA covered employers with 25 or more employees starting
in 1992, and employers with 15 or more employees starting in 1994.
One might expect a differential employment impact of the ADA based
on whether a particular firm is covered by the legislation. In addition,
because of the potential costs of accommodating workers’ disabilities,
there is reason to expect that disabled workers might migrate toward
covered employers (based on size), toward employers who are more able
to absorb the cost of accommodation (larger firms may have more resources to devote to such investments), and toward employers who can
spread the fixed costs of accommodation across more workers (again,
this would be true of larger firms). While most estimates indicate that
per-worker costs of accommodations only range between $100 and
$1,000, this expenditure is clearly easier to absorb for larger, more affluent firms (LaPlante 1992; Kujala 1996).24 The federal government recognizes this burden to small business by making a targeted tax credit
available for up to half of an accommodation expenditure that exceeds
$250 but is less than $10,250 (Dykxhoorn and Sinning 1993; Hays 1999).

38 Hotchkiss and Rovba

Figure 2.4 plots the distributions of disabled and nondisabled
workers across firm sizes. Here, a small firm is one that employs fewer
than 25 workers, a medium firm employs at least 25 but fewer than
100, and a large firm employs at least 100 workers.25 The CPS began
asking about the size (number of employees) of a worker’s firm in
1988. This question refers to a person’s main job during the previous
year and is therefore available for the years 1987–1999. Large firms
employ by far the greatest percentage of both disabled and nondisabled
workers. While the average (over time) percentage in medium-sized
firms is practically identical across disability status (14 percent), a
greater proportion of nondisabled workers (62 percent versus 58 percent) is employed in large firms, and a greater proportion of disabled
workers (28 percent versus 24 percent) is employed in small firms. As
far as trends are concerned, nothing obvious is apparent from Figure
2.4. Trend regression indicates that there have been statistically significant declines in medium-firm employment among both disabled and
nondisabled workers. While most of this decline among the nondisabled shifted toward small firms, the shift among the disabled was
toward large firms. The analysis that follows will allow quantification
of these movements and a direct comparison across disability status.
A multinomial logit analysis was undertaken to determine how the
relative employment of disabled and nondisabled workers in differentsized firms has shifted over the entire time period for which firm size
is available.26 This approach allows us to specify multiple possible
outcomes (e.g., employment in a small, medium, or large firm) as a
function of a variety of observed characteristics and unobservable factors, recognizing that as one’s probability of being in one firm size
increases, the probability of being in another firm size necessarily decreases. A person’s employment outcome is divided into three categories (where n refers to the number of employees at the worker’s firm):
1) employed by a small (n ⬍ 25) firm, 2) employed by a medium (25
ⱕ n ⬍ 100) firm, and 3) employed by a large (n ⱖ 100) firm.27
It is assumed that the individual selects the firm size (ceteris paribus) that maximizes the utility gained from that choice. The employer
plays a role in that decision by making different job packages available,
such as wages and other characteristics. The probability of person i
being employed in firm size 1 is defined as (where u refers to utility):
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Figure 2.4 Distribution of Disabled and Nondisabled Workers across
Firm Size, CPS, 1987–1999
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(2.7)

P1 ⳱ P(ni ⳱ 1) ⳱ P(ui1 ⬎ uij) for j ⳱ 2,3.

Let
(2.8)

Pj
⳱ F(␤⬘jX) for j ⳱ 1,2,
Pj Ⳮ P3

where F (䡠) is the cumulative distribution function, X are individual
characteristics, and ␤ are parameter coefficients. This means that
(2.9)

Pj
F(␤⬘jX)
⳱
⳱ G(␤⬘jX) for j ⳱ 1,2.
P3
1 ⳮ F(␤⬘jX)

Because of the rules of summation,

冋 冘

册

2

(2.10)

P3 ⳱ 1/ 1 Ⳮ

j⳱1

G(␤⬘jX)

G(␤⬘jX) and Pj ⳱

冘G(␤ X)

.

2

1Ⳮ

⬘
j

j⳱1

If we let
(2.11)

G(␤⬘jX) ⳱ exp(␤⬘jX) and Yij
⳱

再

1 if person i falls in firm size category j
0 otherwise

the log likelihood function (ln L) can be written as

冘 冘 Y lnP ,
3

(2.12)

ln L ⳱

where Pij ⳱

3

ij

ij

i⳱1 j⳱1
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k

and Pi3 ⳱

冘
2
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.
exp(X ␤k)
⬘
i

The multinomial logit results in three sets of parameter estimates,
each set describing the probability of one of the firm size outcomes.
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Every person has a probability of being employed by each size firm,
and those three probabilities sum to one (since the analysis is restricted
to employed individuals). Figure 2.5 summarizes the predicted probabilities of disabled workers, relative to the predicted probabilities of
nondisabled workers, being employed by each size firm for the years
from 1987 to 1999.28
The probability of employment of disabled workers relative to nondisabled workers in both small- and medium-size firms declined over
this time period, whereas the relative probability of employment of
disabled workers in large firms increased.29 This means that relative to
nondisabled workers, disabled workers were increasingly likely to be
employed in large firms between 1987 and 1999. This result is consistent with Kaye (2002), who finds growing employment rates among
the disabled in ‘‘big-business’’ industries (500 or more employees).
The increased probability of employment among larger firms may suggest that they have been able to accommodate (i.e., afford, spread costs
over greater numbers of workers, find appropriate job matches) workers’ disabilities more than small- or even medium-sized firms, and that
disabled workers have found it fruitful to seek out jobs at the largest
firms. In fact, large companies have typically been at the forefront of
implementing costly accommodations, either because of public relations initiatives or because of other considerations not faced by smaller
Figure 2.5 Ratio of Predicted Employment Probabilities for Disabled
versus Nondisabled Workers by Firm Size, CPS, 1987–1999
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businesses (Johnson 1997). These visible efforts make larger companies more attractive for disabled job seekers. In addition, one study
has found that large firms are significantly more likely to comply with
the ADA and to have specific policies in place guiding the hiring of
workers with disabilities (Scheid 1998). It is important to point out,
however, that since the ADA has no affirmative action component, the
relative shift in employment of disabled workers toward larger firms is
not likely the result of active recruitment efforts.
Since employers with 25 or more workers were covered by the
ADA beginning in 1992, one additional computation can help to quantify any adjustment that may have occurred at that time in the relative
employment probabilities. Table 2.5 presents a form of differences-indifferences-in-differences (DDD) calculation for the average predicted
probabilities of employment across firm size, time, and disability
status. These DDD results are not derived from an estimation procedure, but are merely the differences in predicted probabilities across
coverage, firm size, and time. The predicted probabilities from the
Table 2.5 DDD Calculation for Average Predicted Probability of
Employment by Firm Size, Disability Status, and across Time,
CPS, 1987–1999
Firm size / year
A. Disabled workers
nⱖ25
n⬍25
Firm size difference at a
point in time
Differences-in-differences
B. Nondisabled workers
nⱖ25
n⬍25
Firm size difference at a
point in time
Differences-in-differences
DDD:

1987–91

1992–98

Time difference for
a given firm size

0.7434
0.2566

0.7280
0.2720

ⳮ0.0154
0.0154

0.4868

0.4560
ⳮ0.0308

0.7798
0.2202

0.7571
0.2429

0.5596

ⳮ0.0227
0.0227

0.5142
ⳮ0.0454
0.0146

NOTE: n refers to the number of employees in the firm. Predicted probabilities for
each firm size from the multinomial logit results presented in Figure 2.3 are averaged
across the years indicated and disability status to obtain the average predicted probabilities.
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multinomial logit estimation are used for differencing, and the probabilities for the medium and large firm sizes are combined to correspond
to the coverage of the ADA beginning in 1992. This analysis is not as
precise as we might like, since employers with 15 or more workers
were covered by the ADA beginning in 1994, and since there are no
standard errors available to determine significance of the results. Consequently, the results in Table 2.5 should be viewed only as suggestive.
The DDD analysis suggests that covered disabled workers have, at
most, a 1.5 percentage point greater probability of being employed,
relative to noncovered disabled workers, post-ADA, relative to preADA, relative to the employment probability differences among nondisabled workers.

CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this chapter was to evaluate the relative employment experiences of disabled and nondisabled workers. A pooled,
cross-sectional analysis determined that the joint labor force and employment probability of the disabled decreased significantly after implementation of the ADA relative to a nondisabled person’s employment
probability. This joint probability is influenced by both supply and
demand factors and therefore confounds the employment experience
of disabled workers with labor supply influences. In order to get a
picture of the expected employment outcome, the unconditional employment probability was calculated. It was found that the unconditional employment probability among the disabled did not change after
implementation of the ADA relative to the employment probability
among the nondisabled. In other words, although improvements in
relative employment outcomes have not been realized, there has not
been the deterioration of the employment position of the disabled as
claimed by others. This suggests that adjustments in the labor supply
of disabled workers are not likely the result of feedback effects or fear
of negative outcomes, since the employment outcomes for disabled
workers relative to those of nondisabled workers did not deteriorate
post-ADA. It was also shown that the decline in labor force participation was likely the result of the reclassification of nondisabled, nonpar-
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ticipants as disabled, post-welfare reform and potentially in response
to the growing generosity of disability benefit policies.
Analysis of the SIPP data produced a confirmation of the CPS
results and allowed a closer evaluation of employment probabilities by
type of disability. In fact, the SIPP results suggest that the relative
employment position actually improved, with greater unconditional
employment probabilities among the disabled post-ADA, compared to
the nondisabled. It was found that those with mental disorders and
those with disabilities classified as other experienced the greatest positive employment impact of the ADA. Workers with musculoskeletal
and internal system disabilities did not experience any different employment probability growth from those without disabilities.
Evidence that the cost of accommodation is not irrelevant in the
labor market’s adjustment to the ADA was found in a DDD analysis,
which accounted for the size of a worker’s employer, allowing for
identification of disabled workers who were covered by the legislation
and those who were not. Disabled workers employed by large or medium firms (covered employers) have, at most, a 1.5 percentage point
greater probability of being employed, relative to disabled workers in
small firms, post-ADA, relative to pre-ADA, relative to nondisabled
workers. In addition, employment of disabled workers was shown to
shift more towards large firms post-ADA than did employment of nondisabled workers. Since the fixed cost of disability accommodations
can be spread over a greater number of workers in large firms, this
result suggests that larger firms were better poised and able to absorb
the costs of accommodations dictated by the ADA and/or better able to
match disabled workers’ job skills with recruitment needs.

Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.

Also see DeLeire (1997, Section 3).
See Table C.2 in Appendix C for the percentages used to generate Figure 2.1.
See Stern (1996).
It has also been suggested that persons with disabilities entering the labor force
after the ADA will have more severe disabilities than those employed prior to the
ADA, making the potential for ‘‘binding’’ accommodation requirements that
much more likely and expensive (Chirikos 1991).
5. This model specification is similar to that familiar to most labor economists: controlling for selection into the labor market (or employment) when estimating a
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wage equation. In that problem, we are interested in the (unconditional) expected
wage for anyone in the population. By controlling for selection into the labor
market (since we can only estimate the wage equation on those for whom we
observe wages), we are able to make unconditional predictions that correspond to
the population. If selection is not controlled for, the only prediction of wages that
can be made is that conditional on labor force participation.
6. The bivariate probit model with selection gives rise to the following likelihood
function:
ln L ⳱

7.

冘

9.
10.

11.
12.

13.

ln ⌽2关␥⬘1X1i,␥⬘2X2i, 兴 Ⳮ
⬘
⬘
LFP⳱1,EMP⳱0 ln ⌽2关␥1X1i, ⳮ ␥2X2i, 兴 Ⳮ

冘

LFP⳱1, EMP⳱1

冘

LFP⳱0

ln ⌽关ⳮ␥⬘1X1i兲,

where ⌽2 is the bivariate normal cumulative distribution function and ⌽ is the
univariate normal cumulative distribution function.
This method of calculating the marginal effect of a change in a dummy variable
is referred to as a measure of discrete change and is described in greater detail by
Long (1997, pp. 135–138). Specifically, the average marginal impact of having
a disability on the joint labor force and employment outcome is calculated as
1 N
兵Pi关lfp⳱1, emp⳱1兩Xi, disable⳱1兴ⳮPi关lfp⳱1, emp⳱1兩Xi, disable⳱0兴其,
Ni⳱1
and the average marginal impact of having a disability on the unconditional probability of employment is calculated as
1 N
兵Pi关emp ⳱ 1兩Xi, disable ⳱ 1兴 ⳮ Pi关emp ⳱1兩Xi, disable ⳱ 0兴其. Both of
Ni⳱1
these are calculated, of course, using the parameter estimates obtained from the
bivariate probit model with selection detailed in endnote 6.
This model specification allows a comparison to results with earlier studies, as
well (through calculation of the joint probability).
See Table C.3 in Appendix C for the numbers used to generate Figure 2.2 (numbers in column 3 minus numbers in column 1).
In addition, Stern (1996) presents empirical evidence that labor supply decisions
of disabled people are driven more by labor supply factors than by labor demand
factors. Also see Averett, et al. (1999) for further evidence on this point.
One can easily show that, for C ⬎ 0 for lfprd ⳱ C/(C Ⳮ D), lfprd/D ⬍ 0 and
lfprd/C ⬎ 0.
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) dismiss this theory by showing that controlling for
receipt of disability benefits only marginally impacts their results. They fail to
point out, however, that the receipt of benefits will reflect only a fraction of the
desire to receive benefits (see Kubik 1999). Consequently, the actual impact of
increasing program generosity on the disability status change for nonparticipants
could be much larger than that measured by growing recipiency.
These trend coefficient estimates for each cell were obtained from simple linear
regressions of the percentage of people represented in that cell as a function of a
time trend corresponding to the period 1990–2000, in order to focus on postADA changes.

冘

8.

冘
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14. The strategy described here can be likened to the popular differences-in-differences (DD) methodology, but it is applied to a nonlinear statistical model.
15. Acemoglu and Angrist (2001, Appendix A) show that results are fairly consistent
across a variety of sample restrictions based on differences between the 1993 and
1994 samples (crossing the survey modification time period). Consequently, it is
not expected that the results reported here are significantly biased by changes in
the CPS survey design.
16. The cyclicality of disabled and nondisabled employment is explored by Burkhauser, Daly, and Houtenville (2000), although, like Acemoglu and Angrist
(2001) and DeLeire (2000), their analysis confounds employment outcomes with
labor supply effects.
17. See endnote 7.
18. The remaining parameter estimates are consistent with labor/leisure choice theory. For example, higher nonlabor income and being female lead to lower labor
force participation, and the age/participation profile is concave. They also conform to standard human capital theory with more education and greater labor
market experience (measured through number of weeks worked last year) leading
to a greater probability of employment.
19. The marginal effect on the joint probability outcome was ⳮ3 percentage points
(column 3, last row). While not directly comparable, DeLeire (2000) estimates a
7.2 percentage point drop in employment among all disabled men, and Acemoglu
and Angrist (2001) estimate a 10–15 percentage point drop in the number of
weeks worked by the disabled. Again, these results are analogous to the joint
probability calculated here, although not surprisingly of slightly varying magnitude given the differences in data used (DeLeire) and in estimation procedure and
model specification (DeLeire and Acemoglu and Angrist).
20. See Appendix B for the source of classification of disability.
21. The musculoskeletal grouping includes disabilities involving the special senses
(e.g., hearing, sight).
22. The President’s Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities had
placed an emphasis in the late 1990s on individuals with mental impairments.
This committee has more recently been replaced by the Presidential Task Force
on Employment of Adults with Disabilities. Information about the activities of
this task force can be found on the U.S. Department of Labor web site, http://
www.dol.gov/ sec/programs/ptfead/.
23. Chay (1996) and Carrington, McCue, and Pierce (2000) represent other research
exploiting the natural phase-in periods across firm size or geographic differences
in dates of implementation in order to measure the labor market impact of social
policy legislation.
24. In addition to the direct costs of accommodation, efficiency costs not directly
absorbed by the employer, but felt by the labor market as a whole, are identified
by Rosen (1991).
25. This definition of small, medium, and large firms follows that of Acemoglu and
Angrist (2001); the definition will change in the next chapter.
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26. Multinomial logits have come under frequent criticism because of the assumption
of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) that is implied by the logit specification. Alternative specifications that retain the desired probability structure
(i.e., multinomial probit) are riddled with their own problems and not considered
here to add value greater than the cost imposed. It has been pointed out that under
the framework of what is called a ‘‘universal’’ logit, the estimation procedure can
be applied, but the utility interpretation of the structural estimates is lost. In
addition, the more regressors included to describe the multiple outcomes, the less
bothersome is the assumption of IIA. For these reasons, the logit structure is
retained. For further discussion on these points, see Ben-Akiva and Lerman
(1985, section 5.2) and Moffitt (1999, pp. 1382–1387).
27. The results of this analysis are relevant for workers only and not generalizable to
the entire population.
28. The predicted probabilities are found in Table C.4 in Appendix C.
29. A firm-size analysis was also undertaken by Acemoglu and Angrist (2001). Since
they did not restrict their analysis to workers, they found that relative employment
declined across all firm sizes (compared with not working), and that there was no
change in relative employment of disabled workers in large firms, as compared
with the nondisabled.

3
Compensation: Wages and Benefits
The issue of compensation has generated numerous contributions
to the demand side of the disability literature. For example, Haveman
and Wolfe (1990) evaluate the economic well-being (in which a major
factor is earnings, or compensation) of the disabled over an extended
period of time (1962–1984). A large part of their measure of wellbeing, however, is accounted for by transfer income (a nonlabor market
source of income).1 In addition, while Salkever and Domino (1997),
Johnson and Lambrinos (1985), and Baldwin and Johnson (2000) have
examined the issue of wage discrimination against the disabled, evidence on how these measures of discrimination have changed over time
is sparse (see DeLeire 2001).
Depending on the nature of the impairment, one would expect a
disabled worker to be less productive than an otherwise identical nondisabled worker; thus, lower wages would be seen for disabled workers.
The implementation of a policy that is expected to raise productivity,
however, would increase those individuals’ wages. The ADA, through
its accommodation requirements, should unambiguously increase the
productivity of disabled workers. The impact of this process on workers’ earnings, however, is uncertain. If productivity is increased by
more than the cost of accommodations, wages of disabled workers
should rise. If, on the other hand, the cost of accommodation exceeds
the gains in productivity, disabled workers are likely to bear some of
the increased costs through lower wages. In addition, since accommodation should not impact the productivity of workers not in need of
those accommodations (i.e., nondisabled workers), we should not observe a substantial wage change for nondisabled workers post-ADA.
The CPS contains data on wages paid and hours employed for all
workers. Information on the availability of health insurance and pension plans through one’s employer is also available. This chapter compares how relative earnings for workers with disabilities have changed
over time and if there was any significant alteration coinciding with the
implementation of the ADA. These comparisons are also made across
types of disability with the help of the SIPP data set. Earnings of
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disabled workers are compared with those of workers without disabilities to determine whether there has been any improvement in the compensation disparity over time and how much of that disparity is left
unexplained by differences in productivity (i.e., potential discrimination), particularly around the period that the ADA became law and was
fully implemented. The methodology employed will also allow an
examination of how much of the earnings disparity is accounted for by
different representations of disabled workers across occupations and/
or industries. Nonwage compensation is growing in importance for all
employees and may be of particular importance to disabled workers.
As such, the probability of being covered by health insurance and a
pension plan is evaluated as a function of disability status, also across
time. These probabilities are compared, again, to see if any change
occurred when the ADA was implemented.
WAGE LEVELS
Figure 3.1 depicts the average real (1982–1984 ⳱ 100) hourly
wages for disabled and non-disabled workers for each year from 1981
Figure 3.1 Average Real Hourly Wages, CPS, 1981–2000
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to 2000. As theorized, wages for disabled workers lie below those of
nondisabled workers for every year, although these raw figures do not
control for differences in human capital or other demographic and job
characteristics. Real wages of nondisabled workers exhibit a clear upward trend (a significant raw trend average of about 0.03 of a percentage point per year), and real wages of disabled workers exhibit a
downward trend (a significant average of about –0.02 of a percentage
point per year, in spite of the recent upward swing). The net result
is a growing differential between wages of nondisabled and disabled
workers. These relative trends will be examined to determine whether
there was a significant difference pre- and post-ADA after controlling
for individual and job characteristics. In addition, the wage differential
will be decomposed to determine what factors are the greatest contributors to its level and its growth. For example, it could be the case
that wages are falling among disabled workers because the nature of
disabilities is becoming more severe in the population (Kaye 2002),
making disabled workers as a whole less productive. Alternatively, the
human capital of disabled workers may be deteriorating for some reason, disabled workers are shifting to lower-paying jobs, or employers
may be passing along the costs of accommodations through lower
wages for disabled workers.
Splitting the time series, the negative trend in wages for disabled
workers observed in Figure 3.1 is clearly driven by the early years (a
significant average decline of 1 percentage point per year from 1981 to
1991), while the years between 1992 and 2000 exhibit no trend at all,
statistically. One could interpret this as a positive outcome of the ADA
if the policy actually halted, or mitigated, a long-running downward
trend in wages of disabled workers. However, this observation tells us
nothing about the relative wage trend or components of the differential.

DIFFERENCES IN WAGES OVER TIME
Pooled, Cross-Sectional Analysis
The first analysis of wages in this chapter is a simple, pooled,
cross-sectional one.2 A linear relationship is specified in which the log
of real wages is a function of demographic and job characteristics, as
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well as indicators for disability status, time period, and the interaction
between disability status and time. The following specification is estimated via OLS for the time period 1984–2000:3
(3.1)

lnrwagei ⳱ ␣ Ⳮ ␥⬘Xi Ⳮ ␤1disablei Ⳮ ␤2posti
Ⳮ ␤3disablei ⳯ posti Ⳮ ⑀i

where lnrwagei is the natural log hourly real (1982–1984 ⳱ 100)
wage of worker i,
Xi is a set of covariates for each person (demographic and job
characteristics),
disablei is equal to 1 if person i has a work-limiting disability,
and
posti is equal to one if person i is observed in 1992 or later.
The affected group (the disabled) is controlled for by a dummy variable
indicating whether the individual has a work-limiting disability, and
the time period is controlled for by a dummy variable indicating
whether the ADA had been implemented yet or not. The coefficient of
interest (␤3) measures the change in real wages of disabled workers,
relative to nondisabled workers, after implementation of the ADA, relative to before implementation. In other words, ␤3 tells us how wages
changed for disabled workers versus nondisabled workers. Xi includes
individual demographic and job characteristics detailed in Table 3.1,
which contains the estimation results; ␥ are additional parameter coefficients to be estimated, and ⑀i is the random error term.
Since wages are observed for workers only, and since the characteristics of workers may be changing over time in unobservable ways,
it is important to control for any potential unobserved self-selection
into the labor market. Consequently, Equation 3.1 is modified by simply adding the standard inverse-Mills ratio obtained from a first-stage
probit estimation of a labor force participation/employment equation.
This standard Heckman (1979) two-step procedure for controlling for
self-selection is presented in greater detail in the section on wage decompositions. Briefly, including the selection term in the regression
allows ␤3 to be interpreted as relevant for the entire disabled and nondisabled population, even though the sample for the regression included workers only. The parameters of the model are identified
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Table 3.1 OLS Selectivity-Corrected Regression Results for Log Real
Wages, across Disability Status and ADA Implementation,
CPS, 1984–2000
Regressor
Intercept
Age
Age squared
Female ⳱ 1
Nonwhite ⳱ 1
Single household ⳱ 1
High school grad ⳱ 1
Some college ⳱ 1
College grad ⳱ 1
Advanced degree ⳱ 1
Hours
Union ⳱ 1
disable ⳱ 1
post (year⳱1992 or later)⳱1
disable⳯post ⳱ 1
ˆ (selection term)
Number of observations
F statistic
Adjusted R2

Parameter estimates
1.1277***
(0.0121)
0.0498***
(0.0059)
ⳮ0.0005
(0.0023)
ⳮ0.2249***
(0.0016)
ⳮ0.0434***
(0.0018)
ⳮ0.0524***
(0.0015)
0.0834***
(0.0020)
0.1614***
(0.0022)
0.2806***
(0.0025)
0.3072***
(0.0013)
0.0024
(0.0055)
0.1976***
(0.0005)
ⳮ0.1719***
(0.0018)
ⳮ0.0033***
(0.0011)
ⳮ0.0286***
(0.0064)
0.0327***
(0.0043)
766,060
18,486***
0.4279

NOTE: Other regressors included in the estimation, but not reported here, include
seven industry and five occupation dummy variables, region, and government employer dummy variables.
*** ⳱ significant at the 99 percent confidence level. Asymptotically consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
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through inclusion of some regressors in the first-stage probit estimation
that are not in the wage regression; these regressors include nonlabor
income and an indicator of whether the person worked last year or not.
Since the purpose of this two-stage estimation approach is merely to
obtain unbiased estimates of the coefficients in the wage equation, interpretation of those coefficients is not changed by controlling for
selection.
All of the parameter estimates in Table 3.1 are of the magnitude
and direction one might expect from standard human capital and other
labor market theories. For example, women and nonwhites earn lower
wages, union workers earn higher wages, and increased wages accrue
to those with greater levels of education. The positive coefficient on
the selection term (ˆ ) indicates positive selection into the labor market;
the more likely someone is to enter the labor market, the more likely
he or she will earn a wage above the population average.
The coefficient on the interaction term disable ⳯ post is
ⳮ0.0286 (and significantly different from zero), indicating that disabled workers experienced about a 3 percent decline in wages, relative
to nondisabled workers, post-ADA implementation, relative to pre-implementation. In other words, wages of the disabled fell by 3 percent
more post-ADA than the wages of the nondisabled. This finding is not
consistent with the result of DeLeire (2000), who found no significant
change in the wages of disabled workers relative to those of nondisabled workers, post-ADA.4 However, the result does suggest that the
cost of accommodating disabled workers, overall, potentially exceeded
their gains in productivity.5 It is important to note that this result was
obtained by controlling for job characteristic differences, such as hours
of work, occupation, and industry. The potential implication of shifts
in occupation and industry distributions on these results is explored in
Chapter 4.
Evidence from the SIPP
The pooled, cross-sectional analysis specified in Equation 3.1 was
reestimated using the SIPP data set for the years 1986–1997 (and,
again, controlling for selection of workers into the labor market
through a two-step estimation strategy). Selected coefficient estimates
from the reestimation are presented in Table 3.2. While not statistically
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Table 3.2 OLS Selectivity-Corrected DD Regression Results for Log Real
Wages, across Disability Status and Type of Disability Status,
SIPP 1986–1997
Parameter estimates
Regressor
disable ⳱ 1
post (year ⳱ 1992 or later) ⳱ 1
disable ⳯ post ⳱ 1
musculoskeletal ⳱ 1

Disability indicator
only
ⳮ0.1535***
(0.0027)
ⳮ0.0515***
(0.0017)
ⳮ0.0070
(0.0072)
—

internal ⳱ 1

—

mental ⳱ 1

—

other ⳱ 1

—

musculoskeletal ⳯ post ⳱ 1

—

internal ⳯ post ⳱ 1

—

mental ⳯ post ⳱ 1

—

other ⳯ post ⳱ 1

—

ˆ (selection term)

0.0046
(0.0067)

Number of observations
F statistic
Adjusted R2

353,651
8,855
0.4289

Type of disability
indicated
—
ⳮ0.0305***
(0.0017)
—
ⳮ0.1230***
(0.0084)
ⳮ0.1537***
(0.0115)
ⳮ0.3427***
(0.0157)
ⳮ0.1124***
(0.0153)
ⳮ0.0424 ***
(0.0098)
0.0125
(0.0148)
0.0220
(0.0183)
ⳮ0.0130
(0.0193)
0.0116*
(0.0065)
287,343
6,502
0.4489

NOTE: Other regressors included in the estimation, but not reported here, include
seven industry and five occupation dummy variables, hours of work, age, age squared,
and race, education, union, gender, marital status, region, and government employer
dummy variables. Asymptotically consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
*** ⳱ significant at the 99 percent confidence level.
* ⳱ significant at the 90 percent confidence level.
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significant, the negative coefficient on the disable ⳯ post regressor
is at least consistent (in sign) with the results obtained from the CPS
data.
Table 3.2 presents an additional specification, which identifies type
of disability. In the following equation, the impact of a worker’s disability on the real wage is allowed to vary by type of impairment:6
(3.2)

lnrwagei ⳱ ␣ Ⳮ ␥⬘Xi Ⳮ ␤S1 musculoskeletali Ⳮ ␤I1 internali
Ⳮ ␤M1 mentali Ⳮ ␤O1 otheri Ⳮ ␤2posti
Ⳮ ␤S3 musculoskeletali ⳯ posti Ⳮ ␤I3 internali
⳯ posti Ⳮ ␤M3 mentali ⳯ posti
Ⳮ ␤O3 other ⳯ posti Ⳮ ⑀i

where lnrwagei is the natural log hourly real (1982–1984 ⳱ 100)
wage of worker i,
Xi is a set of covariates for each person (individual demographic
characteristics),
musculoskeletali is equal to 1 if person i has a musculoskeletal disability,7
internali is equal to 1 if person i has a disability involving the
internal systems,
mentali is equal to 1 if person i has a mental disability,
otheri is equal to 1 if person i has a disability classified as
‘‘other,’’ and
posti is equal to 1 if person i is observed in 1992 or later.
In this framework, the type of disability is controlled for by dummy
variables indicating whether the individual has a musculoskeletal, internal systems, mental, or other limitation, and the time period is controlled for by a dummy variable indicating whether the ADA had been
implemented yet or not. The coefficients of interest (␤j3, j ⳱ S,I,M,O),
therefore, measure the change in log real wages of workers with each
type of disability, relative to nondisabled workers, after implementation of the ADA, relative to before implementation. Xi includes individual demographic and job characteristics, detailed in Table 3.2.
Again, selection into the labor market has been controlled for.8
As it turns out, the type of disability that appears to be driving the
observed overall decline in real wages of disabled workers relative to
nondisabled workers, post-ADA, is musculoskeletal. The real wages
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of workers with musculoskeletal disabilities declined 4 percent more
than for workers without disabilities post-ADA, relative to pre-ADA
(the coefficient on musculoskeletal ⳯ post is ⳮ0.0424). This is
of interest because it lends support to the theory that wages of disabled
workers are sensitive to the degree of accommodation required of the
employer. Whereas accommodation of a worker with a mental disorder, such as depression, may simply be a flexible work schedule, individuals with musculoskeletal disabilities might require more
investment in infrastructure, such as specially constructed office furniture.9 In light of evidence that the typical per-worker cost of accommodation is fairly modest (on the order of $100–$1,000), according to
Kujala (1996), employers may be setting wages on some perceived
higher cost.
Firm Size Analysis
The CPS contains a question about how large (i.e., number of employees) a worker’s main employer was in the previous year. Given
that the ADA covers employers only of certain size, this information
can be exploited to perform an additional analysis across covered and
noncovered disabled workers. Covered disabled workers would be
those employed by a firm with 25 or more employees in 1992 or later
or employed by a firm with 15 or more employees in 1994 or later.
Unfortunately, classifications of firms with fewer than 25 employees
were not made until the 1992 survey year, which limits the amount of
pre-ADA data available for the analysis. The post-ADA years were
restricted to balance this survey-imposed limitation. The following
model will be estimated twice: once for a large versus not-large firm
classification, and a second time for a medium versus small firm classification. Selection into the labor market will be controlled for in both
estimations, using the standard Heckman (1979) two-step procedure
detailed later in this chapter. The impact on wages across firm size
(ADA coverage) is obtained from the following linear specification:
(3.3)

lnrwagei ⳱ ␣ Ⳮ ␥⬘Xi Ⳮ ␤1disablei Ⳮ ␤2posti Ⳮ ␤3coveredi
Ⳮ ␤4disablei ⳯ posti Ⳮ ␤5disablei ⳯ coveredi
Ⳮ ␤6posti ⳯ coveredi
Ⳮ ␤7disablei ⳯ posti ⳯ coveredi Ⳮ ⑀i
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where lnrwagei is the natural log hourly real (1982–1984 ⳱ 100)
wage of worker i,
Xi is a set of covariates for each person (demographic and job
characteristics),
disablei is equal to 1 if person i has a work-limiting disability,
posti is equal to 1 if person i is observed in 1992–1993 for the
large firm analysis and equal to 1 if person i is observed in
1994–1996 for the medium firm analysis,10 and
coveredi is equal to 1 if person i is employed by a firm covered
by ADA legislation.
The dummy variables (disable, post, and covered) control for the
time-invariant characteristics of the affected group, disabled workers
(␤1); the time-series changes in wages (␤2); and the time-invariant characteristics of the covered firm size, large or medium (␤3). The secondlevel interactions control for changes over time for disabled workers
(␤4), time-invariant characteristics of disabled workers in the covered
firm size (␤5), and changes over time within a covered firm size (␤6).
The third-level interaction (␤7) captures all variation in wages specific
to the disabled workers (relative to nondisabled workers) in the covered
firm size (relative to uncovered firms) in the years after the firm was
covered by ADA (relative to before ADA). The uncovered firms for
the large firm analysis contain both small- and medium-sized organizations (n ⬍ 25). Uncovered firms for the medium firm analysis contain
small entities only (n ⬍ 10); large firms are not included in the medium
firm analysis.11 The results of the medium firm analysis are somewhat
contaminated by the fact that the ADA covers firms with 15 or more
employees, so the indicator for medium firms contains some employers
not technically covered by the ADA (those who employ more than 10
but fewer than 15 workers). The covariates included in the regression
are detailed in Table 3.3, which presents the estimation results.
The results in Table 3.3 indicate the following. Workers in large
and medium (covered) firms earn higher wages than workers in small
firms (see the coefficient on covered); disabled workers in large and
medium firms earn higher wages, holding everything else constant,
than nondisabled workers in those firms (see the coefficient on disable
⳯ covered); and wages of disabled workers covered by the ADA did
not change post-ADA relative to disabled workers not covered (see the
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Table 3.3 OLS Selectivity-Corrected Regression Results for Log Real
Wages, across Disability Status, Covered Firm Size, and ADA
Implementation, CPS

Regressor
Intercept
Age
Age squared
Female ⳱ 1
Nonwhite ⳱ 1
Single household ⳱ 1
High school grad ⳱ 1
Some college ⳱ 1
College grad ⳱ 1
Advanced degree ⳱ 1
disable ⳱ 1
post ⳱ 1
covered ⳱ 1
disable ⳯ post ⳱ 1
disable ⳯ covered ⳱ 1
post⳯covered ⳱ 1
disable⳯post⳯covered⳱1

Large firms (nⱖ25)
as covered group
4.4252***
(0.0368)
0.0838***
(0.0169)
ⳮ0.0009
(0.0061)
ⳮ0.3505***
(0.0237)
ⳮ0.0079*
(0.0044)
ⳮ0.0905***
(0.0013)
0.1374***
(0.0032)
0.2023***
(0.0055)
0.3093***
(0.0055)
0.4246***
(0.0064)
ⳮ0.2780***
(0.0047)
ⳮ0.0273***
(0.0057)
0.0982***
(0.0047)
ⳮ0.0570*
(0.0322)
0.0572**
(0.0264)
0.0245***
(0.0066)
0.0517
(0.0382)

Medium firms
(10ⱕn⬍25) as
covered group
3.9121***
(0.0820)
0.0966***
(0.0266)
ⳮ0.0011
(0.0131)
ⳮ0.4264***
(0.0357)
0.0041
(0.0098)
ⳮ0.0683***
(0.0023)
0.2670***
(0.0099)
0.3086***
(0.0112)
0.3965***
(0.0102)
0.5948***
(0.0124)
ⳮ0.4490***
(0.0210)
0.1071**
(0.0081)
0.1174***
(0.0086)
0.0317
(0.0431)
0.1074**
(0.0492)
ⳮ0.0146
(0.0123)
ⳮ0.0879
(0.0707)
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Table 3.3 (continued)

Regressor
 (selection term)
Number of observations
F statistic
Adjusted R2

Large firms (nⱖ25)
as covered group
ⳮ0.2767***
(0.0279)
182,318
5,253
0.51

Medium firms
(10ⱕn⬍25) as
covered group
0.0897
(0.0735)
55,459
1,048
0.40

NOTE: Reference group for large firm analysis is small and medium firms (n⬍25);
reference group for medium firm analysis is small firms only (n⬍10). Other regressors included in the estimation, but not reported here, include seven industry and five
occupation dummy variables, and region, central city, benefit receipt, and government
employer dummy variables. For the large firm comparison, post⳱0 for 1990–91 and
post⳱1 for 1992–93. For the medium firm comparison, post⳱0 for 1991–93 and
post⳱1 for 1994–96. Asymptotically consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
*** ⳱ significant at the 99 percent confidence level.
** ⳱ significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
* ⳱ significant at the 90 percent confidence level.

coefficient on disable ⳯ post ⳯ covered, which is not significant).
The implication is that the decline in wages of disabled workers relative
to those of nondisabled workers found in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 (and in
Table 3.3 by the coefficient on disable ⳯ post) is attributable to
something other than ADA coverage.
It is tempting to attribute the wage decline among disabled workers
relative to nondisabled workers found earlier as indication that firms
are passing accommodation costs on to disabled workers through lower
pay. However, given that the wage difference between covered and
noncovered disabled workers does not change post-ADA, there must
be some other explanation than direct accommodation costs for the
decline in wages relative to those of nondisabled workers. In other
words, if the lower wages among disabled workers were the result of
accommodation costs directly, then the wages of covered workers
should fall relative to those of noncovered workers (whose employers
are not required to incur the cost of accommodation). This is not what
we see from the firm-size analysis. It appears that all disabled workers
(covered or not) are suffering some ramifications of the ADA not directly attributable to the costs of accommodating their disabilities. The
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ADA may have created an environment in which firms view all disabled workers as a hiring risk (perhaps through fear of litigation upon
termination), and are passing that perceived greater risk on through
lower wages.

WAGE DECOMPOSITION
This section decomposes the wage differentials observed in Figure
3.1 to determine which factors have the greatest influence over their
levels and growth. Standard log wage equations are estimated separately for disabled and nondisabled workers. The following specification, presented for person i, is estimated separately for each year. In
these equations, ‘‘nd’’ denotes nondisabled and ‘‘d’’ denotes disabled:
(3.4)

lnWind ⳱ Xind␤nd Ⳮ ⑀ind
lnWid ⳱ Xid␤d Ⳮ ⑀id

where lnWi is the natural log hourly wage of workers,
Xi are explanatory variables,
␤ are coefficients to be estimated, and
⑀i is the random error term.
As was seen in Chapter 2, there may exist significant self-selection into
the labor market, particularly among the disabled population. In order
to obtain an estimate of ␤ representative of the population, this selection is controlled for using the standard Heckman (1979) two-step procedure.12 The first stage of this procedure involves estimating a binary
choice model of the following form:
(3.5)

Ỹi ⳱ Z⬘i␥ Ⳮ ui ,

ui ⬃ N(0,1)

where Zi are explanatory variables, ␥ are parameters to be estimated, ui
is the normally distributed random error, and individual i enters the
labor force if Ỹi ⬎ 0. Since Ỹi is unobserved, a binary variable, Yi, is
defined as
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(3.6)

Yi ⳱

再

1
⬎
as Ỹi 0.
0
ⱕ

The parameters, ␥, are estimated via maximum likelihood probit, and
the inverse-Mill’s ratio is constructed for inclusion in the wage equations, which are then estimated via OLS. The modified wage equations
are
(3.7)

lnWind ⳱ X⬘ind ␤nd Ⳮ ␦nd ˆ ind Ⳮ vind,
lnWid ⳱ X⬘id ␤d Ⳮ ␦dˆ id Ⳮ vid,

(Zij␥j)
, j ⳱ d, nd,
where all variables are as previously defined, ˆ ij ⳱
⌽(Zij␥j)
and vi is the newly defined random error.
The parameter values that result from OLS estimation of the relationships in Equation 7 can be used to decompose the wage differential
between disabled and nondisabled workers as follows:13
(3.8)

lnWnd ⳮ lnWd ⳱ 兺
␤ˆ knd(Xknd ⳮ Xkd) Ⳮ 兺
Xkd(␤ˆ knd ⳮ ␤ˆ d)
k
k
Ⳮ (␦ˆ  ⳮ ␦ˆ  ).
nd

nd

d

d

The first term on the right-hand side reflects the role of differences in
characteristics (endowments) that disabled and nondisabled workers
bring to the labor market; it is referred to as the ‘‘endowment effect.’’
The second term represents the differences among groups of workers
in how their characteristics are valued in the workplace. This second
term is often referred to as the ‘‘coefficient effect’’ or the ‘‘unexplained
portion’’ and is cautiously attributed to discriminatory behavior on the
part of the employer. The third term reflects the role of selection into
the labor market (across disability status). The selectivity-corrected
wage differential is calculated by subtracting the third (selectivity effect) term from the observed wage differential.
Figure 3.2 presents the results from this empirical analysis. The
solid and dashed lines that move together toward the bottom of the
figure represent the observed wage differential and the wage differen-
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Figure 3.2 Observed and Selectivity-Corrected Wage Differentials and
the Coefficient Effect as Percentage of Corrected Wage
Differential, CPS, 1981–2000
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tial corrected for selection, respectively. The dotted line represents the
coefficient effect as a percentage of the corrected wage differential.14
Observed and Selectivity-Corrected Wage Differentials
Since 1981 (the earliest year of data), there is a clear and persistent
increase in both the observed and selectivity-corrected wage differentials between disabled and nondisabled workers. Both differentials
show that over this whole time period, nondisabled workers earned, on
average, wages that were 23 percent higher than those of disabled
workers. In addition, the corrected wage differential increased from 13
percent to 30 percent, indicating a deterioration of earnings of disabled
workers relative to nondisabled workers over this time period. The
decline in relative earnings is consistent with a downward trend identified by Haveman and Wolfe (1990) beginning in 1974. However, the
growth in the wage differential appears to have been mitigated since
1992; the selectivity-corrected wage differential grew from 13 to 29
percent between 1981 and 1992, and has hovered around a mean of 28
percent since 1992, which was the first year of implementation of the
ADA.
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In addition, and particularly since 1996, individual selection into
the labor market, or differences in selection between disabled and nondisabled workers, does not seem to be biasing the observed wage differentials between the two groups. The one exception to this might be
the period 1992–1995. During this four-year span, the observed wage
differential underrepresented the wage differential corrected for selection. The implication of this is that disabled workers were positively
selecting into the labor market to a greater extent than nondisabled
workers, driving the observed wage of disabled workers as a whole
upward (and the wage differential downward). This is consistent with
the labor force participation decline observed in Chapter 2, if the disabled labor force nonparticipants beginning around 1992 had systematically lower earnings potential than the disabled persons who stayed in
the labor market. This would likely be the case as a result of the flow
of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) recipients to SSI
(Lewin Group 1999). This result is not consistent, however, with the
conjecture that the disabled workers entering the labor force post-ADA
were those with the most limiting disabilities (Chirikos 1991). Whatever might have been making the observed and selectivity-corrected
wage differentials diverge in the mid 1990s seems to have disappeared,
since the two series have basically followed identical paths since 1996.
The implication of this is that since 1996, selection into the labor market has had essentially the same impact on wages for disabled and
nondisabled workers; self-selection explains none of the remaining
wage differentials since that time.
Potential Wage Discrimination against Disabled Workers
The dotted line in the top part of Figure 3.2 reflects the coefficient
effect as a percent of the corrected wage differential. Over the entire
time period, the coefficient effect averages 77 percent of the corrected
wage differential, or clearly a majority of the difference in wages between disabled and nondisabled workers. While there is quite a bit of
variation over the years, the coefficient effect dominates the endowment effect in each year. The regressors in each year explain the usual
30–40 percent of the variation in wages of disabled workers and about
45 percent of the variation in wages of nondisabled workers (as indicated by the adjusted R2 of the regressions). Consequently, interpreting
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the entire coefficient effect as an indication of discrimination would
not be prudent. However, given the relative magnitude of the coefficient effect, the expected success in explaining wage variation, and the
number of observable characteristics included in the regression, it is
also unlikely that the coefficient effect can be completely dismissed
as the result of unmeasured characteristics of either the disabled or
nondisabled. Using data from the SIPP, Baldwin and Johnson (1995,
2000) also find that the coefficient effect is larger than the endowment
effect as a percentage of the selectivity-corrected differential in 1984
and in 1990. Using a similar methodology and data from 1972, Johnson and Lambrinos (1985) show that only 34–40 percent of the wage
differential between disabled and nondisabled workers was left unexplained by differences in endowments. Examining SIPP data from
1984 and 1993, DeLeire (2001) finds that only between 5 and 8 percent
of the earnings gap is attributable to the coefficient effect.
Examining the endowment and coefficient effects in greater detail,
it is of interest to see which set of regressors makes the largest contributions to these components. Table 3.4 presents the median contribution (across years) of the groups of regressors that control for
occupation, industry, and education. While the contributions vary
across the years, these median values represent the typical scenario
(i.e., there is no obvious trend in any of these contributing factors), and
it is usually the case that occupation and education were the largest
Table 3.4 Contribution of Regressors to Log Wage Differentials, Median
across Years, CPS, 1981–2000
Contribution
to the
endowment
effect

Contribution
to the
coefficient
effect

Occupation
Industry
Education

0.0452
0.0085
0.0363

0.0424
0.0817
ⳮ0.0419

Median total effects

0.0768

0.1738

NOTE: The contributions of occupation, industry, and education do not add up to the
total effect because these numbers represent the median across all years and also do
not represent all regressors in the wage regression.
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contributors to the endowment effect and that industry was the largest
contributor to the coefficient effect. It is also of interest to note that in
18 of the 20 years, the return to education acted to decrease the wage
differential between disabled and nondisabled workers (the contribution of the education regressors to the coefficient effect was negative).
In other words, disabled workers typically received a greater return to
their educational investment than nondisabled workers.15 Regarding
endowments, it is clear that nondisabled workers bring greater educational attainment to the labor market and are more likely to locate in
the higher-paying occupations and industries (a phenomenon that will
be explored more fully in Chapter 4); these observations are evidenced
by positive contributions made by the occupation, industry, and education regressors to the endowment effect.
An additional feature provided by the analysis is that the relative
importance of the coefficient effect over time can be evaluated. While
perhaps not very obvious in Figure 3.2, there is actually a (slightly)
significant negative trend in the coefficient effect as a percentage of
the corrected wage differential. On average, the contribution of the
coefficient effect to the overall wage differential declines an average of
1.7 percentage points per year from 1981 to 2000.16 In addition, the
endowment effect as a percentage of the corrected wage differential
increased an average of 0.6 of a percentage point per year over the
same time period.17 Consequently, another silver lining to the rising
wage differential between disabled and nondisabled workers, and to
the large portion of that differential not explained by differences in
endowments, is that any potential discrimination against disabled
workers, as measured by the coefficient effect, is declining. Additionally, this result suggests that one way to combat the rising wage differential is to improve disabled workers’ endowments (e.g., greater
investments in human capital, or placement in higher-paying occupations or industries). It is also important to note, however, that these
improvements appear to be a continuation of a trend rather than any
dramatic post-ADA shift.
BENEFIT ANALYSIS
As the percentage of fringe benefits in total compensation continues to increase, benefits become an increasingly important contributor
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to workers’ labor market experience. The CPS allows identification of
a worker receiving two fringe benefits from his or her employer: health
insurance and a pension plan. The data used for this analysis were
obtained from the CPS March supplemental questionnaire and therefore refer to benefit coverage in the years 1980–1999. The probabilities of being included in an employer’s pension plan or of receiving
health insurance through an employer were fairly stable across the
years; however, as Figure 3.3 shows, the proportion of nondisabled
workers relative to disabled workers included in a pension plan has
grown over the time period.
In 1980, nearly 11 percent more of nondisabled workers were included in a pension plan than disabled workers were. This difference
grew to 17 percentage points by 1999. The greater proportion of nondisabled workers receiving either benefit could be closely related to the
types of jobs disabled versus nondisabled workers hold. The increase
in the difference in proportions could also be related to disabled workers moving into jobs less likely to offer these benefits. For example,
Chapter 4 will detail the growth in part-time employment among disabled workers. Neither phenomenon, however, appears to have been
impacted by events surrounding the passage and implementation of the
ADA. The goal of the analysis of this section is to determine whether
Figure 3.3 Difference in Proportion of Nondisabled and Disabled
Workers Receiving Benefits, CPS, 1980–1999
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disabled workers are more or less likely than nondisabled workers to
be included in their employers’ pension plan or to have their employers
pay for health insurance, while controlling for all other individual and
job characteristics.
Since the observed model is an indicator of coverage/inclusion or
not, the empirical model is specified as a probit:
(3.9)

B̃ij ⳱ Q⬘ij Ⳮ vi ,

i ⬃ N(0,1)

where individual i receives benefit j ( j ⳱ health insurance, pension
plan inclusion) if B̃ij ⬎ 0. Since B̃ij is unobserved, a binary variable,
B̃ij, is defined as
(3.10)

Bij ⳱

再

1
⬎
as B̃ij 0.
0
ⱕ

The parameters, , are estimated via maximum likelihood probit. Qi
comprises various individual and job characteristics for worker i, including a dummy variable indicating whether the worker is disabled or
not. The model is estimated on a sample of workers only; thus, the
results are generalizable solely to workers. The marginal effect of
being disabled on receiving a benefit is calculated as the partial derivative for each worker, then averaged over the entire sample.18 The estimation results are depicted in Figure 3.4.19 A reliable measure of
annual earnings is available only since 1987; therefore, the marginal
effects only cover the period 1987–1999.20
The marginal impact of being disabled on fringe benefit receipt
follows the same path for both health insurance and pension plan inclusion: an increasingly negative impact of being disabled on the probability of receiving benefits. Since these marginal effects are calculated
from specifications which included a control for earnings, the increase
cannot be attributed to disabled workers merely being employed in jobs
that are lower paying (thus, less likely to offer fringe benefits). The
specification also included controls for hours of work (thus the potential impact of part-time employment), occupation, industry, and individual human capital characteristics. While there does seem to be a
fairly significant intensification in the negative impact of being disabled in 1995, it would be hard to attribute that to anything other than
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Figure 3.4 Marginal Effect of Disability on the Probability of Fringe
Benefit Receipt, CPS, 1987–1999
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the continuation of a trend, since the negative impact has diminished
somewhat in recent years. However, the negative trend cannot be ignored. There is some evidence that a weakening in 1989 of antidiscrimination laws governing provision of health insurance resulted in
lower rates of benefit incidence among ‘‘peripheral’’ workers, such as
recent hires or those working part-time (Farber and Levy 2000). If
disabled workers fall into the category of ‘‘peripheral,’’ this might explain some of the deterioration in health insurance receipt among disabled relative to nondisabled workers.
An additional consideration that might explain the deterioration of
relative health insurance coverage is that the Employment Opportunities for Disabled Americans Act and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 amended Title XVI of the Social Security Act to allow
SSI recipients to continue participating in Medicaid (under specific
circumstances) even if their earnings exceeded the SSI qualifying level
(59 FR 41403, 12 August 1994). This amendment became effective in
August 1994. The change would not have typically affected disabled
workers already employed but would have encouraged disabled individuals who previously had not sought employment because of a lack
of health insurance to do so. While this law says nothing about the
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provision of pension plans, fringe benefits are highly correlated with
one another, so it is not a surprise that as the proportion of disabled
workers without employer-provided health insurance increased, the
proportion without a pension plan also increased.

CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this chapter was to evaluate the relative compensation experience of disabled and nondisabled workers over time, and to
determine whether any change in that experience is evident in relation
to the implementation of the ADA. A pooled, cross-sectional analysis
using the CPS data indicated that overall, disabled workers experienced
a 3 percent decline in real wages, relative to nondisabled workers, postADA, relative to pre-ADA. Results from the SIPP are consistent with
the CPS results and show that the wage experience of those with musculoskeletal disabilities is driving that observed wage decline. The real
wages of workers with musculoskeletal disabilities declined 4 percent
more than for workers without disabilities post-ADA, relative to preADA; workers with other types of disabilities did not experience any
different wage change than did nondisabled workers. These results
together indicate that overall, the cost of accommodating workers’ disabilities exceeds the gain in productivity of those workers. In addition,
if accommodating musculoskeletal disabilities results in more costly
structural investments, the SIPP results lend support to the theory that
wages of disabled workers are sensitive to the degree of accommodation (in terms of cost) required of the employer. This result is consistent with the finding by Gunderson and Hyatt (1996) that firms pass on
(through lower wages) the cost of workplace modifications to the hired
disabled worker. In light of this, the tax credits in place to assist certain
employers in absorbing these costs (Hays 1999) either have not gone
far enough or are not being widely used.
In contrast with these overall (disabled versus nondisabled) results,
it was found that disabled workers employed by firms covered by the
ADA did not experience any wage deterioration relative to disabled
workers not covered by the ADA. This combination of results suggests
that the wage decline experience by disabled workers relative to non-
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disabled workers is not the result of explicit accommodation costs
being passed on to disabled workers through lower wages (in which
case, the wages of covered disabled workers should have deteriorated
the most). Rather, all disabled workers seem to be bearing the burden
of a perceived additional hiring risk associated with them that may
exist post-ADA.
Consistent with the overall relative wage decline identified through
the pooled, cross-sectional analysis, further study illustrates that the
positive wage differential between disabled and nondisabled workers
has risen considerably since 1981. However, the trend does seem to
have flattened out since the early 1990s. The large portion of that
differential not explained by differences in endowments has also been
declining over time, indicating that any potential wage discrimination
against disabled workers is at least falling. Additionally, the fact that
worker endowments (occupation, education, etc.) contribute positively
to the measured wage differential suggests that one way to fight the
rising wage differential is to enhance disabled workers’ endowments
(e.g., greater investments in human capital, or placement in higherpaying occupations or industries).
In addition to the rising wage differentials, the negative impact of
being disabled on the probability of receiving benefits has also been
rising. One potential contributor to this situation is the allowance (as
of August 1994) for some disabled workers to continue receiving
Medicaid even when their earnings surpass SSI cut-off levels. The
combination of the rising wage differential and decreasing probability
of disabled workers receiving employer-sponsored health and pension
benefits leads to the conclusion that the relative position of disabled
workers regarding compensation is deteriorating overall.
The ADA provides a clear mandate ‘‘for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities’’ (section 2 of the
ADA). The evidence provided in this chapter suggests that while potential wage discrimination against the disabled appears to be declining, the improvement is taking place at a very slow rate, and not
necessarily as a result of the ADA, as the trend goes back at least to
1981. In addition, even if discrimination is decreasing, the overall
compensation experience (including benefit provision) for disabled
workers, relative to nondisabled workers, is declining, as well.
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Notes
1. See also Burkhauser, Haveman, and Wolfe (1993) for an analysis of the wellbeing of the disabled.
2. Examples of other applications of this method of analysis can be found in Card
(1992), Gruber (1994, 1996), Zveglich and Rodgers (1996), and Hamermesh and
Trejo (2000). The reader is reminded of the caveats detailed by Heckman (1996).
Also see further discussion in Chapter 2.
3. The first year in the analysis was 1984 due to the poor representation of disabled
workers in some occupations in 1983, and since union status was not indicated in
1981 or 1982.
4. While insignificantly different from zero, the coefficient in DeLeire’s pooled,
cross-sectional analysis was also negative. The results reported in Table 3.1 are
robust to defining post as years past 1990 and to defining post as 1994 and later.
5. It is important to note that since there is no measure of labor market experience
available in the CPS survey, and since disabled workers likely have less labor
market experience than nondisabled workers of the same age, the coefficient on
the disable dummy variable may be capturing some of the impact of labor market
experience on the wage. The inability to control for labor market experience
should have a smaller impact, however, on the coefficient for the interaction term
of disable ⳯ post, since the consequence of the absence of an experience variable should be similar across time.
6. See Appendix B for disability types grouped for these classifications.
7. The musculoskeletal grouping includes disabilities of the special senses (e.g.,
hearing, seeing).
8. See the wage decomposition section in this chapter for details of the procedure
used to control for self-selection.
9. Whereas the wages of those with mental disorders did not deteriorate post-ADA,
it is of interest to note that the largest (negative) coefficient among types of disability (indicating overall relative wage performance) is that on mental
(ⳮ0.3427). This is consistent with the findings of Baldwin (1999).
10. The pre and post periods were chosen to achieve balance in the number of years;
the results did not change if the number of years were extended.
11. These definitions of ‘‘large’’ and ‘‘small’’ differ from those used in Chapter 2.
12. This specification could also be modified to account for the likely joint determination of wages and hours worked; Moffitt (1984), Lundberg (1985), Altonji and
Paxson (1988), and Tummers and Woittiez (1991) all demonstrate the importance
of the simultaneous determination of wages and hours. This joint model is not
estimated here for simplification, but hours are included as a covariate in the wage
equation.
13. Since only 3 percent of the working sample is disabled, nearly all of the coefficient effect is attributed to the disadvantage experienced by the disabled, since
the linear combination of the two worlds yields estimates very close to those
experienced in the nondisabled world (see Cotton 1988). Other renditions of this
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decomposition, such as Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) would result in a similar
outcome, since the disabled make up such a small portion of the whole workforce.
This same strategy is followed by Baldwin and Johnson (2000) in their analysis
of labor market discrimination against disabled workers.
The data generating this figure are found in Table C.5 in Appendix C.
This finding is consistent with the results reported by Hollenbeck and Kimmel
(2001) that people with poor health or disability earn a positive return to education and training, although they find that return to be equal to that of nondisabled
individuals.
The coefficient of ⳮ0.017 on a linear trend estimation had a standard error of
0.0067, making it significantly different from zero at the 95 percent confidence
level.
The coefficient of 0.006 on a linear trend estimation had a standard error of
0.0027, making it significantly different from zero at the 95 percent confidence
level.
This is preferable to calculating the marginal benefit for the average person, since
we are most likely to be interested in the marginal effect for a worker drawn at
random, rather than the marginal effect for the average person in the sample.
Table C.6 contains the marginal effects used to generate Figure 3.4.
An identical analysis was performed for the entire 1980–1999 time period, excluding the control for earnings. The marginal effect of being disabled was significantly larger, as would be expected, but exhibited the same trend going back
to 1980 as that depicted in Figure 3.4.

4
Hours of Work, Distribution,
and Representation
In addition to the wage, there are a number of other characteristics
that can be used to quantify the quality of a worker’s job. One feature
is whether a job is full-time or part-time. While the availability of
part-time employment may be important to disabled workers (and perhaps more so than to nondisabled workers), part-time jobs are often
accompanied by lower pay, fewer benefits, and less stability.1 The first
part of this chapter compares and evaluates the incidence of part-time
employment and type of part-time employment (voluntary versus involuntary) across disability status and across time. If disabled workers
are considered marginal workers, then they would be more likely to be
employed part-time. If, however, disabled part-time workers are more
likely to be voluntarily, versus involuntarily, employed part-time, then
their part-time status may indicate a greater flexibility that might be
needed to accommodate the worker’s situation. The chapter then explores the full-time wage premium earned by disabled and nondisabled
workers. Disabled workers may not earn as great a premium for committing to a full-time schedule as nondisabled workers. Given the potentially higher fixed cost of accommodating the worker’s disability,
the individual may have to commit to a greater number of hours before
seeing the premium; this could show up in a lower premium at any
given definition of part-time employment.2
A major characteristic of one’s job is its occupation or industry. A
popular indicator of the quality of employment of a disadvantaged
group is how well that group is represented in desirable occupations
relative to some comparison group, and how the disadvantaged group’s
distribution across occupations compares with that of the comparison
group. The occupation that a worker holds, or the industry in which
someone works, can play an important role in that person’s satisfaction
and potential advancement in the labor market. Dual labor market
theory suggests that some workers are relegated to undesirable (e.g.,
low-paying, dead-end) jobs from which they have virtually no escape.3
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The second part of this chapter will explore the distribution of disabled
workers across occupations and industries, relative to the distribution
of nondisabled workers, as well as examine the representation of disabled workers in ‘‘desirable’’ jobs. The emphasis will be on how the
relative distribution and representation have changed over time and
whether the ADA seems to have played a role in their current determination.

HOURS OF WORK
Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1 highlighted a growing disparity in average
hours worked per week between disabled and nondisabled workers.
This section looks more closely at the role part-time employment plays
in that observed decline in hours and determines whether it reflects
voluntary or involuntary behavior on the part of disabled workers.
Part-time employment among the disabled may not be a sign of marginalization or discrimination because of these individuals’ unique
physical or mental capabilities and potential income sources. Such
employment may be sought by disabled workers (and employers for
their disabled workers) as a way to accommodate health limitations. In
addition, part-time employment may provide additional earnings that
do not jeopardize disability benefits based on income levels.
Incidence of Part-time Employment
Figure 4.1 depicts the percentage of both disabled and nondisabled
workers that are employed part-time for each year, 1981 to 2000. Although there is some discrepancy as to the appropriate definition of
part-time employment (see Hotchkiss 1991), the CPS definition of
‘‘less than 35 hours per week’’ is retained here. The use of respondentsupplied reasons (later in the chapter) for working less than 35 hours
per week makes this the practical choice.
As has been suggested in Chapters 1 and 3, part-time employment
has grown among disabled workers between 1981 and 2000 and has
declined somewhat among nondisabled workers. By itself, this observation is consistent with the contention that disabled workers are being
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Figure 4.1 Percentage of Disabled and Nondisabled Workers That Are
Employed Part-Time, CPS, 1981–2000
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pushed to the fringe and becoming more marginalized. However, these
raw numbers do not control for other job or individual characteristics.
In order to appropriately model the impact of having a worklimiting disability on the incidence of part-time employment among
workers, a bivariate probit with selection model, as in Chapter 2, is
specified. This model estimates the probability of being employed
part-time while controlling for unobservable determinants of being
both employed and employed part-time. The bivariate specification
allows for the two outcomes (employment and part-time employment)
to be impacted by the same unobservable factors (e.g., motivation).
The selectivity part of the model is merely a recognition that we do
not get to see the part-time employment outcome unless the person is
employed to begin with, and that those we observe as employed may
have systematically different part-time options or make different hours
choices than those not employed. Correcting for selectivity allows us
to make inferences for anyone from the population, not just those we
observe as employed; this is what makes the probability unconditional.
The following model defines the relationship assumed between the
employment of person i (empi), the probability of being employed part-
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time (pti), and individual characteristics that are believed to affect the
employment outcome (X1i) and the incidence of part-time employment
(X2i):
(4.1)

empi ⳱ ␣1 Ⳮ ␥⬘1X1i Ⳮ ␤1 disablei Ⳮ ⑀1i ⳱

(4.2)

pti ⳱ ␣2 Ⳮ ␥⬘2X2iⳭ␤2 disablei Ⳮ ⑀2i
⳱

再

1 if person i is employed
0 otherwise

再

1 if person i is employed part-time
0 otherwise.

disablei is equal to 1 if person i is disabled, 0 otherwise; ⑀1i and ⑀2i are
distributed as a bivariate normal with means equal to 0, variances equal
to 1, and correlation equal to ; and ␣j, ␥j, and ␤j ( j⳱1, 2) are parameter coefficients to be estimated. In addition, of course, pti is only
observed if empi⳱1.4 X1i and X2i include individual demographic characteristics detailed in the notes to Table 4.1. The impact of having a
work-limiting disability on part-time employment, then, is determined
by calculating the unconditional probability of being employed parttime for each individual, varying the disability index between 0 and 1,
then averaging across the sample.5 Separate specifications are estimated
for each year, and the marginal impact of having a work-limiting disability is calculated. The estimation results are depicted in Figure 4.2.6
The line in Figure 4.2 reflects an increase in the impact of being
disabled on the determinant of the unconditional probability of being
employed part-time. A work-limiting disability increased the probability of a worker being observed as employed part-time by 12 percentage
points in 2000. This is double the 6 percentage points impact of a
disability on being employed part-time estimated for 1981. What is
also apparent from the graph is that this effect has experienced a rather
consistent upward trend during the entire time period, with the largest
adjustment occuring during the ADA phase-in period.
In order to quantify the apparent growth in selectivity-corrected
part-time employment among disabled workers, relative to nondisabled
workers, the pooled, cross-sectional analysis introduced in Chapter 2
is applied here. The idea behind the analysis is to estimate a crosssectional, time-series bivariate probit model with dummy variables rep-
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Figure 4.2 Impact of Having a Disability on Being Employed Part-Time,
CPS, 1981–2000
Percentage-point
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resenting whether the observation shows up in the data pre-ADA or
post-ADA and whether the observation is a disabled or nondisabled
person. These dummy variables are also interacted to determine
whether being disabled had any greater impact on employment after
the ADA than before the ADA, relative to the experience of a nondisabled person.7
The pooled, cross-sectional analysis looks just like the bivariate
probit with selection estimated in one year, except with the additional
time-period dummy variables:
(4.3)

empi ⳱ ␣1 Ⳮ ␥⬘1X1i Ⳮ ␤1 disablei Ⳮ 1 posti
Ⳮ 1 disablei ⳯ posti Ⳮ ⑀1i

(4.4)

pti ⳱ ␣2 Ⳮ ␥⬘2 X2i Ⳮ ␤2 disablei Ⳮ 2 posti
Ⳮ 2 disablei ⳯ posti Ⳮ ⑀2i.

Again, empi ⳱ 1 if person i is in the labor force, 0 otherwise, and pti
is not observed unless empi ⳱ 1. disablei is equal to 1 if person i is
disabled, 0 otherwise; posti is equal to 1 if person i is observed in 1992
or later (as in Chapter 2); X1i and X2i include individual demographic
characteristics; ⑀1i and ⑀2i are distributed as a bivariate normal with
means equal to 0, variances equal to 1, and correlation equal to ; and
j and j ( j ⳱ 1, 2) are additional coefficients to be estimated.
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In this framework, the affected group (the disabled) is controlled
for by a dummy variable indicating whether the individual has a worklimiting disability, and the time period is controlled for by a dummy
variable indicating whether the ADA had been implemented yet or not.
Because of the model’s nonlinearity, a single parameter coefficient
does not tell us the additional impact the ADA had on the difference in
employment probabilities between the disabled and nondisabled. Table
4.1 details the regression results.
Using the parameter estimates, the difference in the impact of having a work-limiting disability on part-time employment across the two
time periods can be calculated by evaluating the probabilities of interest for each person, varying the disable and post dummy variables,
then taking the difference between these probabilities and averaging
those differences across the sample. This calculation translates the
Table 4.1 Employment and Part-Time Employment Bivariate Probit
with Selection Results, CPS Combined Years 1981–2000

Regressor
disable ⳱ 1
post (year ⳱ 1992 or later) ⳱ 1
disable ⳯ post ⳱ 1
Rho
Log-likelihood
Number of observations

Employment
equation
ⳮ0.1118***
(0.0146)
ⳮ0.0112**
(0.0051)
ⳮ0.0298
(0.0224)
0.7983***
(0.0054)
ⳮ477,354
906,646

Part-time
employment
equation
0.3474***
(0.0130)
0.0017
(0.0037)
0.1775***
(0.0190)

NOTE: Regressors included both in the employment and part-time employment equations (but not reported here) include age, education, region, race, gender, marital
status, and a central city residence indicator. Regressors unique to the employment
equation include the state unemployment rate and the number of weeks worked last
year. Regressors unique to the part-time employment equation include occupation
and industry dummies, nonlabor income, and a government employer indicator. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** ⳱ significant at the 99 percent confidence level.
** ⳱ significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
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estimated coefficients from the bivariate probit into a 5 percentage
point greater probability of disabled workers being employed part-time
than nondisabled workers, post-ADA relative to pre-ADA. In addition,
the probability of nondisabled workers being employed part-time
changed by less than one-hundredth of a percentage point post- versus
pre-ADA.
Type of Part-Time Employment
Given the conclusion that disabled workers are more likely than
the nondisabled to be employed part-time and that the disparity is
growing, an important consideration is what is the nature of the parttime jobs? Are disabled workers more likely to be employed other
than full-time by choice? In order to answer this question, a univariate
probit analysis is performed. The purpose of the probit analysis is to
determine, among part-time workers, whether the probability of being
voluntarily (versus involuntarily) employed part-time has increased or
decreased for disabled workers, relative to nondisabled part-time workers, holding constant other factors that may determine the classification.8 The results of this probit estimation can be found in Figure
4.3.9 The graph depicts the marginal effect of being disabled on the
probability that a part-time worker’s status is voluntary. The results
are generalizable to part-time workers only. The observation of interest from Figure 4.3 is that prior to 1992, being disabled decreased a
part-time worker’s probability of being voluntarily (versus involuntarily) employed part-time; however after 1992, disabled part-time
workers became more likely to be voluntarily employed part-time than
nondisabled part-time workers. The implication is that much of the
growth in part-time employment has been voluntary (for a given set of
individual characteristics) and may actually be in response to the better
accommodation of a worker’s disability.10
In order to quantify what may be obvious from Figure 4.3, a
pooled, cross-sectional approach is taken to determine the extent to
which the disabled are more likely than the nondisabled to be voluntarily employed part-time post-ADA versus pre-ADA. Since this analysis
is concerned only with part-time workers as a group, a linear probability model is estimated so that the parameter coefficient is directly interpretable as a marginal effect; again, the results are generalizable only
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Figure 4.3 Impact of Having a Disability on Being Voluntarily Employed
Part-Time, CPS, 1981–2000
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to the part-time employed population. The linear probability model
takes the following form:
(4.5)

vpti ⳱ ␣3 Ⳮ ␥⬘3 X3i Ⳮ ␤3 disablei Ⳮ 3 posti
Ⳮ 3 disablei ⳯ posti Ⳮ ⑀3i

where vpti is equal to 1 if person i is voluntarily employed part-time,
0 if involuntarily part-time,
Xi is a set of covariates for each person (individual demographic
characteristics),
disablei is equal to 1 if person i has a work-limiting disability,
and
posti is equal to 1 if person i is observed in 1992 or later.
In this framework, the affected group (the disabled) is controlled for
by a dummy variable indicating whether the individual has a worklimiting disability, and the time period is controlled for by a dummy
variable indicating whether the ADA had been implemented yet or not.
The coefficient of interest (3), therefore, measures the change in employment probability of disabled workers, relative to nondisabled
workers, after implementation of the ADA, relative to before implementation (the other parameter coefficients are analagous to their coun-
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terparts in Equations 4.3 and 4.4). X3i includes individual demographic
characteristics. Table 4.2 details the regressors included in the estimation and the regression results.
The coefficient on disable ⳯ post confirms that the probability of
being voluntarily (versus involuntarily) employed part-time increased
4 percentage points more for disabled part-time workers than for nondisabled part-time workers, post-ADA. This result, taken with the
overall growth in part-time employment, suggests that part-time employment and flexible hours may be a mechanism by which employers
are able and willing to accommodate workers’ disabilities.
Evidence from the SIPP
The pooled, cross-sectional methodologies are appealed to again
in order to determine the impact of different types of disabilities on
the incidence of part-time employment and on the kind of part-time
Table 4.2 Linear Probability, Voluntary Part-Time Employment Results,
CPS Combined Years 1981–2000
Regressor
disable ⳱ 1
post (year ⳱ 1992 or later) ⳱ 1
disable ⳯ post ⳱ 1
Adjusted R2
F statistic
Number of observations

Coefficient
ⳮ0.0158**
(0.0072)
ⳮ0.0549***
(0.0023)
0.0401***
(0.0102)
0.08
481.91
170,870

NOTE: Observations from 1983 were not included because of the unreliable representation across occupational categories. Regressors included both in the employment
and part-time employment equations (but not reported here) include age, education,
region, race, gender, marital status, and a central city residence indicator. Regressors
unique to the employment equation include the state unemployment rate and the number of weeks worked last year. Regressors unique to the part-time employment equation include occupation and industry dummies, nonlabor income, and a government
employer indicator. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** ⳱ significant at the 99 percent confidence level.
** ⳱ significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
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employment across time using the SIPP data set. The bivariate probit
model with selection is estimated with two different specifications.
The first includes only a single dummy variable indicator for having a
work-limiting disability; the second includes multiple dummies indicating the type of disability a person might have. The general structure
of the estimation strategies looks like this:

冘␤ distype Ⳮ  post
n

(4.6)

empi ⳱ ␣1 Ⳮ ␥⬘1X1i Ⳮ

k
1
k⳱(S,I,M,O)

k
i

1

冘 distype ⳯ post Ⳮ ⑀

i

n

Ⳮ

k
1
k⳱(S,I,M,O)

k
i

i

1i

冘␤ distype Ⳮ  post
n

(4.7)

pti ⳱ ␣2 Ⳮ ␥⬘2 X2i Ⳮ

k
2
k⳱(S,I,M,O)

k
i

冘 distype ⳯ post Ⳮ ⑀

2

i

n

Ⳮ

k
2
k⳱(S,I,M,O)

k
i

i

2i

where

冦

disablei in specification 1
distypei ⳱ musculoskeletali(S); internali(I); mentali(M); and
otheri(O) in specification 2.
Again, empi ⳱ 1 if person i is in the labor force and employed, 0
otherwise, and pti is not observed unless empi ⳱ 1. X1i and X2i include
individual demographic characteristics; posti is equal to 1 if person i
is observed in 1992 or later; disablei is equal to 1 if person i has a
work-limiting disability; musculoskeletali is equal to 1 if person i
has a musculoskeletal disability;11 internali is equal to 1 if person i
has a disability involving the internal systems; mentali is equal to 1 if
person i has a mental disability; otheri is equal to 1 if person i has a
disability classified as ‘‘other’’; and ⑀1i and ⑀2i are distributed as a bivariate normal with means equal to 0, variances equal to 1; and correlation
equal to ; and ␣, ␥, ␤, , and  are all parameters to be estimated.
In this framework, the affected group (the disabled) is controlled
for by a dummy variable (or set of dummy variables) indicating
whether the individual has a work-limiting disability (or type of disability), and the time period is controlled for by a dummy variable
indicating whether the ADA had been implemented yet or not. The
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difference in the impact of having a work-limiting disability on employment across the two time periods can be calculated by evaluating
the probabilities of interest for each person, varying the distype and
post dummy variables, then taking the difference between these probabilities, and averaging across the sample.
An additional estimation is performed on a subsample of part-time
workers only to determine whether the type of disability impacts the
incidence of voluntary part-time employment. The following equation
is estimated via OLS:
(4.8)

冘

vpti ⳱ ␣3 Ⳮ ␥⬘1X3i Ⳮ ␤k3 distypeik Ⳮ 3 posti

冘 distype ⳯ post Ⳮ ⑀ .
k⳱(S,I,M,O)

n

Ⳮ

k
3
k⳱(S,I,M,O)

k
i

i

3i

Table 4.3 contains the results from estimating both specifications
of Equation 4.7 and both specifications of Equation 4.8. The two specifications for each equation correspond to how distype is defined. Consistent with the findings from the CPS, the results in Table 4.3 indicate
that the probability that a disabled worker is employed part-time increased more than the probability for a nondisabled worker, post-ADA
relative to pre-ADA. The coefficient of 0.0925 in column 1 of Table
4.3 translates into a relative 2 percentage point greater probability for
part-time employment for the disabled post-ADA. In addition, the
strongest impact was experienced by those with musculoskeletal
(0.1084) and mental (0.1730) disabilities. Regarding voluntary parttime employment, the results suggest that while the impact of having a
disability on the probability of being voluntarily employed part-time
increased post-ADA, that rise was not significantly different from zero
for disabled workers as a group. However, those with mental disabilities seem to have experienced a greater increase in the probability of
being voluntarily employed part-time than nondisabled part-time workers, post-ADA. This makes sense if mental disorders are the type of
disability most effectively accommodated by a flexible or reducedhours work schedule.12
Full-Time Wage Premium
Even beyond whether a part-time job is voluntary or involuntary is
the wage penalty experienced by part-time workers. It is well docu-

Probability of part-time employmenta
Regressor
disable ⳱ 1

Disability
indicator only

Musculoskeletal disability ⳱ 1

0.2024***
(0.0188)
0.0090
(0.0059)
0.0925***
(0.0238)
—

Internal Systems disability ⳱ 1

—

Mental disorder disability ⳱ 1

—

Other disability ⳱ 1

—

post (year ⳱ 1992 or later) ⳱ 1
disable ⳯ post ⳱ 1

Type of
disability indicated
—
0.0088
(0.0059)
—
0.0821***
(0.0262)
0.2743***
(0.0356)
0.4177***
(0.0464)
0.2587***
(0.0481)

Probability of voluntary part-timeb
Disability
indicator only
0.0151
(0.0102)
ⳮ0.0380***
(0.0035)
0.0095
(0.0127)
—
—
—
—

Type of
disability indicated
—
ⳮ0.0683***
(0.0038)
—
ⳮ0.0221
(0.0156)
0.0275
(0.0194)
0.0398*
(0.0238)
0.0414
(0.0261)
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Table 4.3 Employment and Part-Time Employment Bivariate Probit with Selection and Linear Probability Model
for Voluntary Part-Time Employment, SIPP 1986–1997

musculoskeletal ⳯ post ⳱ 1

—

internal ⳯ post ⳱ 1

—

mental ⳯ post ⳱ 1

—

other ⳯ post ⳱1

—
—
ⳮ199,110
360,036

—
ⳮ199,021
360,036

—
—
—
—
0.06
—
72,890

0.0238
(0.0195)
0.0068
(0.0258)
0.0907***
(0.0281)
0.0266
(0.0344)
0.07
—
59,059

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** ⳱ significant at the 99 percent confidence level.
** ⳱ significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
* ⳱ significant at the 90 percent confidence level.
a
These results are from estimation of a bivariate probit with selection. Other regressors included in the part-time employment equation
include age; age squared; nonlabor income; and gender, education, marital status, race, education, region, urban, government, industry,
and occupational dummy variables. The selection equation (not reported here) is an employment equation.
b
These results are from estimation of a linear probability model via OLS and are generalizable to the part-time population only. Other
regressors included in the voluntary part-time employment equation include age; age squared; and gender, education, marital status,
race, education, region, government, industry, and occupational dummy variables
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Adjusted R2
Log-likelihood
Number of observations

0.1084***
(0.0331)
ⳮ0.0013
(0.0476)
0.1730***
(0.0550)
ⳮ0.0302
(0.0627)
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mented that part-time workers earn considerably less per hour for not
making a full-time commitment to his/her employer. This penalty can
range from 30 to 60 percent lower wages depending on gender and race
groups (Averett and Hotchkiss 1996), and it is a main reason that parttime jobs are considered undesirable (Blank 1990). The reason typically given as to why part-time workers earn a lower wage is the presence of fixed costs associated with hiring personnel. Employers are
able to spread these fixed costs over more hours for full-time workers,
allowing them to pay higher wages to such individuals. One concern
might be that the fixed costs of hiring disabled workers are even greater
than for nondisabled workers so that the wage differential between fulltime and part-time disabled workers is larger than the differential between full-time and part-time nondisabled workers.
This section presents the full-time/part-time wage differentials experienced by disabled and nondisabled workers, controlling for their
selection into the labor market. Standard log wage equations are estimated separately for disabled and nondisabled workers. In the equations for person i, ‘‘ft’’ denotes full-time, and ‘‘pt’’ denotes part-time:
(4.9)

ln Wift ⳱ Xift␤ft Ⳮ ⑀ift
ln Wipt ⳱ Xipt␤pt Ⳮ ⑀ipt

where lnWi is the natural log hourly wage of workers,
Xi is the explanatory variable,
␤ is the set of coefficients to be estimated, and
⑀i is the random error term.
As seen in Chapter 2, there may exist significant self-selection into the
labor market, particularly among the disabled population. In order to
obtain an estimate of ␤ representative of the population, this selection
is controlled for using the standard Heckman (1979) two-step procedure. The first stage of this procedure involves estimating a binary
choice model of the following form:
(4.10)

Ỹi ⳱ Z⬘i␥ Ⳮ ui

,

ui ⬃ N(0,1)

where Zi are regressors expected to affect the labor supply decision,
␥ are parameter coefficients, ui is the normally distributed random
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error, and individual i enters the labor force if Ỹi ⬎ 0. Since Ỹi is
unobserved, a binary variable, Yi, is defined as
(4.11)

Yi ⳱

再

1
⬎
as Ỹi 0.
0
ⱕ

The parameters, ␥, are estimated via maximum likelihood probit, and
the inverse Mill’s ratio is constructed for inclusion in the wage equations, which are then estimated via OLS. The modified wage equations
are
(4.12)

ln Wift ⳱ X⬘ift ␤ft Ⳮ ␦ft ˆ ift Ⳮ ift
ln Wipt ⳱ X⬘ipt ␤pt Ⳮ ␦ptˆ ipt Ⳮ ipt

where Xi and ␤ are defined in Equation 4.9, ␦ is the coefficient on the
selectivity term, i is the modified random error term, and all variables
(Zij␥j)
, j ⳱ ft, pt.
are as just defined and ˆ ij ⳱
⌽(Zij␥j)
The parameter estimates that result from OLS estimation of the
pair of equations in (4.12) can be used to decompose the wage differential between disabled and nondisabled workers as follows:
(4.13)

ln Wft ⳮ ln Wpt ⳱ X⬘ft␤ˆ ft ⳮ X⬘pt␤ˆ pt Ⳮ (␦ˆ ftˆ ft ⳮ ␦ˆ ptˆ pt).

The third term on the right-hand side in the parentheses reflects the
role differences in selection into the labor market (across part-time
status) play in observing differential wages. In order to obtain the
selectivity-corrected wage differential, this selectivity term (or difference in selection) is subtracted from the observed wage differential
between full-time and part-time workers. This estimation procedure
and calculation are performed for each year in the data set to see how
different full-time and part-time wages are across disability status and
whether that differential has changed over time. If the ADA has forced
firms to make environmental changes that also enhance or facilitate a
disabled worker’s employment, this full-time/part-time wage differential might fall post-ADA. This would be because what used to be an
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extra fixed cost to hiring a disabled worker has been shifted to general
access requirements mandated by other provisions of the ADA.
Figure 4.4 plots these selectivity-corrected full-time/part-time
wage differentials for disabled and nondisabled workers across time.
Over the entire period, the part-time wage penalty is declining for both
disabled and nondisabled workers. After full implementation of the
ADA, however, the part-time penalty for disabled workers is less than
the part-time wage penalty for nondisabled workers for all but one
year. There are two potential explanations for this phenomenon. First,
it may be the case that disabled workers are able to negotiate part-time
hours in occupations or jobs that would not typically accommodate
part-time work arrangements. Second, the situation may reflect a
change in social attitude about what is ‘‘acceptable’’ behavior of a committed worker. Either way, a smaller (and shrinking) part-time wage
penalty (although still at roughly 40 percent) is good news for disabled
workers who may require a shorter workweek to accommodate their
impairments.13
DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS
An indication of how mobile workers with disabilities are compared to workers without disabilities (and how this mobility has
Figure 4.4 Full-Time/Part-Time Wage Differentials for Disabled and
Nondisabled Workers, CPS, 1981–2000
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changed over time) is their distribution over different occupations and
industries. Figure 4.5 presents the distribution of disabled and nondisabled workers among occupations and industries in 2000. Approximately the same proportions of disabled and nondisabled workers are
found in the technical support area and in the farming, fishing, and
forestry occupational category. Disabled workers, however, are more
heavily concentrated in service and laborer occupations, with nondisabled workers more concentrated in managerial and craft occupations.
As we will see later (and as was seen in Chapter 3), this concentration
is split along earnings levels, with the occupations in which disabled
workers are concentrated being the lower-paying ones. There does not
seem to be as wide a disparity in the distribution of workers across
industries. However, disabled workers are slightly more concentrated
than nondisabled workers in the trade and service industries. Again,
these are the lower-paying fields, on average.
Figure 4.5 Distribution of Disabled and Nondisabled Workers across
Occupations and Industries, CPS, 2000
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The Duncan Index
The Duncan Index is useful for comparing the distributions of different workers over various occupational and/or industry groups.14 It
can be applied to analyze the distribution of disabled workers in relation to that of nondisabled workers across occupations and industries.
The Duncan Index (I) is calculated as follows (Duncan and Duncan
1955):
(4.14)

I⳱

冘冟

冟

1 K
ndj ⳮ dj ,
2 j⳱1

where K is the total number of occupations or industries and ndj and
dj are the proportions of all nondisabled and disabled workers, respectively, in occupation or industry j. The index is equal to one-half the
sum of the absolute differences between the proportion of nondisabled
and disabled persons in each occupation or industry. An index equal
to zero means that these groups of workers have identical employment
distributions across occupations or industries. An index equal to one
corresponds to the extreme situation of complete segregation (no disabled and nondisabled workers in the same occupation or industry).
Another way to interpret I is as the percentage of disabled (or nondisabled) workers that would have to change occupations (industries) in
order to eliminate the difference in occupational (industry) distributions.
Figure 4.6 presents the Duncan Index calculated for each year and
plotted along with the Duncan Index for white and nonwhite groups of
workers as a frame of reference.15 The first noticeable characteristic of
these graphs is the growing disparity between the distributions of disabled and nondisabled workers in both occupations and industries.
This is in comparison to the declining trend in disparity between nonwhite and white workers. The contrast is particularly interesting since
the average occupational index for both disabled versus nondisabled
and nonwhite versus white is 0.13, but with very different end points.
In other words, an average of 13 percent of disabled or of nondisabled
workers would have to change occupations to equalize their distributions across occupations.
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Figure 4.6 Duncan Indices of Dissimilarity across Occupations and
Industries, Disabled versus Nondisabled and Nonwhite versus
White, CPS, 1981–2000
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A second observation is that it appears as though the ADA may
have helped to halt the early growth in occupational disparity, since
that series (panel A) seems to have begun a new downward trend since
1992 (the first year of implementation of the ADA). This suggests that
disabled workers may be able to take advantage of opportunities not
available to them or that they merely may not have utilized pre-ADA.
To the extent that matching the distribution of nondisabled workers is
an objective, this is a positive outcome for disabled workers.
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It is of interest to note that other literature concerned with the
distribution of workers may present different goals than equalization of
distributions. For example, a dissimilarity in occupational distributions
between native and immigrant workers can be considered a positive
indicator for an economy, as immigrants fill in occupational gaps left
by native workers (see Green 1999). In addition, it may not be clear
that the equality of occupational distributions across disability status is
desirable. The unique skills and abilities of typical disabled workers
may make them fundamentally better suited for occupations not held
by the typical nondisabled worker. The growth in disparity among
industries does not seem to have followed the pattern of improvement
seen among occupations; the distribution of disabled and nondisabled
workers has become increasingly disparate, particularly in recent years.
Evidence from the SIPP
Analysis of the SIPP data reveals a similar pattern of growth in the
dissimilarity in distributions across occupations between disabled and
nondisabled workers. In addition, the SIPP allows for an evaluation of
which type of disabilities results in the least similar distribution. Figure 4.7 provides the Duncan Index calculated to compare the distribuFigure 4.7 Duncan Indices of Dissimilarity across Occupations and
Industries, by Type of Disability, SIPP, 1997
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tion of workers with each type of disability with the distribution of
nondisabled workers across both occupations and industries. Workers
with mental disorders are distributed most differently across both industries and occupations from nondisabled workers: 38 percent of either workers with mental disabilities or nondisabled workers would
have to change occupations to equalize the distributions, compared
with only 11 percent of workers with a musculoskeletal disability.
Workers with mental disorders are much less likely than nondisabled
workers to be employed in professional, technical, and craft occupations, whereas they are much more likely to be employed in service
and as laborers.
Thirteen percent of workers with mental disorders (or of nondisabled workers) would have to change industries to equalize the distribution, whereas only 6 percent of workers with internal system
disabilities would have to switch industries. Workers with mental disorders are less likely to be employed in the transportation, communication, and utility industry, and more likely to be employed in the service
industry.
REPRESENTATION OF WORKERS
The equality in the distribution of disabled and nondisabled workers is a goal only if the disparity in distribution reflects characteristics
of jobs or industries that are desirable. In other words, if nondisabled
workers are systematically more concentrated in jobs that are more
attractive than jobs in which disabled workers are concentrated, there
is a call to make the distributions more equal. A ‘‘share of workers’’
measure can be used to determine whether disabled workers are more
or less concentrated in occupations and industries with appealing qualities, such as higher wages or growth. The desirability of higher wages
is obvious, but growth of an occupation could also be considered attractive since it may be indicative of stronger demand for workers,
perhaps leading to greater wage growth and occupational advancement.
Representation and Growth
A high-growth indicator for each occupation (and industry) in the
sample is constructed as follows:
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(4.15)

hgk ⳱

冦

冉

冊

1 if emp ktⳭ1 ⳮ emp tk / emp tk ⬎
K

冉

冊

兺 emp tⳭ1
ⳮ emp jt / emp tj
(1 / K ) j⳱1
j
0 otherwise

where occupation (or industry) k is defined as high-growth if the percentage change in employment between year t and t Ⳮ 1 for that occupation exceeds the average percentage change in employment in all
occupations represented in the sample (K corresponds to the total number of occupations or industries). The probability of being employed
in a high-growth occupation (and/or industry) is determined as a function of individual characteristics, including disability status.
The sample was split into three time periods, and the employment
growth of each occupation and industry represented in the sample was
determined by a source external to the data file.16 Table 4.4 contains
the growth rates of each occupation and industry represented in the
sample. For example, for the 1983–1989 period, service occupations,
managerial and professional specialty, and technical, sales, and administrative support are considered ‘‘high growth,’’ since their growth exceeds the average for all occupations. Similarly, for the same period,
mining and construction; transportation and public utilities; retail
trade; finance, insurance, and real estate; services; and public administration are all considered high-growth industries.
Simple probit models were estimated to determine whether disabled workers are more or less likely to be employed in growing occupations or industries:
(4.16)

Ỹi ⳱ Xi␤j Ⳮ ⑀i ,

⑀i ⬃ N(0,1)

where individual i’s job is in a growing occupation/industry if Ỹi ⬎ 0.
Since Ỹi is unobserved, a binary variable, Yij, is defined as
(4.17)

Yij ⳱

再

1
⬎
as Ŷij 0.
0
ⱕ

The set of parameters, ␤, were estimated via maximum likelihood
probit. Xi comprises various individual and job characteristics for
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Table 4.4 Employment Growth Rates for Industry and Occupational
Classifications
Growth rate (%)
1983–89

1987–93

1991–98

Occupation
Managerial and professional specialty
Technical, sales, and administrative support
Service
Precision production, craft, and repair
Operators, fabricators, and laborers
Farming, forestry, and fishing
Average Growth Rate

28.8
15.6
12.3
12.1
12.0
ⳮ7.5
12.2

16.2
5.6
11.7
ⳮ1.0
ⳮ0.8
ⳮ3.6
4.7

25.9
6.1
9.7
8.8
4.6
ⳮ0.1
9.2

Industry
Agriculture
Mining and construction
Manufacturing
Transportation and public utilities
Wholesale and retail trade
Finance, insurance, and real estate
Services
Public administration
Average growth rate

ⳮ9.7
18.8
8.6
15.8
14.6
22.7
23.6
17.9
14.0

ⳮ2.9
ⳮ3.9
ⳮ5.8
8.2
7.5
2.7
17.7
10.2
4.2

3.3
16.1
0.7
13.0
11.4
10.2
18.4
4.1
9.7

SOURCE: Author’s calculations from Jacobs (1998).

worker i, including a dummy variable indicating whether the worker is
disabled or not. The model was estimated on a sample of workers
only; therefore, the results are generalizable to workers only. The marginal effect of disability on being employed in a high-growth occupation or industry was calculated as the marginal benefit for each worker,
then averaged over the entire sample. Table 4.5 presents the estimated
marginal effects of a work-limiting disability on having a job in a highgrowth occupation or industry.
In each of the three years analyzed, the probability of a disabled
worker being employed in a high-growth occupation was from 2 to 5
percentage points less than the probability of a nondisabled worker
being employed in a high-growth occupation. In addition, the marginal
(negative) effect was the highest during the post-ADA years, suggesting that the ADA has not improved the opportunity of disabled workers
to move into high-growth occupations. On the other hand, disabled
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Table 4.5 Marginal Effect of Disability on the Probability of Employment
in a ‘‘High Growth’’ Occupation or Industry, CPS
Year
1989
1993
1998
All three years

prob (high growth
occupation)/disable
ⳮ0.0299
(0.0092)
ⳮ0.0194
(0.0085)
ⳮ0.0453
(0.0140)
ⳮ0.0381
(0.0068)

prob (high growth
industry)/disable
0.0123
(0.0108)
0.0469
(0.0121)
0.0261
(0.0129)
0.0268
(0.0070)

NOTE: Probit estimations included the following regressors, in addition to a disability
dummy variable: age; age squared; regional, education, marital, female, and nonwhite
dummy variables; and occupation (for the industry probit) and industry (for the occupation probit) dummy variables. Standard errors are in parentheses.

workers have been more likely to be employed in high-growth industries. Unfortunately, a worker’s industry does not reflect as much on
an individual’s job opportunities as one’s occupation does. For example, for someone with skills suited to a secretarial job, a decline in
manufacturing as an industry is not as devastating to the person’s opportunities as a decline in the administrative support occupation. Of
course, occupational representation within an industry, such as the proportion of those in the precision production occupation in manufacturing industry, could be an important consideration.
Representation and High Wages
A simple correlation between wages in an industry or occupation
and the percentage of workers in that industry or occupation that are
disabled was performed to determine whether disabled workers are
concentrated in low-paying occupations. The wage decomposition results in Chapter 3 suggest that disabled workers are concentrated in the
lower-paying occupations and industries, since occupation and industry
regressors contribute positively and significantly to the observed wage
differential between disabled and nondisabled workers.
Figure 4.8 plots this correlation coefficient for each year for both
occupations and industries. First, over the entire time period, the corre-
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Figure 4.8 Correlation Coefficients, Concentration of Disabled Workers
and Industry/Occupation Wage, CPS, 1981–2000
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NOTE: Correlation coefficients plotted include projections for industry years 1984 and
1999 and occupation year 1983, as these coefficients appeared to be extreme
outliers.

lation coefficient between concentration of disabled workers in an occupation and the average hourly wage in that occupation is ⳮ0.82;
the average across industries is ⳮ0.55. Disabled workers are more
concentrated in the low-wage occupations and industries. Consequently, concern about the disparity in distributions across occupations
and industries is warranted. While not particularly dramatic, there appears to be some modest improvement (becoming less negative) in
these correlation coefficients since 1992 (the first year of ADA implementation). If the ADA did enhance the mobility of disabled workers
across occupations and industries, it appears as though these individuals are moving slightly toward the more desirable jobs, in terms of
wage levels.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter explored some dimensions of employment not captured merely by employment probabilities or overall compensation.
Initially, the incidence of and type of part-time employment were com-
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pared across disability status. Then, the distribution of disabled workers relative to nondisabled workers across occupations and industries
was analyzed. Finally, the representation of disabled workers in what
might be considered ‘‘desirable’’ occupations was evaluated.
Having a work-limiting disability increased the probability of a
worker being observed as employed part-time by 12 percentage points
in 2000; this is double the 6-percentage-point impact of a disability on
being employed part-time estimated for 1981. The upward trend in the
relative occurrence of part-time employment among disabled workers
does seem to have gotten a boost during the phase-in period of the
ADA. There also seems to have been an ADA-related shift in the type
of part-time employment experienced by disabled workers. After
1992, disabled part-time workers went from being less likely voluntarily employed part-time to more likely relative to nondisabled part-time
workers. The implication is that much of the growth in part-time employment has been voluntary and may actually reflect the required accommodation of a worker’s disability. Analysis with the SIPP data
indicates that the growth in part-time employment has occurred primarily among those with musculoskeletal and mental disabilities, but
that only part-time workers with mental disabilities have experienced
any significant relative increase in voluntary part-time employment.
This may reflect the fact that part-time or flexible work hours may be
the best and least costly way to accommodate a worker with a mental
disorder.
An additional indication that part-time jobs are becoming an acceptable alternative for employing disabled workers is the greater decline between 1981 and 2000 in the full-time/part-time wage differential
among disabled workers than among nondisabled workers. In 2000,
full-time nondisabled workers earned a wage (ceteris paribus) 45 percent higher than part-time nondisabled workers, while the full-time/
part-time wage differential between disabled workers was only 39 percent. It may also be the case that required accommodation enables
disabled workers to negotiate part-time hours on a job that would not
normally allow for flexible hours. Either of these reasons translates
into an improved labor market experience for disabled workers in the
dimension of hours of work.
The movement of nondisabled workers away from part-time employment and the movement of disabled workers towards part-time
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employment may be one explanation why we observe a growing disparity in the distribution of workers across occupations (and industries). It may be the case that some occupations, such as service
occupations, are better suited to accommodate workers with disabilities. Workers with mental disorders are the most dissimilar in their
distribution across both occupations and industries as compared with
workers without disabilities. This might be expected considering that
workers with mental disorders are the most likely to be voluntarily
moving into part-time employment, which may mean that they are restricted in the types of occupations or industries open to this type of
accommodation. The overall growth in occupational distributional disparity, however, is mitigated somewhat post-1992. This may mean
that, post-ADA, disabled workers have been able to profit from opportunities not previously available to them or that they merely may not
have taken advantage of pre-ADA.
To the extent that occupations and industries in which nondisabled
workers are concentrated are desirable, this mitigation of dissimilarity
since 1992 is a positive outcome for disabled workers. Further analysis
found that in each of the three years analyzed, nondisabled workers
were more likely to be employed in high-growth occupations and in
the highest-paying occupations and industries. Consequently, concern
about the disparity in distributions across occupations and industries is
warranted, since nondisabled workers seem to be more concentrated in
what might be considered desirable occupations and industries than
are disabled workers. On the upside, there does appear to be modest
movement of disabled workers into more high-paying occupations and
industries since 1992.

Notes
1. See Averett and Hotchkiss (1995, 1996, and 1997), Hotchkiss (1991), and Farber
and Levy (2000).
2. This phenomenon, identified by Averett and Hotchkiss (1996), has been the experience of women in the labor market.
3. For a discussion of labor market segmentation and dual labor market theory and
references to this literature, see Kaufman and Hotchkiss (2000, Chapter 6).
4. The bivariate probit model with selection gives rise to the following likelihood
function:
ln L ⳱
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5.

6.
7.

8.

9.
10.

11.
12.

13.

14.

15.

where ⌽2 is the bivariate normal cumulative distribution function and ⌽ is the
univariate normal cumulative distribution function.
This method of calculating the marginal effect of a change in a dummy variable
is referred to as a measure of discrete change and is described in greater detail by
Long (1997, pp. 135–138).
Table C.7 (column 1) in Appendix C contains the marginal effects used to generate Figure 4.2.
This type of pooled, cross-sectional analysis has been applied by many researchers (for example, Card 1992; Gruber 1994 and 1996; Zveglich and Rodgers 1996;
and Hamermesh and Trejo 2000). The technique, however, also has its critics
(such as Heckman 1996). The primary criticism of this pooled, cross-sectional
approach is that it is impossible to control for unobserved changes in the environment that occurred at the same time as the event of interest. Issues of potential
concern in this regard are explored in Chapter 2.
Voluntary part-time is defined as (1994–2000) working less than 35 hours per
week and did not want to work full-time, and (1981–1993) reason for working
less than 35 hours per week coded as 07–15 (see Stratton 1994 for justification).
Category reasons 07–15 are holiday, labor dispute, bad weather, own illness, on
vacation, too busy with school or house, did not want to work full-time, full-time
work week is less than 35 hours, or other.
Table C.7 (column 2) in Appendix C contains the marginal effects used to generate Figure 4.3.
These results are consistent with those of Schur (2002), who finds that part-time
and contingent work grows among the disabled during tight labor markets (where
demand is strong relative to supply), which would be expected if these arrangements are voluntary.
The musculoskeletal category includes disabilities of the special senses (e.g.,
hearing, seeing).
See Magill (1997) for a detailed discussion about how flexible and part-time work
schedules can often serve as low- or no-cost solutions to the accommodating
problem. However, indirect costs, such as having to hire additional workers to
cover lost hours of a disabled part-time worker, should not be ignored.
The SIPP data showed the same differential decline for both disabled and nondisabled workers as seen in the CPS data, but essentially inconsequential differences
across disability status in any given year.
An additional distribution index, the IP Index (see Watts 1992), was also evaluated, and the conclusions were the same. While there is a direct mathematical
relationship between these two indices, the IP index reflects the percentage of
workers in the labor market that would have to switch occupation or industry
in order to equalize the distribution of disabled and nondisabled workers across
occupations or industries, while maintaining the original occupational structure.
Since the conclusions were the same regardless of the index employed, the more
familiar Duncan Index is detailed here.
The actual indices plotted in Figure 4.6 are contained in Table C.8 in Appendix
C. The indices calculated for the distribution across industries are consistent with
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what Yelin and Cisternas (1996) calculated using the National Health Interview
Survey; their data indicate that the relative distributions of disabled and nondisabled workers have been fairly steady as far back as 1970. The occupational
categories in their data were not comparable to those in the CPS, however.
16. Employment growth was calculated as the percentage change in the number of
workers in an occupation from one time period to the next.

5
Separation, Unemployment,
and Job Search
Separation from one’s job is an important dimension of the experience of a worker. If separations are dominated by involuntary actions,
such as a layoff or being fired, the worker’s experience is obviously
diminished. Voluntary separation, however, may or may not be an
indicator of a positive situation. On the one hand, voluntary separation
(quitting) may indicate that workers are able to respond to better job
opportunities through labor market mobility. On the other hand, excessive voluntary separations may reflect instability among that group of
workers. This may be of particular importance for disabled workers
who may need to voluntarily quit jobs for health reasons. The first
analysis in this chapter considers a group of labor force participants
who have experienced a recent job separation and evaluates the determinants, including disability status, of the type of separation.1
Unemployment is another important dimension of the labor market
experience. In a given month in 2000, an average of 3.3 million people
flowed into unemployment.2 Between the ages of 18 and 27, individuals average 4.4 unemployment spells and spend an average of 31 weeks
unemployed (Veum and Weiss 1993). In addition, Figure 5.1 shows
that, in 1999, workers in the CPS data used here spent from roughly
one to two weeks on average looking for work.3 Figure 5.1 also shows
that while the disabled clearly spend more of their time in a given
year looking for work, the movement of weeks spent in this activity
essentially mirrors the trend for the nondisabled. The next sections
will look more closely at this time spent looking for work.
Job separation is only one reason why a worker might be unemployed. Workers entering the labor market for the first time and rejoining the labor market after an absence are also considered unemployed
until they find a job. Examining the composition of the unemployed
over time can tell us something about flows into and out of the labor
market. The second analysis of this chapter will explore the probabilities of unemployment categories as a function of disability status.
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Figure 5.1 Weeks Spent Looking for Work, by Disability Status, CPS,
1980–1999
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The worker’s situation while unemployed, namely the job search
experience, will also be explored in this chapter. For the same reasons
argued in Chapter 2, one would expect that disabled workers would
have a more difficult time finding a job that suits their skills, and would
thus have longer spells of search duration, ceteris paribus. In addition,
if disabled workers are subjected to hiring discrimination, search duration would also increase. The third analysis in this chapter will evaluate the search spells of disabled and nondisabled workers and
determine whether differential search strategies are more successful for
one group or the other.

SEPARATION
If disabled workers have a more difficult time finding employment
or employers that will accommodate their disabilities, they may experience greater voluntary turnover as they continue to search for the job
that will best match their skills. On the other hand, the fear of losing
one’s health benefits (‘‘job-lock’’) may be more severe for disabled
workers, leading to fewer voluntary separations relative to nondisabled
workers (see Kapur 1998; Buchmueller and Valletta 1996). The impact
of the ADA on voluntary separations among the disabled is ambiguous.
Voluntary separations may increase as more opportunities become
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available to disabled workers, but may also decrease as employers
make disability accommodations, which have been shown to increase
tenure and reduce voluntary turnover among disabled workers (Burkhauser, Butler, and Kim 1995).
If disabled workers suffer from discrimination, or overall have less
labor market experience or tenure with their employers, they might
suffer more frequent involuntary separations through layoffs. Based
purely on anecdotal evidence, Yelin (1991) concludes that ‘‘persons
with disabilities, like those from minority races, constitute a contingent
labor force, suffering displacement first [as an industry declines]’’
(p. 135). However, if disabled workers are a more selected group in
the sense that they are less substitutable with other inputs (perhaps the
accommodations employers have made for them enhance their productivity beyond that of nondisabled workers, ceteris paribus), they will
be less likely to be laid off as marginal workers. In other words, the
discrimination or marginalization might be taking place at the hiring
stage, rather than at the separation stage of the relationship. The passage of the ADA might decrease involuntary separations among disabled workers if employers are fearful of accusations of discrimination.
Among workers who have separated from their jobs, the CPS contains information about why a separation occurred. Figure 5.2 presents
the percentage of disabled and nondisabled individuals who have experienced a recent job separation and the reason for that separation. The
series are split into pre- and post-1994, since the universe for the job
separation question changed at that time.4 Overall, disabled workers
have a greater incidence of voluntary separations, and nondisabled
workers have a greater incidence of involuntary separations. The break
in 1994 makes it difficult to draw any conclusions regarding trends. In
order to look more closely at any possible trends, and to control for
individual characteristics, a multinomial logit estimation was performed.5 A multinomial logit specification allows us to specify multiple possible outcomes (e.g., separation types) as a function of a variety
of observed characteristics and unobservable factors, recognizing that
as one’s probability of having separated voluntarily increases, the probability of having separated involuntarily necessarily decreases.
Job separations have been divided into three categories: 1) voluntary separation, 2) involuntary separation, and 3) ‘‘other’’ separation.6
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Figure 5.2 Percentage of Job Separations by Type and Disability Status,
CPS, 1981–2000
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The separation is modeled as a multinomial logit, where the probability
of observing a job separation (S) of type j for person i is equal to
(5.1)

Pj ⳱ P(Si ⳱ j), j ⳱ 1,2,3.

(5.2)

Pj
⳱ F(␤⬘j X) for j ⳱ 1,2,
Pj Ⳮ P3

where F(䡠) is a cumulative distribution function, X corresponds to characteristics expected to influence the type of separations, and ␤j dictates
how those characteristics affect separation j.
This means
(5.3)

Pj
F(␤⬘j X)
⳱
⳱ G(␤⬘j X) for j ⳱ 1,2.
P3
1 ⳮ F(␤⬘j X)

Because of the rules of summation:
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册

2

(5.4)

P3 ⳱ 1/ 1 Ⳮ

G(␤⬘j X)

G(␤⬘j X) and Pj ⳱

j⳱1

冘G(␤ X)

.

2

1Ⳮ

⬘
j

j⳱1

If we let
(5.5)

G(␤⬘j X) ⳱ exp (␤j⬘X) and Yij
⳱

再

1 if person i falls in separation category j
,
0 otherwise

the log likelihood function (ln L) can be written as

冘 冘Y ln P ,
3

(5.6)

In L ⳱

where Pij ⳱

3

ij

ij

i⳱1 j⳱1

exp(X⬘i ␤j)

冘
2

1Ⳮ

k⳱1

exp(X⬘i ␤k)

and Pi3 ⳱

冘

1

2

1Ⳮ

k⳱1

.

exp(X⬘i ␤k)

The multinomial logit gives three sets of parameter estimates, each
set describing the probability of one of the separation types. Each per-
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son has a probability of every type of separation, and those three probabilities sum to one (since the sample contains only those who
experienced a separation). Figure 5.3 summarizes the marginal effects
of having a work-limiting disability on the probability that the separation was involuntary or voluntary for years 1981–2000.7
Over the period, the probability of a separation being voluntary is,
on average, 12 percentage points higher for workers with disabilities,
relative to workers without disabilities. This result lends support for
the theory that disabled workers may have more difficulty finding the
right ‘‘match,’’ and are therefore more likely to quit in search of a
better accommodation for their disability. It could also point to the
higher frequency of health-related quits among the disabled. In addition, with the exception of the most recent two years, the impact of
disability on voluntary turnover seems to be declining since the phasein of the ADA. This suggests that mandated accommodations relieve
the disabled worker of the burden of changing jobs in order to search
for a better fit; the worker’s current job (or employer) does the changing to better suit the disabled worker. It could also mean that employers are accommodating potential health cycles that in the past would
Figure 5.3 Marginal Effect of Being Disabled on the Probability of
Separation Type, CPS, 1981–2000
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have necessitated a job separation. This result is marginally consistent
with the research of Baldwin and Schumacher (1999), who find, using
1990 data from the SIPP, that disabled workers are more likely (but
insignificantly so) to voluntarily separate from their employers, relative
to nondisabled workers.
The probability of a separation being involuntary is, on average
over the time period, 11 percentage points lower for workers with disabilities. This does not support the notion that disabled workers are
considered ‘‘marginal.’’ Since this negative impact of being disabled
on involuntary separations is in evidence well before the ADA, it may
also help alleviate employers’ fears that the ADA makes it more ‘‘difficult’’ to dismiss disabled workers, on average. These results are not
consistent with these of Baldwin and Schumacher (1999), who find that
disabled workers are slightly more likely to experience an involuntary
separation than nondisabled workers. Baldwin and Schumacher (1999)
explore overall job turnover, where nonseparation plays a large role in
the outcomes of workers analyzed; their results are primarily driven by
the fact that disabled workers experience more separations overall. The
analysis here compares only types of separation and does not consider
the nonseparation outcome. This approach is more relevant when considering the separation experience of workers, rather than the question
of turnover. In other words, the question answered here is, ‘‘Among
those who have separated, what is the most common reason?’’
Further evidence that disabled workers are not marginalized is the
experience during the recession of the early 1990s. Separation during
the early nineties for disabled workers was even less likely to be the
result of involuntary action, relative to nondisabled workers, compared
with the years prior to and since the recession.

UNEMPLOYMENT
Examining the composition of the unemployed over time can tell
us something about flows into and out of the labor market. For example, if most of the unemployed are new entrants or reentrants, these
individuals would constitute an inflow of workers into the labor market.
In 2000, job losers (fired or laid-off) made up the largest category of
all the unemployed (44 percent), and re-entrants represented the next
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largest category (36 percent of the unemployed).8 As far as disabled
workers are concerned, a policy such as the ADA is expected to decrease the cost of entering the labor market (with improved accommodation and fewer barriers to employment), thus potentially increasing
the incidence of new entrants and reentrants to the labor market, relative to these categories for nondisabled workers.
Another multinomial logit was estimated to evaluate the determinants of unemployment categories, with the type of unemployment divided into four classifications: 1) job loser (fired or laid-off), 2) job
leaver (quit), 3) reentrant to the labor force, and 4) new entrant to the
labor force. The first two categories were considered in detail in the
previous section. The focus of the analysis in this section is on the
relative probabilities that unemployment spells for disabled workers
are of the new entrant or reentrant variety, and on whether the composition of the unemployed was altered by the ADA. The structure of the
multinomial logit estimated for this analysis is the same as described
by Equations 5.1 through 5.5, except that there are four categories instead of just three.
The multinomial logit provides four sets of parameter estimates.
Each set describes the probability of one of the unemployment types;
every person has a probability of each type of unemployment, and
those four probabilities sum to one (since the sample contains only
those who are unemployed). The CPS started categorizing types of
unemployment in 1989, so that is the first year of analysis. The four
panels in Figure 5.4 summarize the predicted probabilities of the jobless experiencing each of the categories of unemployment.9 The actual
probabilities have been smoothed using a third-order polynomial.10
The smoothing process amounts to taking a plotted series and drawing
a smooth line through the middle of the plotted points. The effect is to
highlight any trends that are more difficult to decipher from the raw
data. The higher the order of the polynomial (e.g., third- versus firstorder), the more changes in direction will be captured (the higher the
order, the less restrictive is the smoothing).
The probabilities of being a job loser (fired or laid-off) and a job
leaver (quit) are consistent with the results reported for separations in
the previous section (see Figures 5.2 and 5.3). The disabled are less
likely to be job losers than the nondisabled (panel A) and (typically)
more likely to be job leavers (panel B). The disabled unemployed are
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Figure 5.4 Probability of Different Types of Unemployment by Disability
Status, CPS, 1989–2000
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also predicted to be more likely to be new entrants and reentrants into
the labor market (panels C and D) than the nondisabled. This indicates
that the disabled move into and out of the labor market more than do
nondisabled workers. This is not good news for the disabled, as shifts
between jobs (even with intervening unemployment) typically result in
better subsequent outcomes than movements out of and back into the
labor market (Horvath and Shack 1986).
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Figure 5.4 (continued) Probability of Different Types of Unemployment
by Disability Status, CPS, 1989–2000
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There does not seem to be any noticeable effect of the passage and
phase-in of the ADA on the probability of unemployed disabled workers being in one category of unemployment or another. There is an
upswing in the probability of being a reentrant beginning about 1992,
but that change is shared by the nondisabled, which likely means it was
a general labor market response (by all workers) of recovery from the
early 1990s recession; workers discouraged by the recession began to
reenter the labor market as the economy recovered. The fairly steady
decline in the probability of being a job loser among disabled workers
since 1993 deviates somewhat from that observed for nondisabled
workers, perhaps signaling that additional accommodations have made
disabled workers even that much less marginalized than before. It
could also be signaling employers’ fears of being accused of inappropriately dismissing disabled workers. Perhaps, because of these fears,
employers are even more scrutinizing when hiring a disabled worker,
improving the chances of a good fit.

JOB SEARCH
The theory proposed so far as to why the disabled have a lower
probability (among those who separate) of being a job loser, or experiencing an involuntary separation, is that employers are more careful in
their hiring of disabled workers. Employers may feel that hiring a
disabled worker is more risky, or they may fear the consequences if
they would have to dismiss the worker. The greater ‘‘care’’ in hiring a
disabled worker should show up in longer search spells. Of course, the
observation of longer search spells is also consistent with a theory of
discrimination against disabled workers, but it is necessary to provide
support for the preceding theory. Figure 5.5 presents the average difference between the expected search spells of disabled workers and of
nondisabled workers.11 While exhibiting some degree of variation
from year to year, the average length differential ranges from a high of
24 weeks in 1987 to a low of 0.66 weeks in 1998. The median spell
length differential (not controlling for any individual characteristics)
for the entire time period is approximately 14 weeks.12
The expected impact of the ADA on search spell length of disabled
workers is ambiguous. The legislation may reduce search spells by
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Figure 5.5 Average Search Spell Length Differential between
Unemployed Disabled and Nondisabled Searchers, CPS,
1981–2000
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making overt hiring discrimination more difficult. It may also shorten
spells merely by raising the awareness of employers to the capabilities
of workers with disabilities. On the other hand, it may lengthen search
spells if the fear of dismissing disabled workers is so great that employers increase their scrutiny of such individuals before hiring them. It
appears from Figure 5.5 that the ADA did not have an impact on the
average search spell length differential. Fitting a trend line through the
data points in Figure 5.5 results in a zero slope; while there is a wide
variation in the average from year to year, and while the difference
does not exhibit any trend, it is positive throughout the time period.
Search Duration Estimation
The difficulty of estimating job search spells using CPS data is
notorious (Kiefer, Lundberg, and Neumann 1985). Individuals who
are currently searching for a job are asked how long they have been
searching, so that everyone in the sample is in the middle of a censored
spell. Akerlof and Main’s (1981) approach to using CPS data is to
double the observed censored search spells and then treat them as completed. This results in an accurate representation of completed search
spells under the assumption of a steady state.13 Under this assumption,
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the impact of various demographic characteristics on the length of a
search spell can be determined. The demographic of particular interest, of course, is whether someone has a work-limiting disability. The
accelerated failure time model that will be described allows for the
estimation of these spell lengths, taking into account how long someone has already been searching. This is of interest if, for example, the
longer someone has been searching the harder it is for him or her to
escape the search (by finding a job).
If a person has a completed search spell length, t, the contribution
to likelihood is f(t), where f(.) is the probability density function of the
random search duration, T. In order to describe the variation in T
conditional on a set of explanatory variables, X, a specific distribution
is specified for T as a function of a set of parameters, ␤. If T0 is a
random time duration sampled from the baseline distribution for an
individual whose covariates are all zero, then for nonzero covariates,
X, the event time will be T(X) ⳱ exp(X⬘␤)T0 (see Kalbfleisch and Prentice 1980; Kiefer 1988). This model specification allows writing the
log duration as a linear function of the covariates, lnt ⳱ X⬘␤ Ⳮ ⑀.
Assuming T is distributed as a Weibull, the following likelihood function results:
(5.7)

1
L(␤兩ti,Xi) ⳱ ⌸ g((lnti ⳮ X⬘i ␤)/),
i 

where g(.) is the probability density function of the transformed search
duration; in this case, g(.) takes on the form of an extreme value distribution. Regressors for the duration analysis include age; age squared;
nonlabor income; female, single, nonwhite, education, and regional
dummies; dummy variables for availability for employment, whether
searcher wanted a full-time job, and whether searcher worked last year;
and dummy variables for search methods, disability status, and search
methods interacted with disability status.
The specification of a duration model, as opposed to merely estimating the relationship by OLS, for example, allows for the likelihood
that the chance of a search spell ending in time t is related to how large
t is (i.e., the probability that someone finds a jobs and stops searching
in t depends on how long the individual has already been searching).
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This relationship between the chances of finding a job and how long a
worker has been searching is referred to as duration dependence.
Figure 5.6 plots the predicted expected search duration for the total
sample, by disability status, for each year.14 Over this entire time period, on average, disabled individuals could expect to be looking for a
job 3.2 weeks longer than nondisabled workers with identical demographic characteristics and search strategies. The only trends that appear in this graph correspond to the general conditions of the labor
market; predicted expected duration for both disabled and nondisabled
searchers moves together. There is an obvious rise in search length
beginning in the early nineties (corresponding to the recession of the
period), and duration begins to fall again in the mid 1990s.
Controlling for demographic and search strategy reduces the average marginal effect of being disabled on expected duration over this
time period from approximately 14 weeks to approximately 3 weeks.
The implication is that the majority of the observed search duration
differential is explained by demographic and search strategy differences. This suggests that discrimination in hiring may not be of great
concern, but it does not rule out that employers are more ‘‘careful’’
in screening disabled workers. In other words, it is possible that the
characteristics of disabled and nondisabled workers are being valued
equally, but that employers go to greater length to discern the fit of a
Figure 5.6 Predicted Expected Search Duration by Disability Status,
CPS, 1981–2000
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disabled worker with a particular job. This behavior would be consistent with a risk-averse employer who has more difficulty determining
the productivity of disabled workers than of nondisabled workers from
observable traits. This could be due to lack of experience on the part
of the employer or because there is greater variance in the productivity
among disabled workers for any given set of observable characteristics.
Effectiveness of Search Methods
One important quality that an individual brings to the job search is
the type of strategies used. It is of interest to determine whether disabled job seekers consistently use different search strategies and
whether those methods are consistently more or less effective for disabled searchers than for the nondisabled. Several researchers have
found that certain search methods are more effective in finding employment than others (Bortnick and Ports 1992; Thomas 1991), so if
disabled individuals are systematically relying on less effective methods, or systematically have less effective methods available, this leads
to an obvious remedy. Figure 5.7 details the average percentage of
disabled and nondisabled job seekers using each of six search strategies
(‘‘did nothing’’ is excluded as a strategy from the illustration).
Figure 5.7 Percentage of Disabled and Nondisabled Searchers Using
Each Search Strategy, Averaged over the Period 1981–2000,
CPS
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Disabled searchers are marginally more likely to check with
friends, public agencies, and advertisements. None of the differences
across strategies, however, is significantly different from zero. The
implication, then, is that disabled and nondisabled job seekers rely, in
the same percentages, on the same search strategies. In addition, there
is no trend over time in the proportion of people using each method
across disabled or nondisabled searchers.
Furthermore, out of the 100 possible coefficients (across years and
across search strategies) included to control for potential differential
impacts of search strategies on length of search for disabled workers,
only 17 were significantly different from zero and not in any consistent
way. In other words, each strategy never helped or hindered disabled
searchers, relative to nondisabled searchers, in any systematic way.
The implication is that personal demographics were the primary determinants of search outcome, and that merely changing strategies will
not improve those outcomes for disabled workers.

CONCLUSIONS
The ‘‘not working’’ side of the labor market can be important in
shaping the overall experience of a worker. This chapter compares the
separation, unemployment, and job search experiences of disabled and
nondisabled workers over time. The lower probability for disabled
workers that a separation is involuntary is clearly good news for disabled workers. It implies that disabled individuals are not ‘‘marginal’’
workers, as some have theorized. The higher probability for this group
that a separation is voluntary indicates, at a minimum, that disabled
workers do enjoy some labor market mobility with which they can seek
out the most accommodating employment setting. It may also show
that disabled workers have a more difficult time finding a good employment match, which is not entirely unexpected, or that health conditions
necessitate more frequent voluntary movements in and out of jobs.
There is no indication from the analysis performed here that the ADA
has had much impact on the probability that a disabled worker’s separation is either voluntary or involuntary.
Disabled workers are more likely to be reentrants and new entrants
into unemployment than nondisabled workers. This is unfortunate be-
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cause leaving and reentering the labor market typically results in less
advantageous outcomes than movements between jobs.15 There are not
a lot of policy options, sadly, that might alter this pattern, since much
of the movement into and out of the labor market may be dictated by
the nature of the disabled worker’s mental or physical condition.
On average over the time period, an unemployed disabled worker
searches three weeks longer than a similar nondisabled worker before
locating a job. This result, in combination with the finding that disabled workers are less likely to separate from his/her job for involuntary reasons, suggests that employers are being more ‘‘careful’’ in their
hiring of disabled workers. There is a fine line between discrimination
and being discriminating. However, it was also found that differences
in individual characteristics between disabled and nondisabled workers
explain most of the difference in their search spell lengths. Therefore,
it is possible that the characteristics of disabled and nondisabled workers are being valued equally (the typical measure for discrimination),
but that employers go to greater lengths to discern the fit of a disabled
worker’s endowments with a particular job. This behavior on the part
of the employer would result both in longer search spells for the disabled and in a lower probability that a separation is involuntary.
These results, taken together, suggest that policies that assist employers and disabled workers in finding each other would go a long way
to improving search outcomes. Active job placement and objective
screening of skills might be useful and serve the needs of the ‘‘discerning’’ employer.

Notes
1. While it may seem natural to first focus on the incidence of separation, the employment analysis contained in Chapter 2 essentially contains the inverse of an
analysis of incidence. The CPS does not ask separation questions of those who
are currently working, so that an evaluation of separation incidence would amount
to an analysis of unemployment incidence (the inverse of what was evaluated in
Chapter 2). The results from Chapter 2 indicate that the disabled are more likely
at any given time to have separated from their job, and that the difference in
probability across disability status is unchanged over time.
2. Unpublished data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; obtained November
2001.
3. The sample for whom these statistics were plotted consisted of those who spent
at least some (no matter how little) time working in the previous year. This gives

122 Hotchkiss

4.
5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.
11.

12.

us a better picture of the looking-for-work activity of those with at least some
marginal attachment to the labor market.
The data used to generate Figure 5.2 and details of the questionnaire change are
found in Table C.9 in Appendix C.
Multinomial logits have come under frequent criticism because of the assumption
of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) that is implied by the logit specification. Alternative specifications that retain the desired probability structure
(i.e., multinomial probit) are riddled with their own problems and not considered
here to add value greater than the cost that would be imposed. It has been pointed
out that under the framework of what is called a ‘‘universal’’ logit, the estimation
procedure can be applied, but the utility interpretation of the structural estimates
is lost. In addition, the more regressors included to describe the multiple outcomes, the less bothersome is the assumption of IIA. For these reasons, the logit
structure is retained. For further discussion on these points, see Ben-Akiva and
Lerman (1985, section 5.2) and Moffitt (1999, pp. 1382–1387).
Voluntary separations included the following reasons: personal, family, school;
personal/family (includes pregnancy); return to school; health; retirement/old age;
and unsatisfactory work arrangements (hours/pay/etc.). Involuntary separation
included the following reasons: seasonal job completed, temporary seasonal or
intermittent job completed, slack work/business, and temporary nonseasonal job
completed. The analysis in this chapter is based only on those who experienced
a separation either in the past five years (1981–1993) or in the previous year
(1994–1999); the results, therefore, are not generalizable to the entire labor force.
The predicted probabilities are found in Table C.10 in Appendix C. Whereas the
impact of the questionnaire change was obvious in the raw data (see Figure 5.2),
the predicted probabilities are comparable across years in the cross section, with
the primary impact being larger sample sizes prior to 1994.
U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Earnings (January 2001, p. 203). To
be counted as unemployed, the respondent must have undertaken some action
within the past four weeks to find a job.
The predicted probabilities from the multinomial logit analysis used to generate
these figures are found in Table C.11 in Appendix C. The figures plot a
‘‘smoothed’’ version of the series of numbers reported in Table C.11.
This simply involves calculating a least squares third-order polynomial fit through
the data points.
Following the suggestion of Akerlof and Main (1981) to compensate for the deficiencies of the job search data collected by the CPS, expected search duration is
calculated as twice the observed duration at a given point in time. This representation of expected duration relies on the assumption of a steady state, which may
be difficult to support for a statistic across time (i.e., business cycles; Sider 1985);
however, this may be less critical when making cross-sectional comparisons, as
is done here. It is also assumed that this assumption has the same implication
across disability status.
The numbers used to prepare Figure 5.5 can be found in Table C.12 (column 1)
in Appendix C.

Separation, Unemployment, and Job Search 123

13. See note 11.
14. Predicted expected duration was calculated using the coefficient estimates resulting from the accelerated failure time model. Where search duration is assumed to be distributed as a Weibull, expected search duration is calculated as
E关ti兩ti ⬎ 0;Xi,␤,兴 ⳱ exp(X⬘i ␤)⌫(1 Ⳮ ), where ⌫ is the gamma distribution
function. The characteristics (other than disability) for which the predicted expected durations were calculated (X) are the means corresponding to the entire
sample. See Long (1997). The numbers used to prepare Figure 5.6 can be found
in Table C.12 (columns 2 and 3) in Appendix C.
15. There is even some evidence that disabled workers experience more discrimination between employers (from switching jobs) than they experience with any
given employer (on their current job). See O’Hara (2000). The implication is
that any job separation may worsen a disabled person’s labor market outcome.

6
State versus Federal Legislation
Whenever major federal legislation to regulate the functioning of a
market is enacted, a key question raised is whether that law is redundant or whether it has the potential of actually altering the functioning
of the market (i.e., is ‘‘binding’’). By the time the ADA was passed,
all states had some form of legislation addressing discrimination
against the disabled (see Table 6.1).1 Thus, the environment in which
the ADA was approved was arguably already a post-ADA one. One
might suggest that the ADA was superfluous; the states were already
addressing the problem of discrimination against the disabled and there
was no need for federal legislation. This situation may be an explanation for finding no or very little labor market impact attributable to the
ADA in previous chapters. In other words, it may be the case that the
state legislation ‘‘crowded out’’ any potential impact of the ADA. On
the other hand, legislation at the state level may have served as a statement of ethical beliefs already integrated into the economy.
To determine whether state-level protective legislation ‘‘crowded
out’’ or had a differential impact on the experience of disabled workers
than the federal ADA, employment, wage, and hours analyses mirroring those contained in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are repeated here, but only
for a subsample of states that enacted disability legislation between
1981 (the beginning of available data) and 1991 (the last year before
implementation of the federal legislation). The employment impact is
determined by estimation of a pooled, cross-sectional bivariate probit
with selection model analogous to that estimated in Chapter 2. The
state-level impact of disability legislation on wages is determined by a
pooled, cross-sectional estimation of log wages, controlling for selection into the labor market, mirroring the wage analysis in Chapter 3.
The bivariate probit with selection will again be used to parallel the
part-time employment analysis of Chapter 4. Only the CPS data set
will be used for analyses in this chapter.
The condition for being included in the subsample for analysis is
whether the worker resided in a state that adopted protection for the
disabled during this period.2 To coincide with the provisions of the
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Table 6.1 Summary of State-Level Disability Legislation
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii

First year disability
legislation in place

Public/
private coverage

1975
1987
1985
1973
1993
1980
1979
1973
Before 1988
1988
1977
1978
1981
1981

public
public/privatea
public/private
public
public/private
public/privatea
public/private
public/private
public
public/private
public/private
public
public/private
public/private

State
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania

First year disability
legislation in place
1974
1971
1973
1971
1975
1978
1973
1974
1985
1983
1976
1981
1973
1974

Public/
private coverage
public/private
public
public/private
public/private
public/private
public/private
public/private
public/privatea
public/private
public/private
public/privatea
public/private
public/private
public/private

Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana

public
public/private
public/private
public/private
public
public/privatea
public/private
public/private
public
public/private
public/privatea
public/private
public/private
public/private
public/private
public
public/private

Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
Washington, DC
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

NOTE: Some further details of each of these state’s laws can be found in Appendix D.
a
Exact original coverage not available; classification based on current coverage definitions.

1973
1972
1996
1973
1984
1976
1989
1979
1981
1972
1973
Before 1972
1994
1981
1965
1985

public/private
public
public/private
public
public/privatea
public/private
public/private
public/private
public/private
public
public/privatea
public
public/private
public/private
public/private
public/privatea
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Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

1969
1988
1980
1975
Before 1971
1972
1974
1976
1975
1980
1973
1974
1983
1976
1973
1974
1978
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ADA, the date at which legislation covering both public and private
employers became effective was used to distinguish pre- and post-time
periods. As can be seen from Table 6.1, 10 states passed disability
legislation between (but not including) 1981 and 1991. These states
were Alaska (1987), Arizona (1985), Delaware (1988), Idaho (1988),
Massachusetts (1988), North Carolina (1985), North Dakota (1983),
South Dakota (1984), Texas (1989), and Wyoming (1985).
A preliminary look at the potential impact on employment probabilities and labor force participation is shown in Figures 6.1 and 6.2,
which plot these statistics for the disabled and the nondisabled. These
Figure 6.1 Labor Force Participation Rates for the Disabled and the
Nondisabled, CPS, 1981–1991
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Figure 6.2 Proportion of Disabled and Nondisabled Labor Force
Participants That Are Employed, CPS, 1981–1991
100

Nondisabled

95
90
85

Disabled

80
(%)

75
70
65
60
55
50
9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Event period

State versus Federal Legislation 129

illustrations show the averages across all 10 states, event-study style,
with t ⳱ 0 corresponding to the year disability legislation was in place
in the state; t ⬍ 0 corresponds to the pre-legislation period and t ⱖ 0
corresponds to the post-legislation period. There is no obvious change
in either the labor force participation rate or conditional employment
rate for either the disabled or nondisabled, except for perhaps a higher
employment rate for both groups, in the post-legislation period.

IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT
To determine the employment impact of state-level disability legislation, a pooled, cross-sectional bivariate probit model with selection
was estimated with dummy variables representing whether the observation shows up in the data pre-legislation or post-legislation and whether
the observation is a disabled or nondisabled person. These dummy
variables were also interacted to determine whether being disabled had
any greater effect on employment after the legislation than before, relative to the experience of a nondisabled person.3 The bivariate specification allows for the two outcomes (labor force participation and
employment) to be impacted by the same unobservable factors (e.g.,
motivation). The selectivity part of the model is merely a recognition
that we do not get to see the employment outcome unless the person is
in the labor market to begin with, and that those we observe in the
labor market may have systematically different employment outcomes
than those not in the labor market. Correcting for selectivity allows us
to make inferences for anyone from the population, not just those we
observe in the labor market; this is what makes the probability unconditional.
The empirical model is specified as follows:
(6.1)

lfpis ⳱ ␣1 Ⳮ ␥⬘1X1i Ⳮ ␤1disablei Ⳮ 1 posts
Ⳮ 1 disablei ⳯ posts Ⳮ ⑀1is
empis ⳱ ␣2 Ⳮ ␥⬘2X2i Ⳮ ␤2disablei Ⳮ 2 posts
Ⳮ 2 disablei ⳯ posts Ⳮ ⑀2is

empis⳱1 if person i in state s is employed, 0 otherwise; lfpis ⳱ 1 if
person i in state s is in the labor force, 0 otherwise, and empis is not
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observed unless lfpis ⳱ 1. disablei is equal to 1 if person i is disabled,
0 otherwise; X1i and X2i include individual demographic characteristics;
posts is equal to 1 if person is observed in state s post legislation for
that state; ⑀1is and ⑀2is are distributed as a bivariate normal with means
equal to 0, variances equal to 1, and correlation equal to ; and ␣j, ␥j,
␤j, j, and j (j⳱1,2) are parameters to be estimated.
In this framework, the affected group (the disabled) is controlled
for by a dummy variable indicating whether the individual has a worklimiting disability, and the time period is controlled for by a dummy
variable indicating whether disability legislation in the state had been
implemented yet or not. Given the nonlinearity of the bivariate probit
estimation procedure, a single parameter coefficient does not tell us the
additional effect the legislation had on the difference in employment
probabilities between the disabled and nondisabled; however, the significance of the coefficient on the interacted disablei ⳯ posts will
yield significance levels of that impact. Table 6.2 details the results
from the estimation.
The first thing to notice from Table 6.2 is that the parameter estimates on the vast majority of regressors are of the same sign and the
same magnitude as those in Table 2.1 in Chapter 2, corresponding to
the national sample. The only exceptions to this are the west, central
city, college, and advanced degree dummy variables; and the state unemployment rate (the signs across the tables are the same, but the magnitudes differ slightly) and the Midwest dummy variable (less
significant in the state analysis). The implication of the similarity
across the national and state-level analyses is that the observations in
this subset of states are not at all far from the norm and that the results
on the regressors of interest (those related to disability status) should
be considered generalizable beyond these states.
The second result to note from Table 6.2 is the lack of significance
of the coefficient on the disable ⳯ post regressor in the employment
equation. This means that the employment probability of a disabled
person, relative to a nondisabled person, did not change post-legislation. Again, in a set of results where most other regressors are significant at the 99 percent confidence level, this is notable.
The lack of impact of the ADA at the national level could have
been the result of state legislation crowding out any potential effect of
the federal law, in which case we should see an influence of enactment
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Table 6.2 Labor Force Participation and Employment Bivariate Probit
with Selection Results, CPS, 1981–1991
Regressor
Intercept
Age (00)
Age Squared (0000)
Female ⳱ 1
Nonwhite ⳱ 1
High school grad ⳱ 1
Some college ⳱ 1
College grad ⳱ 1
Advanced degree ⳱ 1
Central city ⳱ 1
Midwest ⳱ 1
South ⳱ 1
West ⳱ 1
Single household ⳱ 1
Nonlabor income
(000000)
Worked last year ⳱ 1
Weeks worked last year
(00)
State unemployment
rate (0)

Labor force
participation equation
ⳮ2.9613***
(0.0492)
13.3187***
(0.2278)
ⳮ16.4768***
(0.2828)
ⳮ0.5123***
(0.010)
ⳮ0.0340**
(0.0148)
0.2689***
(0.0127)
0.1187***
(0.0135)
0.3347***
(0.1784)
0.1836***
(0.0310)
0.0781***
(0.0150)
ⳮ0.0406**
(0.0175)
0.0108
(0.0142)
ⳮ0.1120***
(0.0166)
0.2345***
(0.0117)
ⳮ21.2445***
(0.8830)
1.9908***
(0.0110)
—

ⳮ0.0389
(0.0334)

Employment equation
0.8355***
(0.2396)
ⳮ1.2545***
(0.3533)
2.3317***
(0.4673)
0.2041
(0.0143)
ⳮ0.2871***
(0.0194)
0.0614***
(0.0180)
0.1680***
(0.0198)
0.3606***
(0.0262)
0.1843***
(0.0463)
ⳮ0.0040
(0.0216)
0.0010
(0.0336)
0.0771***
(0.0222)
0.0788***
(0.0298)
—

—
—

3.0181***
(0.0457)
ⳮ0.8264***
(0.0483)
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Table 6.2 (continued)
Regressor

Labor force
participation equation

Real gross state product
(000000)

—

Log population

—

disable ⳱ 1
post legislation ⳱ 1
disable ⳯ post ⳱ 1
Rho
Log-likelihood
Number of observations

Employment equation
0.0593
(0.1539)
ⳮ0.0042
(0.0159)
ⳮ0.2095***
(0.0514)
ⳮ0.0273
(0.0185)
0.0057
(0.0663)

ⳮ0.7197***
(0.0301)
0.0442***
(0.0127)
ⳮ0.0523
(0.0377)
0.0403***
(0.0065)
ⳮ65,190
140,707

NOTE: States included in the analysis are Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Massachusetts, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** ⳱ significant at the 99 percent confidence level.
** ⳱ significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
Notation of, for example (00), indicates regressor has been scaled by dividing by 100.

of disability legislation at the state level. Alternatively, it may be the
case, as has been pointed out with other social legislation, that the law
itself merely was the culmination of changes already incorporated into
the labor market experience of the affected group. In this instance, we
should see no effect of enactment of such legislation at the state level
either. This latter scenario is what we observe. While, overall, persons
with disabilities have a lower probability of unconditional employment,
there is no relative change in that employment probability post-legislation versus pre-legislation.
The third result of particular interest is related to the determination
of labor force participation. Recall that in the national analysis (see
Table 2.1) there was a dramatic decline in labor force participation
rates among the disabled post-ADA. If, indeed, the ADA legislation
caused individuals to flee the labor market, similar legislation at the
state level should result in the same behavior. The results in Table
6.2, however, indicate that state-level disability legislation had no such
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impact; the coefficient on disable ⳯ post in the labor force participation equation is not significantly different from zero. Again, this is in
an estimation where nearly all the other regressors are significant at the
99 percent confidence level. These findings support the theory posited
in Chapter 2 that the drop in the labor force participation rate that
occurred in 1994 at the national level (see Figure 2.2) cannot be attributable to the ADA and is likely the result of some other confounding
factor (i.e., modifications in welfare and Social Security Administration
policies).
Lastly, while the state unemployment rate has a large negative impact on employment probabilities, the new regressors of real gross state
product and log population are insignificant determinants of employment; the positive sign of real gross state product does, however, make
intuitive sense.
IMPACT ON WAGES
It was found in Chapter 3 that the ADA seems to have had a negative impact on wages of disabled workers overall, although it did not
appear to be directly related to the cost of accommodations required of
firms covered by the legislation. This section looks at the state level
to see whether a similar impact on wages occurred when protective
legislation was passed.
Log real wages are specified as a function of demographic and job
characteristics, as well as indicators for disability status, time period,
and the interaction between disability status and time. The following
specification is estimated via OLS for the time period 1981–1991:
(6.2)

lnrwageis ⳱ ␣ Ⳮ ␥Xi Ⳮ ␤1 disablei Ⳮ ␤2 posts
Ⳮ ␤3disablei ⳯ posts Ⳮ ⑀is

where lnrwageis is the natural log hourly real (1982–1984⳱1) wage
of worker i in state s,
Xi is a set of covariates for each person (demographic and job
characteristics),
disablei is equal to 1 if person i has a work-limiting disability,
and
posts is equal to 1 if person is observed in state s post-legislation
for that state.
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The affected group (the disabled) is controlled for by a dummy variable
indicating whether the individual has a work-limiting disability, and
the post-legislation time period in each state is controlled for by a
dummy variable indicating whether disability legislation was in place
yet or not. The coefficient of interest (␤3) measures the change in
real wages, relative to nondisabled workers, after passage of disability
legislation, relative to before legislation was in place. Xi includes individual demographic and job characteristics.
Wages are observed for workers only, and because the characteristics of workers may be changing over time in unobservable ways, it is
important to control for any potential unobserved self-selection into
the labor market. Consequently, Equation 6.2 is modified by simply
adding the standard inverse-Mills ratio obtained from the first-stage
probit estimation of a labor force participation/employment equation.
This standard Heckman (1979) two-step procedure for controlling for
self-selection is presented in greater detail in Chapter 3. The parameters of the model are identified through some regressors in the firststage probit estimation that are not in the wage regression; these regressors include nonlabor income and an indicator of whether the person worked last year or not. Since the purpose of this two-stage
approach is merely to obtain unbiased estimates of the coefficients in
the wage equation, interpretation of those coefficients is not changed
by controlling for selection. Table 6.3 contains the estimation results
from the log wage equation estimation.
As with the employment analysis, the results in Table 6.3 mirror
those at the national level, as reported in Table 3.1 in Chapter 3; most
coefficients on the control variables are of the same sign, and they are
roughly of the same magnitude. Two exceptions are the coefficient on
the advanced degree dummy variable, which is about one third the size
of that estimated at the national level, and the coefficient on the selection term. In Chapter 3, there was evidence of positive self-selection,
meaning that those entering the labor market could expect to earn
higher wages than the population as a whole. In the state-level analysis, the coefficient on the selection term is negative, indicating that
those entering the labor market typically will earn less than the population as a whole. Since the purpose of controlling for selection is to
obtain consistent estimates of the other coefficients in the wage equation, this difference in sign between the national and state-level analy-
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Table 6.3 Log Real Wage OLS Estimation with Selection, CPS,
1981–1991
Regressor
Intercept
Age (00)
Age Squared (0000)
Female ⳱ 1
Nonwhite ⳱ 1
High school grad ⳱ 1
Some college ⳱ 1
College grad ⳱ 1
Advanced degree ⳱ 1
Midwest ⳱ 1
South ⳱ 1
West ⳱ 1
Hours worked per week
Union ⳱ 1
Single household ⳱ 1
State unemployment rate (0)
Real gross state product (000000)
Log population
disable ⳱ 1

Labor force
participation equation
2.5415***
(0.0509)
0.0415***
(0.0051)
ⳮ0.0004
(0.0140)
ⳮ0.2266***
(0.0048)
ⳮ0.0416***
(0.0042)
0.1230***
(0.0046)
0.2072***
(0.0055)
0.3863***
(0.0067)
0.1071***
(0.0032)
ⳮ0.3072***
(0.0010)
ⳮ0.1441***
(0.0000)
ⳮ0.1125***
(0.0001)
0.0017
(0.0142)
0.1496***
(0.0008)
ⳮ0.0659***
(0.0033)
0.0109***
(0.0003)
0.0081
(0.0052)
ⳮ0.0953***
(0.0047)
ⳮ0.0802***
(0.0033)
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Table 6.3 (continued)
Regressor
post legislation ⳱ 1
disable ⳯ post ⳱ 1
 (selection term)
R2
F statistic
Number of observations

Labor force participation
equation
0.0307***
(0.0039)
ⳮ0.0452**
(0.0176)
ⳮ0.0811***
(0.0057)
0.46
2,354
95,604

NOTE: States included in the analysis are Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Massachusetts, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming. The
wage regression also included seven industry and five occupational dummy variables,
and a government dummy variable not reported here. The first-stage probit estimation
included age; age squared; gender, race, education, and disability dummies; and the
state unemployment rate. Nonlabor income and an indicator of working last year
were included as identifying regressors. All estimated coefficients in the first-stage
estimation were significantly different from zero at the 99 percent confidence level.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** ⳱ significant at the 99 percent confidence level.
** ⳱ significant at the 95 percent confidence level.

ses is not a concern here but may be worth exploring elsewhere from a
behavioral perspective.
The coefficient on the interaction term (disable ⳯ post) is
ⳮ0.0452, indicating that disabled workers experienced a 4.5 percent
decline in wages, relative to nondisabled workers, post-disability legislation, relative to pre-disability legislation. This is roughly of the same
magnitude as the 3 percent decline in wages experienced post-ADA
implementation (see Table 3.1). The implication is that we see the
same relative decline in wages of disabled versus nondisabled persons
at the state and national levels. This may mean that the measured
impact of the federal ADA on relative wages is muted, given that some
adjustment to disability legislation had already taken place as a result
of state laws. In addition, this lower wage of disabled workers relative
to that of nondisabled workers may not be the consequence of adjustment cost, but, rather, reflect the overall negative impact on the dis-
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abled, not just those covered by the legislation; this was the result
discovered in Chapter 3.

IMPACT ON HOURS
The increase in part-time employment post-ADA found in Chapter
4 is worth exploring at the state level, as well. It is of interest since
flexibility in hours may serve as an important mechanism through
which employers can accommodate many types of disabilities. If this
is the case, then requirements to accommodate workers’ disabilities at
the state level should result in similar adjustments as seen post-ADA.
Figure 6.3 plots the average proportion across states of disabled and
nondisabled workers that are employed part-time. The reference vertical line corresponds to the time when legislation was in place in each
state. There appears to be an increase in the proportion of disabled
workers that are employed part-time, as well as a modest divergence in
the two series.
The pooled, cross-sectional analysis of Chapter 4 is repeated here
in order to determine whether there is any significant growth in parttime employment among disabled workers, post-legislation, relative to
Figure 6.3 Proportion of Disabled and Nondisabled Workers That Are
Employed Part-Time, CPS, 1981–1991
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nondisabled workers. The model estimated is the bivariate probit with
selection:
(6.3)

empis ⳱ ␣1 Ⳮ ␥⬘1X1i Ⳮ ␤1 disablei Ⳮ 1 posts
Ⳮ 1 disablei ⳯ posts Ⳮ ⑀1is
ptis ⳱ ␣2 Ⳮ ␥⬘2X2i Ⳮ ␤2 disablei Ⳮ 2 posts
Ⳮ 2 disablei ⳯ posts Ⳮ ⑀2is.

empis ⳱ 1 if person i in state s is employed, 0 otherwise, and ptis ⳱ 1
if person i in state s is employed part-time and is not observed unless
empis ⳱ 1. disablei is equal to 1 if person i is disabled, 0 otherwise;
posts is equal to 1 if the person is observed after passage of the state
legislation; X1i and X2i include individual demographic characteristics;
⑀1is and ⑀2is are distributed as a bivariate normal with means equal to 0,
variances equal to 1, and correlation equal to .
Again, the coefficient in the part-time equation on the disable ⳯
post regressor is what tells us whether there is any change in the probability of part-time employment among disabled workers, post-legislation, relative to nondisabled workers. Table 6.4 details the regression
results. Using the parameter estimates, the difference in the impact of
having a work-limiting disability on part-time employment across the
two time periods can be calculated by evaluating the probabilities of
interest for each person, varying the disable and post dummy variables, then taking the difference between these probabilities and averaging the differences across the sample. This calculation translates the
estimated coefficients into a 2-percentage-point greater probability of
disabled workers being employed part-time than nondisabled workers,
post-legislation relative to pre-legislation. This result is only significantly different from zero at the 85 percent confidence level, but it
does provide some support for the notion that disability legislation,
whether by the states or national, influences the hours of work of disabled workers.4 Also, as with the preceding wage analysis, these findings suggest that the impact of the ADA was dampened somewhat by
the adjustments in hours that had already taken place as a result of the
state-level legislation.
CONCLUSIONS
The goal of this chapter was to determine what impact state-level
disability legislation has had on the employment, wage, and hours out-
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Table 6.4 Employment and Part-Time Employment Bivariate Probit
with Selection Results, CPS, 1981–1991
Regressor
disable ⳱ 1
post legislation ⳱ 1
disable ⳯ post ⳱ 1
Rho
Log-likelihood
Number of observations

Employment
equation

Part-time
employment equation

ⳮ0.1311***
(0.0498)
ⳮ0.0280*
(0.0165)
0.0129
(0.0654)

0.3406***
(0.0462)
0.0208*
(0.0118)
0.0828^
(0.0582)
0.7707***
(0.0169)
ⳮ54,402
101,584

NOTE: States included in the analysis are Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Massachusetts, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming. Regressors included both in the employment and part-time employment equations (but
not reported here) include age, education, region, race, gender, marital status, and
central city residence indicator. Regressors unique to the employment equation include the state unemployment rate and the number of weeks worked last year. Regressors unique to the part-time employment equation include occupation and
industry dummies, nonlabor income, and a government employer indicator. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
*** ⳱ significant at the 99 percent confidence level.
* ⳱ significant at the 90 percent confidence level.
^ ⳱ significant at the 85 percent confidence level.

comes of disabled workers. The question is whether the ADA is redundant with laws passed at the state level. The results indicate that the
state-level legislation operates on the labor market in the same way as
does the federal ADA. Namely, relative employment probabilities of
persons with disabilities are not affected by state-level disability legislation. It was also found that labor force participation rates were unaffected by the state-level legislation, lending support for the theory that
the decline in labor force participation rates observed post-ADA at the
national level was not ADA-induced. In addition, the disabled also
experienced a relative wage decline and a tentative rise in relative parttime employment at the state level following legislation.
The main implication of these results is that the lack of impact of
the ADA on employment, while perhaps disappointing to proponents,
is consistent with the contention that this type of legislation arrives
after society has already adopted its main principles, both at the na-
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tional and the state level. On the other hand, observing similar wage
and hours effects in states and nationally indicates that the wage and
hours impacts of the ADA would likely have been greater in magnitude
had the disabled not already partially experienced the impact of protective legislation at the state level. The analyses in this chapter clearly
indicate that state-level disability legislation did not fully crowd out
the impact of the ADA (not at all regarding employment, and potentially only partially regarding wages and hours). Can we conclude,
then, that the ADA was redundant? The answer is ‘‘no.’’ There was
no employment effect to crowd out (no employment effect at the national level), and there was still a measurable impact on wages and
hours at the national level. In addition, the federal legislation served
as a mechanism to instill uniformity of expectations of employers (even
though some state laws have a broader definition of coverage), and it
brought the issue of discrimination against disabled workers to the national forefront.

Notes
1. Also see Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1989) for additional information.
2. Methodologies that take advantage of differing legislative statuses among states
(or, more generally, across observations) have often been referred to as ‘‘natural
experiments’’ and have been applied by a number of researchers. For example,
see Chay (1996) and Carrington, McCue, and Pierce (2000).
3. The strategy described here can be likened to a differences-in-differences (DD)
methodology but is applied to a nonlinear statistical model. While this type of
pooled, cross-sectional analysis has been used by many researchers (for example,
Card 1992; Gruber 1994 and 1996; Zveglich and Rodgers 1996; and Hamermesh
and Trejo 2000), the technique also has its critics (such as Heckman 1996). The
primary criticism of this approach is that it is impossible to control for unobserved
changes in the environment that occurred at the same time as the event of interest.
The concern is mitigated in the analysis in this chapter, however, by the fact that
the post-legislation period varies across states.
4. Also, similar to the approach in Chapter 4, an additional analysis was performed
to determine whether, as at the national level, there was a marked increase in
voluntary part-time employment, but the results were inconclusive. The coefficient on the interaction disable ⳯ post term was not significantly different from
zero, and the adjusted R2 was only 0.08.

7
Conclusions and Policy Implications
This book has examined and documented the relative labor market
experience of workers with disabilities with an eye to evaluating the
impact of the ADA. A worker’s labor market experience goes beyond
simply whether a person has a job and what he or she is being paid.
While these dimensions are fundamental, the quality or characteristics
of the worker’s job, the process of obtaining it, and the nature of job
separation are also important factors. One intention of the ADA is to
break down barriers in the labor market; thus the focus of all analyses
in this book is on the experience of the disabled in that environment,
not on factors that influence decisions to enter the labor market. Accounting for those choices, however, is important in obtaining results
generalizable to the disabled population, so measures are taken, where
appropriate, to control for the decision to seek employment. In addition to the multiple dimensions of the potential impact of the ADA on
disabled Americans in the labor market, there are at least as many more
ways in which the ADA affects the lives of all disabled Americans;
such issues are not the subject of this work, but they may in fact amount
to a much greater overall effect than that experienced by disabled
workers alone.
Overall, the analyses presented here lead to the conclusion that the
labor market experience of disabled workers is quantitatively lower in
all dimensions than that of nondisabled workers. In addition, while
this relative situation has improved over time in some ways, there is no
strong evidence that it has been substantively impacted by the ADA.
There are two primary reasons why the ADA may not have had the
hoped-for dramatic effect. It could be the case that no one is paying
attention to the legislation. In other words, employers may not be
complying (either through lack of awareness or refusal) with the mandates of the ADA, workers may not be aware of their rights under the
law, or workers may not be pursuing these rights. Alternatively, it may
be the case that the bulk of the experience of disabled workers in the
labor market is being defined by factors other than those corrected for
by the ADA.
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It is not likely that the former is the case. For example, cognizance
of the ADA is widespread. A 1999 Harris poll indicated that 67 percent
of those surveyed were aware of the ADA, and it is likely that even a
higher percentage of people with disabilities (and employers) know of
the legislation (Roper Center for Public Opinion Research 1999). In
addition, the rate of ADA litigation suggests that disabled workers are
actively pursuing their rights. After climbing to a height of almost
20,000 in 1995, the number of claims tapered off to about 16,000 in
2001.1 Lastly, there is evidence that at least large employers and municipalities are complying with the provisions of the ADA (see Scheid
1998; Condrey and Brudney 1998). Additional evidence of compliance
is implied by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s ‘‘determination of no reasonable cause to believe that discrimination occurred based upon evidence obtained in investigation’’ in 54.1 percent
(fiscal year 2001) of the ADA charges made.2 This statistic has stayed
at 54 percent or higher since 1996.
It is probable, therefore, that the lack of notable impact of the ADA
on the labor market experience of the disabled implies that, like many
other pieces of legislation with a strong social and moral content, it
was adopted in an environment that had already embraced its principles
and mandates, for the most part. For example, by 1990, every state
had adopted some form of legislation granting protection to disabled
workers. Results in Chapter 6 indicate that these state-level policies
had influences on employment, wages, and hours similar to those found
when the federal legislation was implemented. The implication is that
some of the anticipated effect of the ADA had already been experienced at the state level over a longer period of time, beginning typically
in the 1970s. This is not to say that the ADA was an unnecessary piece
of legislation from the perspective of the labor market. Even if the
ADA merely reflects the environment in which it was passed, it serves
to strongly proclaim our social values and to provide a uniform legal
mechanism with which to arrest the activities of those who have not
yet embraced those values. As such, however, we are left with the
nagging question of, ‘‘What do we do now to improve the labor market
experience of workers with disabilities?’’ The results of the analyses
presented in this book can provide some guidance in answering this
question.
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The dimensions of a worker’s labor market experience evaluated
include employment, compensation, hours of work, distribution across
and representation in occupations and industries, job separation, unemployment, and job search. The CPS is the primary source of data
for each analysis. Various repeated cross-sectional and pooled crosssectional analyses were performed with data spanning the years 1981–
2000. Some of the analyses were supplemented with information in the
SIPP. The SIPP is primarily used to identify whether any experience or
impact differs across type of disability. The years of analyses with the
SIPP are limited to 1986–1997 but generally confirm the conclusions
from the longer data series available from the CPS. The results of most
notable interest are summarized in the following discussion and are
accompanied by policy recommendations. This chapter ends with an
overall assessment of the implications of the findings for the ADA and
beyond.

EMPLOYMENT INCENTIVES
Chapter 2 presents evidence that while the joint labor force participation and employment outcome declined among the disabled (driven
by a decreasing labor force participation rate), the unconditional employment probability of the disabled did not change, relative to that of
the nondisabled. In other words, the employment prospects for the
disabled, while not improved by the ADA, were also not harmed.
Analysis of the SIPP data set revealed that workers with mental disabilities (and disabilities classified as ‘‘other’’) actually experienced an increase in employment relative to the nondisabled. This may be the
result of easier accommodation of mental impairments or the recent
emphasis on providing employment opportunities for the mentally disabled by the Presidential Task Force on Employment of Adults with
Disabilities (formerly, the President’s Committee on Employment of
People with Disabilities).3 In addition, there has been a relative gain
in employment in large firms among the disabled, as compared with
the nondisabled; of course, large employers are those most able to
absorb the cost of accommodation. These results lead to some obvious
policy suggestions: providing incentives for the disabled to enter the
labor force and facilitating the accommodation process.
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Incentives for the Disabled
The most recent initiative to encourage labor force participation
among the disabled is the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999; it applies to recipients of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)
government cash payment programs for people with disabilities. The
main provisions that encourage labor force participation under these
programs involve reducing the risk and cost associated with ‘‘trying’’
work. One provision is a disregard for impairment-related work expenses (e.g., special equipment modified to accommodate a worker’s
disability, medical devices, and special transportation needs). These
expenses are deducted from a worker’s income before it is evaluated
for payment eligibility purposes. In order to encourage and facilitate
labor force participation, this provision could be expanded to provide
for direct reimbursement of these fixed (out-of-pocket) expenses. The
criteria for determining reimbursement could be the same for current
deductibility.
Another current work incentive provision allows for the exclusion
of earned income for SSI recipients. Under this policy, the first $65 a
month and half of the remainder of earnings are disregarded in calculating the SSI payment amount. This provision could be made more
generous and match that of the Trial Work Period (TWP) available for
SSDI recipients. The TWP allows SSDI recipients to work for nine
months without any reduction in benefit payments; after that period,
payments are discontinued if the person is able to maintain his or her
work activity.
The continuation of Medicare and Medicaid benefits beyond SSI
or SSDI eligibility is an important feature of the current incentives.
Many jobs for which disabled workers can qualify might not offer benefits, especially if the person must work part-time in order to accommodate his or her impairment. In addition, the extended period of
eligibility (SSDI) and reinstatement of payments without a new application (SSI) are important safety nets for the disabled worker not sure
if he or she should give employment a try. These provisions basically
allow recipients to reinstate payments without once again going
through the lengthy application process if they discover they are not
yet ready to permanently enter or reenter the labor force. SSDI can be
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reinstated up to 36 months after ineligibility, but former SSI recipients
only have 12 months to apply for reinstatement. While the SSI time
allowance is considerably shorter than the SSDI time allowance, eligibility requirements for the programs likely necessitate this differentiation.
In addition to these programmatic incentives, strategies encouraging labor force participation among all disabled individuals (not just
those receiving disability benefits) are warranted, based on the results
in Chapter 2. One suggestion, the Disabled Worker Tax Credit (Burkhauser, Glenn, and Wittenburg 1997), would provide incentives similar
to the current Earned Income Tax Credit for the working poor, but be
targeted at the disabled worker. Under this program, disabled workers
would essentially receive a subsidy to their employment wage. It is
not clear whether this program, however, would be effective in improving the labor market experience along compensation or job quality dimensions. The subsidy may encourage disabled workers to take lowerpaying jobs while not holding employers responsible for valuing the
skills (with accommodation) of this group equally with those of nondisabled workers.
Incentives for Employers
There has been a shift of employment among disabled workers
toward larger firms. The implication is that cost might be an important
factor in the willingness to hire a person with disabilities, and if that
cost were reduced, disabled labor force participants would make even
greater gains in employment. The federal government currently provides tax incentives to smaller firms to help pay for the expense of
accommodating workers with disabilities. Section 44 (Title 26) of the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Code allows for a tax credit to cover
50 percent (up to $5,000) of an ‘‘eligible access expenditure’’ in one
year incurred by a business with total revenues of $1 million or less, or
30 or fewer full-time employees (Hays 1999). Qualifying expenditures
under this section include adaptations of existing structures and purchase of special equipment and services (such as sign language interpreters).4 While this provision allows firms to be reimbursed for outof-pocket expenses for accommodating disabled workers, the actual
physical process of accommodating (i.e., evaluation of need and modi-
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fication of the environment) distracts the organization from its primary
focus of business. One thing the government could do to ease this
situation would be to equip the disabled worker with knowledge and
information regarding any specific accommodation he or she might
require in the type of job being sought. It is not the intention of the
ADA to put the burden of acquiring this background on the worker.
However, the more information workers can provide and the easier
they can make it for the employer, the better chance the individuals
will not be seen merely for the burden they might cause, but for the
attributes they provide to the firm.
The Work Opportunity Tax Credit (Title 26, Section 51 of the IRS
Code) provides a tax credit for hiring individuals from specific target
groups, with SSI recipients being one of those groups. The employer
can claim 40 percent (up to $6,000) of the hired worker’s first-year
wages. The maximum credit applies to individuals employed at least
400 hours during the year, and lesser credit applies to those employed
between 125 and 400 hours per year. While it is difficult to find the
number of employers who have taken advantage of the tax credit opportunities associated with hiring the disabled, it is likely that these
programs might suffer the same sort of administrative burdens that
have resulted in the ineffectiveness of other tax credit and employment
subsidy programs (for example, see Tannenwald 1982 and Katz 1998).
The Job Accommodations Network (JAN), sponsored by the Office
of Disability Employment Policy of the U.S. Department of Labor, is
a government resource that provides both employers and workers with
valuable information. Network members share experiences in successful accommodation strategies; employers who utilize the service are
required to join the network (Magill 1997).5 One benefit provided by
JAN is Searchable Online Accommodation Resource (SOAR), which
allows someone on the Internet to go through a series of steps (select a
disability, functional limitation, an affected job function, and an accommodation solution) and to obtain a list of vendors (from across the
nation) providing the accommodation solution identified that could
help a worker with a specified job function. There is also the opportunity on the SOAR website to enter specifics about an employer’s or
worker’s unique situation and to obtain personal feedback. In addition,
JAN provides information services to individuals with disabilities regarding starting a small business or becoming self-employed.
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Armed with the data obtained through JAN, the disabled job seeker
leaves the employer little excuse for not considering only the qualifications of the disabled applicant (i.e., productivity with accommodations
in place). Clearly, if one could document the usefulness and success
of these information dissemination efforts, a case might be made for
devoting even more resources toward such efforts and perhaps providing regional consultants that could evaluate a worker’s or employer’s
situation in person.

EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND JOB CHARACTERISTICS
One analysis in Chapter 3 indicates that the disabled overall have
suffered a cost in terms of lower relative wages post-ADA. With the
exception of large firms, wages of disabled workers declined by about
3 percent post-ADA, relative to those of nondisabled workers. People
with musculoskeletal disabilities suffered the bulk of the wage loss.
Policy suggestions made in the previous section to facilitate worker
accommodation should also go toward improving the apparent compensation tax on disabled workers for whatever workplace adjustments
are required. Further analysis in Chapter 3 indicates that these wage
losses may not be directly related to accommodation costs, however,
but are suffered by disabled workers whether or not they are covered
by the ADA. By facilitating the accommodation process (through information and resources provided by JAN or some other organization),
a person with disabilities is in a better position to negotiate a wage
comparable to that of nondisabled individuals.
Decomposing the wage differential between disabled and nondisabled workers indicates that only about 30–40 percent of the gap is
explained by observed characteristics of the workers themselves.
While the remainder cannot all be interpreted as discrimination against
the disabled, there is a significant portion of the differential that remains unexplained. Within the explained part, the greatest contributions to the wage discrepancy are made by differences in industry,
occupation, and educational attainment. In addition, it was found that
disabled workers actually typically received a higher return on their
education than did nondisabled workers, ceteris paribus. The implication is that investment in disabled workers’ education and training for
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high-paying jobs would go a long way to improving their compensation
experience in the labor market and is consistent with the results found
in Chapter 4. The analyses in Chapter 4 indicate that the distribution
of disabled and nondisabled workers across occupations has actually
become more dissimilar over time (with some recent improvements),
with disabled individuals being significantly more concentrated in the
lower-paying occupations. Workers with mental disorders are the most
dissimilar in their distribution across occupations, compared with nondisabled workers.
The SSI and SSDI programs have a number of provisions that assist with training, rehabilitation, and educational attainment. The primary one is that benefit payments will continue while an individual is
participating in a rehabilitation program, even if the recipient recovers
from his or her disability. Recipients of SSI may also participate in
what is called a PASS (Plan for Achieving Self-Support) program,
under which a SSI recipient may put aside assets and money toward a
plan that helps the recipient become self-sufficient, including rehabilitation or starting a business. These assets will be ignored in continuing
determination of eligibility. In addition, the 1999 Ticket to Work legislation provides (as of December 2000) SSI and SSDI recipients with a
‘‘ticket’’ that can be used to obtain vocational rehabilitation, job or
other support services from an employment network of the recipient’s
choice. This provision makes obtaining vocational rehabilitation more
flexible, and thus more accessible.
In spite of such provisions, Chatterjee and Mitra (1998) indicate
that less than 5 percent of federal spending for SSI and SSDI goes to
training and rehabilitation. They suggest that this type of expenditure
pattern on the disabled is the result of ‘‘a bias in disability programs in
favor of short term equity considerations as opposed to the long run
efficiency objectives’’ (p. 360). These authors also show that there is
a positive link between enhancing a disabled person’s human capital
and his or her chances of participating in the labor market. The implication is that devoting more resources toward education and training
would not only improve disabled workers’ labor market experiences,
but also help the bottom line of the SSI and SSDI programs by leading
to more disabled people becoming self-sufficient.
In addition, the focus of SSI and SSDI on vocational rehabilitation
may not direct resources where they will provide the greatest boost
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in compensation and occupational attainment outcomes for disabled
workers. The growing earnings gap between those with and without
college educations is well documented (for example, see Murphy, Juhn,
and Pierce 1993). Training disabled workers for jobs requiring a college degree is an idea that has not received a great deal of attention.
According to the results in Chapter 3, workers with musculoskeletal
disorders appear to have suffered the most in terms of compensation.
One reason for this may be that the cost of accommodating a worker’s
musculoskeletal disability in a blue-collar or physically-challenging
position is likely much more expensive than if that worker became
skilled in a less physically but more mentally demanding, and potentially higher-paying, job. Further evidence of the general lack of support for higher education is found in the income exclusion for earnings
of disabled students. While attending school, students only under the
age of 22 are allowed to earn income that is excluded from calculating
benefit eligibility and levels. This income exclusion could be extended
to individuals over the age of 22 when they are working toward a terminal degree that would improve their occupational outcome.6
One area in which further general education for older SSI recipients is supported is in the development of a PASS; tuition, fees, books,
and supplies for school are among those expenses that can be set aside
as part of the SSI recipient’s plan for self-support. While laudable,
this provision is not likely to be very practical since it requires the SSI
recipient, who is subject to strict earnings limitations, to set aside savings and assets that are likely difficult to acquire. An additional provision that allows the recipient to work (without penalty) while attending
school may place attainment of higher education within the realm of
financial possibility. The federal government does allow educational
grants, fellowships, and scholarships used for tuition and fees to be
excluded from earnings limitations. Portions of those sources used for
room and board, however, are not currently excluded. A report by
the Social Security Administration (2000) suggests that all portions of
grants, scholarships, and fellowships be excluded from the earnings
test.7
Given the importance of general education in improving the employment experience of disabled workers (as demonstrated in the analyses of this book), the federal government should explore the
possibilities of providing more active support. One could also argue
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that if the basic goal is to improve the labor market experience of
workers with disabilities, subsidized training and education should be
made available to all disabled individuals, not only those affiliated with
a government cash payment disability program. Improving the labor
market experience of a single disabled worker could also provide externalities to the experience of other disabled workers. As employers
and fellow workers become more comfortable working alongside the
disabled and become more aware of such individuals’ capabilities, even
more doors would open to disabled workers who follow.
One policy change that seems to have had an unambiguous effect
on the characteristics of jobs held by disabled workers is the extension
of Medicaid and Medicare for SSI and SSDI recipients who have become ineligible for disability payments. Most part-time jobs do not
offer health insurance, but many disabled workers may prefer part-time
employment as a means of accommodation for their disability. Due to
the extension of Medicaid and Medicare, disabled workers can now
consider part-time employment without the risk of losing medical benefits. The results in Chapter 4 support this outcome; disabled workers
are increasingly more likely to be employed part-time (versus fulltime), but they are also increasingly more likely to be voluntarily (versus involuntarily) employed on a part-time basis. On the one hand, the
extension of Medicaid and Medicare has opened up work opportunities
that may improve a disabled worker’s life. On the other hand, there
is some evidence that part-time jobs are more likely to be marginal,
temporary, unstable, and lower-paying (Blank 1990). The government
might be able to provide assistance to (particularly, small) employers
who want to explore flextime in order to accommodate workers’ disabilities in occupations that may not be typical candidates for such
scheduling, but that pay more and provide for advancement opportunities within the firm. One step that will likely contribute positively to
this effort is the President’s ‘‘New Freedom Initiative.’’8 This concept
calls for the fulfillment of the promise made by the government to
people with disabilities through the passage of the ADA; it includes
education, home ownership, access, and employment provisions. Expanding telecommuting opportunities is one example: ‘‘The Administration will provide Federal matching funds to states to guarantee lowinterest loans for individuals with disabilities to purchase computers
and other equipment necessary to telework from home. In addition,
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legislation will be proposed to make a company’s contribution of computer and Internet access for home use by employees with disabilities
a tax-free benefit.’’9 Given the results in Chapter 4, that flexible work
arrangements (i.e., part-time jobs) may be an important aspect of
greater employment opportunities for people with disabilities, this proposal holds promise.

SCREENING AND MATCHING
The evidence of job separation and job search experiences of disabled workers presented in Chapter 5 is ambiguous. On the one hand,
disabled workers search three weeks longer, on average, than similar
nondisabled individuals before finding a job. On the other hand, job
separations are less likely to be for involuntary reasons among disabled
than among nondisabled workers, implying that disabled workers are
not likely the ‘‘marginal’’ employees that some have speculated they
are. While longer search spells are consistent with discriminatory hiring practices on the part of employers, the finding that most of the
observed longer search spell is explained by individual characteristics
suggests that endowments of disabled and nondisabled workers are
being valued equally, but that employers go to greater lengths to discern the fit of a disabled worker’s traits with a particular job. This care
in hiring on the part of the employer would also lead to the lower
probability that a separation is involuntary. In addition, the firm may
have made some expenditures in accommodating the worker’s disability and thus will be reluctant to lose that investment by laying off or
firing the worker.
The lower probability that a separation is involuntary means that
disabled workers experience a higher likelihood that a separation is
voluntary. While this may be interpreted as disabled workers having a
fair amount of mobility in the labor market, it may also mean that they
have more difficulty than nondisabled individuals in finding a good job
match. What is called for is a policy that assists employers in discerning the qualifications and fit of a disabled worker more quickly and
that helps disabled workers in determining the appropriateness of a
particular job. Measures for improving the efficacy and speed of job
matches would include a clearing house at which employers could post
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job openings and workers could advertise skills (with appropriate accommodations); third-party certification of worker skills; and assistance with information (such as JAN) and with cost (such as tax
credits) for accommodating a particular disability for the job to be
filled.
The National Easter Seal Society provides many services that
would facilitate matching of workers with employers. Skills evaluation
and screening, employment skills training, and job placement services
are among the programs offered through Easter Seals. JAN could also
be expanded to provide job placement services, which it currently does
not do.10 The U.S. Office of Disability Employment Policy, however,
has some initiatives that do assist in employment on a limited basis.11
The Employer Assistance Referral Network (EARN) is designed to
help employers in locating and recruiting qualified individuals with
disabilities. The Workforce Recruitment Program is involved with securing summer employment and internships for students with disabilities, and Project EMPLOY is designed to expand and enhance job
opportunities for people with cognitive disabilities by, primarily, providing funding to other organizations to provide employment services.
One thing that might be difficult for an employer to assess is the
productivity of a disabled worker with accommodating equipment or
services in place. If the government, or some private entity, could
certify a particular skill (such as typing or editing) when a disabled
individual has access to facilitating equipment, the employer would not
be forced to bear the risk of hiring the worker and installing the necessary equipment without knowing what the outcome will be. There
could be testing centers set up regionally, or mobile testing centers,
that would contain the most common equipment needed for the worker
to do the job in question.

THE ADA AND BEYOND
The labor market provisions of the ADA comprise a small part of
the overall goals of the legislation. Furthermore, given the relatively
low proportion of the disabled population that is actually in the labor
force, and smaller yet that is employed, the potential impact of these
provisions is not nearly as widespread as the effect of other elements
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of the legislation that cover aspects of a disabled person’s life outside
the labor market. As such, measuring the influence of the ADA on the
overall quality of life of the disabled goes far beyond the potential
impact on the labor market experience. Indeed, the key contributions
of the ADA may be beyond quantification in economic terms; it is
difficult to put a price on the dignity and respect that proponents might
argue are among the most important dividends of the ADA.
Nevertheless, learning that the ADA did not result in dramatic, or
even notable, improvement across multiple dimensions of the labor
market experience of the disabled must be quite disappointing for the
proponents of the legislation. In light of these findings, we are left
with the question of why no such impact was forthcoming. One possible reason for legislation not having an effect on the intended beneficiaries is that there was nothing to improve: the disadvantaged are not
really as disadvantaged as they might appear (because of factors the
researcher may not be able to observe, for example). If this is the case,
then the ADA is directed at a nonexistent target. A second possibility
for finding no influence of the ADA on labor market outcomes among
the disabled might be that the labor market provisions of the legislation
are focused on the wrong things. Title I of the ADA is couched in
terms of eliminating discriminatory behavior on the part of employers.
It could be the case that discrimination is not the culprit determining
inferior labor market outcomes for the disabled; in other words, the
ADA is aiming at the wrong target. A third potential explanation for
finding no impact is that the ADA is focused on the right target, but
just missed. In other words, it may be the case that the legislation is
ineffective, that employers are finding ways to get around the provisions and that workers are not able to exercise their rights under the
law.
With the amount of evidence presented in this book, as well as that
provided elsewhere, it is not likely that the ADA is aiming at a nonexistent target. One advantage of examining labor market outcomes from
multiple dimensions, as was done here, is to be able to rule out numerous explanations for inferior labor market outcomes. The disabled
clearly have further to go before enjoying labor market outcomes comparable to those experienced by the nondisabled. The possibility that
the ADA has missed the target and that employers are able to somehow
get around complying with the legislation is also not likely. The inabil-
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ity of employers to ignore the ADA is evidenced by the fact that disability claims made up 20 percent of all claims made to the EEOC
during fiscal year 2001. This percentage was not too far behind the
ratio of claims filed based on race (36 percent), sex (31 percent), and
age (22 percent) during the same year and suggests that workers are
aware of their rights and are holding employers accountable. The
chance, then, that the ADA is aiming at the wrong target is still a
possibility. While individual cases of discrimination (as evidenced by
the number of EEOC claims) indicate that discrimination against disabled workers is likely occurring in the labor market, it still may not
be the overwhelming determinant of inferior labor market outcomes.
As suggested earlier in this chapter, other policies, such as promoting
education and training, may go further toward improving labor market
outcomes than a policy outlawing discrimination (which may only
touch a small portion of the disabled).
Regardless of why the ADA does not seem to have affected the
labor market experience of the disabled, this absence of impact begs
the question of whether the ADA is necessary. Clearly, it is possible
to argue the merits of the ADA on the ways in which it has likely
improved the quality of life among the disabled beyond its labor market
or quantifiable influence. However, even with regard to its labor market provisions, the ADA does serve as a statement of our social values,
and it provides a legal mechanism with which to stem the activities of
those who have not yet accepted those values. In addition, there is no
question that it does serve to set the stage and to provide a labor market
environment in which effective reforms, more narrowly focused on the
needs of the disabled for improving outcomes, can be introduced.

Notes
1. See table of statistics titled, ‘‘Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)
Charges FY1992–FY2001,’’ found at ⬍http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-charges
.html⬎.
2. See table of statistics titled, ‘‘Americans with Disabilities Act of 1900 (ADA)
Charges FY1992–FY2001,’’ found at ⬍http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-charges
.html⬎.
3. Other possible explanations include the potential for the ADA to have a greater
impact on overcoming negative social attitudes against people with mental disabilities (versus other types of disabilities) or improvements in medications occur-
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4.
5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.
11.

ring during the same time period, which facilitated the labor market performance
of people with mental disabilities.
More substantial architectural and transportation adaptation expenses can be deducted from tax liability by all businesses under IRS Code Section 190.
The web site for JAN is ⬍http://www.jan.wvu.edu/⬎. Additional government resources for people with disabilities can be found at ⬍http://www.disabilitydirect
.gov⬎. The National Easter Seal Society (http://www.easter-seals.org/) also offers free information referral and suggestions for technological devices to help
workers do their jobs.
This recommendation is also made by the Social Security Administration’s March
2000 report to the Congress on income and resource exclusions. That report also
recommends that the amount of earnings excluded be increased and then indexed
to the CPI.
The report also suggests that grants, fellowships, and scholarships be excluded
from resource limitations for nine months, based on the reality that many forms
of financial aid are received at the beginning and paid out over the balance of the
school year.
See the U.S. Health and Human Services Web site, ‘‘New Freedom Initiative:
Fulfilling America’s Promise to Americans with Disabilities,’’ found at ⬍http://www
.hhs.gov/newfreedom/⬎.
See the U.S. Health and Human Services Web site, ‘‘New Freedom Initiative:
Fulfilling America’s Promise to Americans with Disabilities,’’ found at ⬍http://www
.hhs.gov/newfreedom/⬎. Also see Chen (2001).
See note 5.
These job search and placement efforts (and others) can be located from the ⬍http://
www.disabilitydirect.gov⬎ Web site.

Appendix A
CPS Sample Construction
This appendix provides information regarding the use of the Current Population Survey data set for the analyses in this book. The lessons learned
might be useful to others creating successive cross-sections across many years
using the CPS. The notes and recommendations reflect the experience of the
author only.
1. The complete set of outgoing rotation groups from the CPS was obtained from Unicon Research Corporation (http://www.unicon.com). The outgoing rotation group in the CPS consists of individuals in their 4th and 8th
month of eight monthly interviews. A CPS respondent is interviewed for four
consecutive months, not interviewed for four months, then interviewed again
for four consecutive months. This source is highly recommended for not only
outgoing rotation groups, but for all of the CPS data sets one might want. The
data arrive on CDs with easy-to-use extraction software. The documentation
is excellent; the coding across years is consistent; technical support is accessible and helpful; and the documentation also makes note of known data anomalies or errors. Unicon makes these data available for a fee.
2. The March supplemental files for each year were obtained from the
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), ⬍http://
www.icpsr.umich.edu/⬎. We identified tremendous (un-correctable) problems with the 1994 March CPS obtained from ICPSR and ultimately obtained
the data needed for 1994 from Unicon.
3. A variable of crucial importance to the analyses in this book is the
indicator of disability status. That indicator is not available in the CPS public
use file between 1981 and 1987; we contracted with the Census Bureau to
extract the necessary variable and individual identifiers essential for matching
with the rest of the CPS file for those years.
4. Creation of the CPS data sets for each year required matching individuals in each of the outgoing rotation groups from March, April, May, and June
with the supplemental questionnaire in March. The match rate was approximately 90 percent for each month, except March, where the match rate, of
course, was 100 percent.
5. The coding of the variable in the March supplement indicating whether
an individual worked last year changed over the entire time period. Although
this coding change is well documented, it could confound analyses if the difference is not noticed. Specifically, for 1981–1987, a ‘‘1’’ indicates that the
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person did not work during the previous year, and, for 1988–1999, a ‘‘1’’
indicates that the person did work during the previous year.
6. Prior to 1994, the question of usual hours worked per week was asked
of those who were earner eligible (outgoing rotation groups) and employed
during the previous week. Starting in 1994, this variable was coded as zero
for workers with variable hours, and the question regarding how many hours
were worked at all jobs last week was changed to read, ‘‘Last week, how many
hours did you actually work at your (main) job?’’ Unfortunately, the Census
code book (which accompanies data from ICPSR) does not reflect the change
in this question since 1994 (it still indicates that the question refers to hours
worked at all jobs, when in fact, it now only reflects hours at the main job).

Appendix B
SIPP Sample Construction
In the terminology of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, a
Panel refers to a group of interviewees and the year in which that group was
first interviewed. A Wave refers to an interview within a Panel. Each Panel
has anywhere from 3 (1989 Panel) to 12 (1996 Panel) interviews. Further
details of the SIPP can be found on the Internet at ⬍http://www.bls.census
.gov/sipp/⬎. Core data from each Wave within a Panel used for sample construction were merged with the topical module for Wave 2 from the same
Panel. Wave 2 topical modules were used for identification of a work disability for consistency over as many consecutive years as possible. When available, core data from Wave 2 in one Panel were combined with core data from
Wave 5 in the previous Panel and with core data from Wave 8 in the Panel
before that in order to construct a larger sample year. Table B.1 presents the
layout of the SIPP sampling structure. The Waves merged across Panels (columns in Table B.1) are combined for illustration using a bold box outline.
Since the goal was to create multiple cross sections comparable to the CPS,
only Waves 2, 5, and 8 in each Panel were exploited.
Combining data across Panels was not possible for sample years 1986,
1989, 1990, 1995, 1996, and 1997 due to the lack of availability of overlapping Panels for which disability information is available. The labor market
information, due to the rotation of sets of questions in the SIPP, corresponds
to June of the year referenced. The exception to this pattern is the 1997
sample labor market information, which came from Wave 5 of the 1996 panel,
which corresponds to August of 1997. Of course, these waves were merged
with the disability topical module for that panel.
The disability check in the topical module was the variable used to designate a work-limiting disability. There are two checks in topical modules for
the 1986–1993 Panels, but only one check in the 1996 Panel, resulting in the
slightly smaller incidence of individuals with work-limiting disabilities in the
1996 and 1997 samples. The match rate across Waves within a Panel ranged
from 81 to 89 percent success. Labor status refers to activity during the previous month (as opposed to the previous week, as in the CPS), since job information corresponds to activity over the month.
The primary usefulness of the SIPP derives from an ability to identify the
nature of a disabled worker’s disability. The categories identified are too
numerous for all of them to be included in the analysis, so they are grouped
into broad headings based on the classifications used by the Social Security
Administration. Table B.2 shows how specific disabilities are classified.
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Waves

Panel

Year

Month

1984

1983
1984

Oct.
Feb.
June
Oct.
Feb.
June
Oct.
Feb.
June
Oct.
Feb.
June
Oct.
Feb.
June
Oct.
Feb.
June
Oct.
Feb.
June
Oct.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1985

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

1986

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

<- 1986 sample

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1989 sample ->

<- 1987 sample
1
2
3
4
5
6

<- 1988 sample
1
2
3

<-Wave 2 (1989) top. mod. not avail.
1
2
3

<- 1990 sample

1996
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Table B.1 SIPP Data Structure

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

4
5
6
7
8

1
2
3
4
5
6

<- 1991 sample

1
2
<- 1992 sample
3
7
4
1
5
1993 sample -> 8
2
6
3
7
4
1994 sample -> 8
5
9
6
10
7
1995 sample ->
8
9
1
2
1996 sample ->
3
4
5
1997 sample ->
6

NOTE: Wave 2 topical module (number in bold) is where disability information is located. Waves bordered in bold are merged to create
the sample year indicated. Each wave used for sample construction was merged with the Wave 2 topical module, then combined across
panels as indicated. The 1996 panel continues for 12 waves through 1999, but only six were available at the time of analysis.
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1997

Feb.
June
Oct.
Feb.
June
Oct.
Feb.
June
Oct.
Feb.
June
Oct.
Feb.
June
Oct.
Apr..
Aug.
Dec.
Apr.
Aug.
Dec.

162 Hotchkiss

Table B.2 Classification of Disabilities in the SIPP Data Set
1. Musculoskeletal
Arthritis or rheumatism
Back or spine problems
Broken bone/fracture
Head or spinal cord injury
Hernia or spinal injury
Missing legs, feet, arms, hands, or fingers
Paralysis of any kind
Stiffness or deformity of the foot, leg, arm, or hand
Blindness or vision problems
Deafness or serious trouble hearing
Speech disorder
2. Internal systems
AIDS or AIDS-related condition
Cancer
Diabetes
Heart trouble, hardening of the arteries
High blood pressure
Kidney stones or chronic kidney trouble
Lung or respiratory problems
Stomach trouble
Thyroid trouble or goiter
3. Mental disorder
Alcohol or drug problem or disordera
Learning disability
Mental or emotional problem or disorder
Mental retardation
Senility/dementia/Alzheimer’s disease
Cerebral palsy
Epilepsy
Stroke
Tumor, cyst, or growth
4. Other
NOTE: Complete classification of disabilities by the Social Security Administration
can be found at ⬍http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/cfr20/404/404-ap09.htm⬎.
a
Drug addiction is excluded from protection by the ADA.
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Table C.1 Trends in the Percentages of Total Sample and of Workers
Indicating a Work-Limiting Disability, CPS Combined
Outgoing Rotation Groups, 1981–2000
Year

% of sample

% of workers

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

9.79
10.19
9.73
10.20
10.34
9.89
9.62
9.15
9.26
9.34
9.34
9.44
9.82
10.95
11.14
10.88
10.75
10.05
9.84
9.99

2.68
2.69
2.53
2.74
2.66
2.68
2.69
2.63
2.67
2.74
2.60
2.70
2.87
2.68
2.53
2.73
2.81
2.51
2.37
2.70
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Table C.2 Percentages of Disabled and Nondisabled Individuals
Employed, CPS, 1981–2000
Subsample employed (%)
Year

Disabled

Nondisabled

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

17.76
17.27
16.34
17.21
16.76
17.70
18.32
19.11
19.43
19.35
18.41
18.88
19.05
16.50
15.44
16.41
17.30
17.09
16.60
17.15

62.62
61.39
60.45
62.93
63.57
63.79
64.49
63.98
65.74
65.98
64.74
64.39
64.42
66.16
66.32
66.71
67.40
67.88
68.05
68.70
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Table C.3 Predicted Joint Probability of Labor Force Participation and
Employment and Predicted Unconditional Employment
Probability, by Disability Status, CPS, 1981–2000
Average predicted probability
Nondisabled

Disabled

Being in the labor
Being in the labor
force and employed
Employment
force and employed
Employment
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Year Prob(lfp⳱1, emp⳱1) Prob(emp⳱1) Prob(lfp⳱1, emp⳱1) Prob(emp⳱1)
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

0.64271
0.62609
0.61727
0.64824
0.65675
0.66467
0.67498
0.68827
0.69070
0.69150
0.67530
0.67426
0.67738
0.68448
0.68820
0.69305
0.70309
0.71169
0.71529
0.72085

0.84244
0.81519
0.79255
0.85387
0.85665
0.85364
0.86818
0.87833
0.88346
0.87427
0.84653
0.82397
0.83780
0.84973
0.87372
0.87742
0.87734
0.89380
0.89326
0.91141

0.47840
0.47742
0.47474
0.50693
0.50837
0.51167
0.51993
0.53576
0.53884
0.52609
0.52123
0.51998
0.53733
0.49882
0.49520
0.50769
0.51408
0.51334
0.50755
0.52832

0.79271
0.77384
0.76856
0.82802
0.82475
0.81465
0.83475
0.82908
0.85364
0.82427
0.81285
0.76743
0.80476
0.81405
0.83877
0.84971
0.84607
0.86027
0.83657
0.86493

NOTE: Estimates obtained from a bivariate probit model with selection. Regressors
for both labor force and employment determination included the state unemployment
rate; age; age squared; female, nonwhite, education, and regional dummies; and a
disability dummy. The labor force participation equation also included nonlabor
income, marital status, and a worked-last-year indicator. The employment equation
included the number of weeks worked last year. The probabilities for each column
are the average across the entire sample obtained by calculating the probability for
each person (varying the disability dummy variable between 0 and 1), then averaging
across the sample.
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Table C.4 Relative Predicted Probabilities of Working in Each Firm Size,
CPS 1987–1999
Ratio of predicted probabilities of a disabled worker relative
to the predicted probability for a nondisabled coworker
being employed by a firm by size
Year

Small firm

1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

1.1842
1.1836
1.1524
1.1372
1.1682
1.2127
1.0873
1.0567
1.1772
1.1811
1.1341
1.0110
1.0963

1.0756
1.1063
1.0403
1.0174
0.9417
0.8759
1.0410
0.9999
0.9384
0.8598
0.9900
0.9319
0.9840

0.9189
0.9134
0.9409
0.9507
0.9493
0.9501
0.9512
0.9787
0.9399
0.9575
0.9511
1.0106
0.9675

ⳮ0.0879

ⳮ0.0917

0.0487

Change over
time period

Medium firm

Large firm

NOTE: Small firms have fewer than 25 employees; medium firms have 25–99 employees; and large firms have 100 or more employees. Regressors (in addition to a
disability dummy variable) in the multinomial logit regression included age; age
squared; and regional, education, female, nonwhite, and central city dummy variables.
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Table C.5 Observed and Selectivity-Corrected Wage Differentials, CPS,
1981–2000

Year

Observed
wage
differentiala

Wage differential
corrected for
selectivity into
the labor marketb

Endowment
effectc

Coefficient
effectd

Selection
effecte

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

0.1587
0.1294
0.1717
0.1885
0.1706
0.1948
0.2008
0.2089
0.2512
0.2469
0.2649
0.2644
0.2723
0.2733
0.2400
0.2638
0.2117
0.2843
0.2941
0.2809

0.1315
0.1318
0.1991
0.1902
0.2037
0.2144
0.2342
0.1954
0.2009
0.2605
0.2494
0.2901
0.3114
0.3337
0.2768
0.2642
0.2090
0.2776
0.3028
0.2566

0.0386
0.0307
0.0056
0.0312
0.0476
0.0634
0.0591
0.0436
0.0766
0.0807
0.0769
0.0890
0.0852
0.0911
0.0792
0.0929
0.0791
0.0884
0.0881
0.0674

0.0929
0.1011
0.1935
0.1590
0.1561
0.1510
0.1751
0.1518
0.1243
0.1798
0.1725
0.2011
0.2262
0.2427
0.1976
0.1713
0.1299
0.1892
0.2147
0.1892

0.0272
ⳮ0.0024
ⳮ0.0275
ⳮ0.0017
ⳮ0.0332
ⳮ0.0197
ⳮ0.0334
0.0135
0.0503
ⳮ0.0136
0.0154
ⳮ0.0258
ⳮ0.0391
ⳮ0.0605
ⳮ0.0368
ⳮ0.0004
0.0027
0.0066
ⳮ0.0087
0.0243

NOTE: The first-stage probit estimation included the following regressors: age; age
squared; nonwhite, female, disabled, single household, education, and worked-lastyear dummy variables; and nonlabor income. Regressions for 1981 and 1982 do
not include a union dummy. Second-stage wage estimations included the following
regressors: hour of work; age; age squared; and union, female, single household,
nonwhite, education, region, industry, occupation, and government dummy variables.
Regressions for 1983 do not include dummies for the service; farming, fishing, and
forestry; or the craft occupations due to the absence of representation of disabled
workers in these occupations in the sample. ␤ˆ nd (coefficients from the nondisabled
estimation) was used to represent the ‘‘nondiscriminatory’’ world since the disabled
make up such a small proportion of the whole.
a
ln Wnd ⳮ ln Wd
b
ln Wnd ⳮ ln Wd ⳮ [(ĉndnd) ⳮ (ĉdd)]
c ˆ
␤nd(Xnd ⳮ Xd)
d
Xd(␤ˆ nd ⳮ ␤ˆ d)
e
[(ĉndnd) ⳮ (ĉdd)].
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Table C.6 Marginal Effect of Being Disabled on the Probability of
Employer-Provided Health Insurance and of Being Included
in the Employer’s Pension Plan, CPS
Measure of earnings not
included in probit estimation
Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996

Measure of earnings included in
probit estimation

⌽(HealthIns)

⌽(Pension)

⌽(HealthIns)

⌽(Pension)

Disabled

Disabled

Disabled

Disabled

ⳮ0.0848
(0.0094)
ⳮ0.0859
(0.0096)
ⳮ0.0888
(0.0101)
ⳮ0.0822
(0.0099)
ⳮ0.0740
(0.0098)
ⳮ0.0861
(0.0098)
ⳮ0.0956
(0.0099)
ⳮ0.0850
(0.0100)
ⳮ0.0990
(0.0099)
ⳮ0.0891
(0.0095)
ⳮ0.1050
(0.0099)
ⳮ0.1150
(0.0099)
ⳮ0.1188
(0.0101)
ⳮ0.0741
(0.0100)
ⳮ0.0831
(0.0107)
ⳮ0.1070
(0.0105)
ⳮ0.1159
(0.0104)

ⳮ0.0890
(0.0098)
ⳮ0.0924
(0.0100)
ⳮ0.0751
(0.0104)
ⳮ0.0835
(0.0102)
ⳮ0.0677
(0.0100)
ⳮ0.0849
(0.0102)
ⳮ0.0824
(0.0103)
ⳮ0.0901
(0.0105)
ⳮ0.0911
(0.0104)
ⳮ0.0820
(0.0097)
ⳮ0.0900
(0.0101)
ⳮ0.1059
(0.0101)
ⳮ0.0967
(0.0101)
ⳮ0.0856
(0.0102)
ⳮ0.0872
(0.0108)
ⳮ0.1210
(0.0108)
ⳮ0.1281
(0.0108)

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

ⳮ0.0243
(0.0096)
ⳮ0.0428
(0.0095)
ⳮ0.0315
(0.0091)
ⳮ0.0415
(0.0095)
ⳮ0.0626
(0.0095)
ⳮ0.0638
(0.0098)
ⳮ0.0329
(0.0097)
ⳮ0.0380
(0.0104)
ⳮ0.0869
(0.0105)
ⳮ0.0970
(0.0104)

ⳮ0.0356
(0.0101)
ⳮ0.0402
(0.0100)
ⳮ0.0285
(0.0093)
ⳮ0.0347
(0.0097)
ⳮ0.0595
(0.0097)
ⳮ0.0462
(0.0097)
ⳮ0.0424
(0.0098)
ⳮ0.0450
(0.0105)
ⳮ0.1045
(0.0108)
ⳮ0.1094
(0.0107)
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Table C.6 (continued)
Measure of earnings not
included in probit estimation
Year
1997
1998
1999

Measure of earnings included in
probit estimation

⌽(HealthIns)

⌽(Pension)

⌽(HealthIns)

⌽(Pension)

Disabled

Disabled

Disabled

Disabled

ⳮ0.1101
(0.0109)
ⳮ0.1018
(0.0111)
ⳮ0.0728
(0.0108)

ⳮ0.1110
(0.0113)
ⳮ0.1022
(0.0115)
ⳮ0.1036
(0.0111)

ⳮ0.0913
(0.0109)
ⳮ0.0822
(0.0111)
ⳮ0.0526
(0.0107)

ⳮ0.0944
(0.0112)
ⳮ0.0828
(0.0114)
ⳮ0.0832
(0.0110)

NOTE: A reliable earnings variable was not available in the years 1981–1987. Regressors in the probit estimation included nonwhite, female, education, single household, government, industry, occupation, and disabled dummy variables; age; age
squared; earnings from the job; and usual hours worked. Standard errors for the
partial derivatives are in parentheses.
⌽ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
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Table C.7 Impact of Being Disabled on the Probability of Part-Time and
Voluntary Part-Time Employment, CPS, 1981–2000
Predicted marginal effect of a disability on probability
Year

Being employed part-timea
(1)

Being voluntarily employed part-timeb
(2)

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

0.0557
0.0581
0.0836
0.0665
0.0664
0.0850
0.0594
0.0820
0.0924
0.0824
0.0844
0.0886
0.1134
0.1425
0.1227
0.1380
0.1492
0.1407
0.1569
0.1250

ⳮ0.0030
ⳮ0.0010
ⳮ0.0643
ⳮ0.0098
ⳮ0.0744
ⳮ0.0145
ⳮ0.0085
ⳮ0.0399
0.0067
ⳮ0.0214
ⳮ0.0367
0.0053
0.0173
0.0365
0.0187
0.0266
0.0676
0.0385
0.0594
0.0182

NOTE: The marginal effects are calculated at the sample means, except disability
status, which is varied between 0 and 1 to generate the marginal effect. See Long
(1997).
a
Predicted marginal effects in column 1 result from estimation of a bivariate model of
employment and part-time employment, accounting for selection at the employment
stage. Regressors in both the employment and part-time employment equations included age, education, region, race, gender, marital status, and a central city residence
indicator. Regressors unique to the employment equation included the state unemployment rate and the number of weeks worked last year. Regressors unique to the
part-time employment equation included occupation and industry dummies, nonlabor
income, and a government employer indicator.
b
Predicted marginal effects in column 2 result from estimation of a univariate probit
model of the probability of being voluntarily employed part-time. The sample is
restricted to all part-time workers, so results are not generalizable beyond this sample.
Voluntary part-time is defined as did not want to work full time (1994–1999), and the
reason for working under 35 hours per week (1981–1993) was coded as 07–15 (see
Chapter 4, Note 8, and Stratton 1994). Regressors included age, education, region,
race, gender, marital status, nonlabor income, and occupation dummies, industry
dummies, a government employer dummy, and an indicator of whether the person
worked last year or not.

Supplemental Tables 173

Table C.8 The Duncan Index as a Measure of Dissimilarity in
Distribution of Workers across Occupations and Industries,
CPS, 1981–2000
Disabled vs. nondisabled

Nonwhite vs. white

Year

Occupation

Industry

Occupation

Industry

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

0.1251
0.1065
0.1077
0.1089
0.1141
0.1455
0.1340
0.1188
0.1431
0.1351
0.1447
0.1506
0.1442
0.1474
0.1336
0.1340
0.1273
0.1316
0.1467
0.1236

0.0443
0.0438
0.0602
0.0514
0.0394
0.0630
0.0602
0.0670
0.0472
0.0518
0.0878
0.0475
0.0425
0.0684
0.0425
0.0854
0.0682
0.0782
0.0562
0.0771

0.1514
0.1648
0.1588
0.1528
0.1590
0.1570
0.1430
0.1492
0.1375
0.1357
0.1323
0.1407
0.1247
0.1173
0.1239
0.1264
0.1210
0.1055
0.1107
0.1082

0.1063
0.1081
0.0923
0.1029
0.1018
0.0915
0.0770
0.0902
0.0885
0.0871
0.0822
0.0711
0.0838
0.0745
0.0754
0.0724
0.0726
0.0693
0.0805
0.0851

NOTE: The Duncan Index reflects the % of workers in the labor market that would
have to switch occupation or industry in order to equalize the distribution of workers
in both groups across occupations or industries. The index is calculated as
1 K
兩aj ⳮ bj 兩, where K is the number of occupations (industries), and a and b
D⳱
2 j⳱1
refer to the proportion of the two different groups of interest in occupation/industry j
(e.g., a is the proportion of nondisabled workers in occupation/industry j, and b is the
proportion of disabled workers in occupation/industry j). The numbers in bold represent projections replacing the actual calculated index for that year, which was clearly
an outlier.

冘
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Table C.9 Disabled and Nondisabled Job Separators by Reason for Job
Separation (%), CPS, 1981–2000
Nondisabled

Disabled

Year

Voluntary
(%)

Involuntary
(%)

Other
(%)

Voluntary
(%)

Involuntary
(%)

Other
(%)

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

66.42
66.39
66.21
66.05
66.28
67.32
68.57
68.96
69.89
69.83
63.05
61.55
62.09
56.54
56.20
56.36
58.55
58.89
58.73
60.95

19.09
19.50
20.11
19.92
18.55
18.68
17.71
17.43
24.44
24.11
30.65
32.75
31.62
36.97
36.46
35.96
33.13
33.36
32.64
30.81

14.50
14.11
13.68
14.03
15.16
13.99
13.72
13.61
5.67
6.06
6.30
5.70
6.30
6.49
7.34
7.68
8.32
7.75
8.63
8.24

82.30
81.13
81.04
80.42
78.13
80.58
80.49
80.99
82.01
80.68
79.37
76.46
78.31
60.98
57.99
52.92
57.19
58.27
68.72
63.64

8.35
11.21
10.07
10.49
11.44
9.68
10.21
9.87
12.90
14.02
14.49
18.29
16.98
33.07
31.07
36.77
33.09
29.92
26.43
27.27

9.36
7.66
8.89
9.09
10.43
9.74
9.30
9.14
5.09
5.30
6.14
5.25
4.71
5.94
10.95
10.31
9.71
11.81
4.85
9.09

NOTE: Voluntary separations included the following reasons: personal, family,
school; personal/family (includes pregnancy); return to school; health; retirement/old
age; and unsatisfactory work arrangements (hours/pay/etc.). Involuntary separations
included the following reasons: seasonal job completed, temporary seasonal or intermittent job completed, slack work/business, and temporary nonseasonal job completed. Sample sizes for the years 1994–1998 were considerably smaller than in
earlier years due to a change in respondents for job separation questions. Prior to
1994, questions were asked of those who worked in the past five years; after 1994,
only those who worked in the past 12 months were asked job separation questions.
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Table C.10 Probability of an Employment Separation Being Voluntary
and Involuntary by Disability Status, CPS, 1981–2000
Probability
Voluntary separation

Involuntary separation

Year

Disabled

Nondisabled

Disabled

Nondisabled

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

0.8153
0.7989
0.8052
0.8032
0.7751
0.8056
0.8060
0.8089
0.8496
0.8479
0.8144
0.8067
0.8090
0.7115
0.6811
0.6506
0.7068
0.6533
0.7940
0.7346

0.6767
0.6816
0.6794
0.6803
0.6854
0.6960
0.7067
0.7073
0.7216
0.7271
0.6655
0.6382
0.6456
0.5848
0.5768
0.5843
0.6145
0.6091
0.6121
0.6338

0.0786
0.1113
0.0950
0.0952
0.1111
0.0903
0.0903
0.0901
0.1011
0.1067
0.1240
0.1395
0.1428
0.2287
0.2134
0.2532
0.2019
0.2238
0.1621
0.1748

0.1868
0.1879
0.1921
0.1887
0.1740
0.1727
0.1646
0.1648
0.2219
0.2135
0.2708
0.3057
0.2911
0.3514
0.3498
0.3373
0.2997
0.3133
0.2990
0.2794

NOTE: See notes to table C.9 for definitions of voluntary and involuntary. The characteristics (other than disability) for which the probabilities were calculated were the
means corresponding to the entire sample. See Long (1997). Regressions for 1981,
1982, and 1983 contain more limited industry and occupation classifications. Regressors included in the multinomial logit analysis included age; age squared; number
of weeks worked last year; and industry, occupation, education, female, nonwhite,
single, central city, region, and disability dummy variables.
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Table C.11 Probability of an Unemployment Spell Being the Result of
Losing a Job, Leaving a Job, Reentering the Labor Force, or
Newly Entering the Labor Force, by Disability Status, CPS,
1989–2000
Probability
Job loser

Job leaver

Reentrant

New entrant

NonNonNonNonYear Disabled disabled Disabled disabled Disabled disabled Disabled disabled
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

0.4346
0.3980
0.5041
0.5121
0.4925
0.3996
0.4094
0.4947
0.3269
0.4399
0.2005
0.3662

0.4890
0.5174
0.6294
0.6721
0.6120
0.5155
0.5358
0.5246
0.4712
0.5030
0.4736
0.4757

0.1459
0.1753
0.1873
0.1299
0.1671
0.1425
0.0994
0.0681
0.0625
0.1380
0.1852
0.1587

0.1601
0.1536
0.1283
0.1032
0.1235
0.0975
0.1080
0.1082
0.1180
0.1165
0.1410
0.1393

0.3974
0.4085
0.2988
0.3474
0.3280
0.4546
0.4780
0.4342
0.5826
0.4192
0.6127
0.4695

0.3315
0.3081
0.2297
0.2150
0.2535
0.3849
0.3497
0.3647
0.4017
0.3773
0.3844
0.3811

0.0221
0.0182
0.0099
0.0106
0.0123
0.0033
0.0132
0.0029
0.0280
0.0029
0.0015
0.0055

0.0194
0.0208
0.0126
0.0096
0.0110
0.0020
0.0065
0.0025
0.0091
0.0032
0.0010
0.0039

NOTE: The characteristics (other than disability) for which the probabilities were calculated are the means corresponding to the entire sample. See Long (1997). Regressors in the multinomial logit analysis included age; age squared; number of weeks
worked last year; number of weeks looking last year; and female, single, nonwhite,
education, central city, region, and disability dummy variables.
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Table C.12 Mean Difference in Expected Duration and Predicted
Expected Duration across Disability Status, CPS, 1981–2000
Predicted expected duration
(weeks)

Year

Mean difference in expected duration
across disability status (weeks)
(1)

Disabled
(2)

Nondisabled
(3)

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

8.72
11.84
12.96
12.40
16.74
20.12
23.54
19.10
13.04
12.94
16.82
5.42
15.62
11.24
18.70
17.74
14.24
0.66
19.68
3.78

24.18
27.92
37.14
31.44
33.40
26.20
32.75
25.88
26.69
22.37
27.60
32.17
36.46
37.68
41.87
47.71
32.44
22.39
32.39
30.60

24.20
26.79
34.43
30.52
25.55
24.57
24.81
22.07
20.81
20.56
23.82
30.84
30.25
39.56
34.27
34.19
31.81
30.03
27.90
27.64

NOTE: Mean expected duration (used to calculate the difference shown in column 1)
is calculated as two times the observed censored search duration at a given point in
time, as advocated by Akerlof and Main (1981); this results in a valid representation
of completed search spells under the assumption of a steady state. Predicted expected
duration (columns 2 and 3) was calculated using coefficient estimates resulting from
the estimation of an accelerated failure time model where search duration is assumed
to be distributed as a Weibull: E[tilti⬎0;Xi,␤,] ⳱ exp(Xi␤)⌫(1Ⳮ). See the text to
Chapter 5 for definition of terms. The characteristics (other than disability) for which
the predicted expected durations were calculated (X) are the means corresponding to
the entire sample. See Long (1997). Regressors for the duration analysis included
age; age squared; non-labor income; female, single, nonwhite, education, and regional
dummies; dummy variables for availability to work, whether searcher wanted a fulltime job, and whether searcher worked last year; and dummy variables for search
methods (private agency, public agency, checked with friends, checked with employer, and checked ads), disability status, and search methods interacted with disability status.

Appendix D
State Disability Legislation
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Table D.1 State Disability Legislation

State
Alabama

Legislation
Title 21 Handicapped
Persons, Acts 1975, Chapter 7
Rights of Blind and
Otherwise Physically
Disabled Persons

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions
No definitions available

Source: Michie’s Alabama
Code 1975, Volume 14A,
1997 Replacement Volume.
Alaska

Title 18 Health, Safety, and
Housing, Chapter 80 State
Commission for Human
Rights, Article 4
Discriminatory Practices
Prohibited
Language referring to
disability added in 1987
Source: Alaska Statutes 1962,
Volume 5 (1998).

Employer: person including
state, political subdivision of
state, one or more employees
Disability: physical or mental
impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life
activities; a history of, or a
misclassification as having
such; an impairment treated
as a limitation, regarded by
others as such; condition
requiring use of prosthesis,
special equipment or service
animal
Exclusions: fraternity,
charitable, educational, or
religious associations or
corporations, if not organized
for private profit, domestic
employment
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Table D.1 (continued)

State
Arizona

Legislation
Title 41 State Government,
Chapter 9 Civil Rights,
Article 4 Discrimination in
Employment
Language referring to
disability added in 1985
Source: Arizona Revised
Statutes Annotated, Volume
12B (1999).

Arkansas

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions
Employer: has 15 or more
employees, working for 20 or
more calendar weeks
Disability: a physical
impairment, a record of
physical impairment, being
regarded as having a physical
impairment
Exclusions: U.S. government,
departments, agencies;
corporations, Indian tribes;
private associations;
employers of aliens; religious
entities

Title 16 Practice, Procedure,
and Courts, Subtitle 7
Particular Proceedings and
Remedies, Chapter 123 Civil
Rights, Subchapter 1 The
Arkansas Civil Rights Act of
1993

Employer: employs nine or
more employees, 20 or more
calendar weeks

Source: Arkansas Code of
1987 Annotated, 1999
Supplement Volume 16.

Exclusions: employment by a
religious corporation,
association, society, or other
religious entity, family
employment

Title 20 Public Health and
Welfare, Chapter 14 Disabled
People, Subchapter 3 Rights
General, Section 301 Policy
(public employers only)
Source: Arkansas Code of
1987 Annotated, 2000
Replacement Volume 20 A.

Disability: a physical or
mental impairment that
substantially limits a major
life function
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Table D.1 (continued)

State
California

Legislation
Title 2 Government of the
State of California, Division 3
Part 2.8 Department of Fair
Employment and Housing
Article added in 1980
Source: West’s Annotated
California
Codes—Government Code,
Sections 12300–14599
(1992).

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions
Employer: regularly employs
five or more persons or
representative agents, the
state, political or civil
subdivision thereof, and
cities; for purposes of mental
disability, employs 15 or
more persons
Disability: includes mental
and psychological disorder;
health impairment affecting
the body systems, or limits an
individual’s ability to
participate in major life
activities; other health
impairment requiring special
education or related services;
being regarded as having or
having had such health
impairment; being regarded
as having or having had such
health impairment that may
become a disability
Exclusions: religious
organizations and not-forprofit private corporations,
family employment
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Table D.1 (continued)

State
Colorado

Legislation
Administrative and
Organization Act of 1968
Title 24 Government—State,
Article 34 Department of
Regulatory Services, Part 3
Colorado Civil Rights
Division—Commission—
Procedures and Part 4
Employment Practices
Physical impairment
provision was in place in
1979; amended after July 1,
1992, to include mental
impairment for different
articles

Connecticut

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions
Employer: state of Colorado
and any political subdivision,
commission, institution, or
school district thereof, every
other person employing
persons within the state
Disability: physical
impairment which
substantially limits one or
more of a person’s major life
activities, includes record of
and being regarded as having
such an impairment; mental
impairment means mental or
psychological disorder

Source: Colorado Revised
Statutes 1997, Volume 7.

Exclusions: religious
organizations except those
supported by public funds,
domestic employment

Title 46a Human Rights,
Chapter 814c Human Rights
and Opportunities

Employer: includes state and
political divisions and any
person/employer with three or
more persons in employ

In 1973 discrimination based
on physical disability
including blindness was made
unfair employment practice
Source: Connecticut General
Statutes Annotated, Volume
21B (1995).

Disability: any individual
who has any chronic physical
handicap, infirmity, or
impairment
Exclusions: family
employment, domestic
service
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Table D.1 (continued)

State
Delaware

Legislation
Title 19 Labor, Chapter 7
Employment Practices,
Subchapter 3 Handicapped
Persons Employment
Protections
Handicapped section added
on July 11, 1988
Source: Delaware Code
Annotated, Revised 1974,
Volume 11, 1995
Replacement Volume.
Title 16 Health and Safety,
Chapter 95, Delaware White
Cane Law, Section 9501
Public Safety; White Cane
Day (public employers only)
Source: Delaware Code
Annotated, Revised 1974,
Volume 9, 1995, Replacement
Volume.

Florida

Title XLIV Civil Rights,
Chapter 760 Discrimination
in the Treatment of Persons;
Minority Representation, Part
1 Florida Civil Rights Act
Provided for discrimination
based on handicap in 1977
Source: West’s Florida
Statutes Annotated, Volume
21A (1997).

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions
Employer: state or any
political subdivision, or
board, department,
commission or school district
thereof, and any person
employing 20 or more
persons, 20 or more calendar
weeks
Disability: having physical or
mental impairment which
substantially limits one or
more major life activities, has
a record of such or is regarded
as having such an impairment
Exclusions: agriculture,
domestic employment, family
employment

Employer: person employing
15 or more employees, 20 or
more calendar weeks, any
agent for such a person
No other definitions available
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Table D.1 (continued)

State
Georgia

Legislation
Title 34, Chapter 6A Equal
Employment for Persons with
Disabilities
Act passed in 1981
Source: Official Code of
Georgia Annotated, Volume
21, 1998 Edition.
Title 45, Chapter 19
Labor Practices, Article 2
Fair Employment Practices
Act passed in 1978
(public employers only)

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions
Employer: person or
governmental unit or officer,
or agent of an employer,
having 15 or more individuals
employed, 20 or more
calendar weeks
Disability: any condition or
characteristic that renders a
person an individual with
disabilities
Exclusions: no exclusions
available

Source: Official Code of
Georgia Annotated, Volume
33, 1990 Edition.
Hawaii

Title 21 Labor and Industrial
Relations, Chapter 378
Employment Practices, Part 1
Discriminatory Practices
Initially passed in 1981 with
reference to physical
handicap
Source: Hawaii Revised
Statutes, Volume 7, 1993
Replacement.

Employer: any person,
including state or political
subdivisions, any agent of
such a person, having one or
more employees
Disability: the state of having
a physical or mental
impairment which
substantially limits one or
more major life activities,
having a record of such an
impairment, or being
regarded as having such an
impairment
Exclusions: U.S. government,
religious organizations
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Table D.1 (continued)

State
Idaho

Legislation
Title 67 State Government
and State Affairs, Chapter 59,
Commission on Human
Rights
Language added in 1988
referring to handicap
Source: Idaho Code, Volume
11 (1995).
Title 56 Public Assistance
and Welfare, Chapter 7 Rights
of Blind and Physically
Handicapped Persons,
Section 56–707
Initially passed in 1969
(public employers only)

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions
Employer: person who hires 5
or more employees, 20 or
more calendar weeks
Disability: physical or mental
condition which constitutes a
substantial limitation to that
person, person with disability
is one with such a disability,
has record of such, or is
regarded as having such a
disability
Exclusions: domestic
employment, religious
organizations

Source: Idaho Code, Volume
10 (1999).
Illinois

Chapter 775 Human Rights,
Act 5 Illinois Human Rights
Act
Effective July 1, 1980, with
handicapped provisions in
place
Source: West’s Illinois Smith
and Hurd Illinois Compiled
Statutes Annotated, Chapter
765 to 799(1993).

Employer: employs 15 or
more employees, 20 or more
calendar weeks, employing
one or more employees when
a handicap discriminatory
complaint is made, without
regard to number of
employees for governmental
unit or agency, or any party to
a public contract
Disability: determinable
physical or mental
characteristic of a person
which is unrelated to a
person’s ability to perform a
particular job or position
Exclusions: religious entities,
domestic servants, elected
public officials (as
employers)
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Table D.1 (continued)

State
Indiana

Legislation
Title 22 Labor and Industrial
Safety, Article 9 Civil Rights,
Chapter 5 Employment
Discrimination against
Disabled Persons
Handicap language added in
1975
Source: Burns Indiana
Statutes Annotated, Title 22,
Articles 4–15, 1997
Replacement Volume.

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions
Employer: state or any
political or civil subdivision
thereof and any person
engaged in industry affecting
commerce having 15 or more
employees, 20 calendar
weeks
Disability: physical or mental
impairment that substantially
limits at least one of the major
life activities, a record of an
impairment or being regarded
as having an impairment
Exclusions: U.S. government
or corporation owned by the
government of the U.S.A. or
an Indian tribe, and a private
membership club other than
labor organization, religious
corporation
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Table D.1 (continued)

State
Iowa

Legislation
Title VI Human Services,
Subtitle 1 Social Justice and
Human Rights, Chapter 216
Civil Rights Commission,
Section 216.6 Unfair
Employment Practices
Iowans with Disabilities Act
1995
Ch. 216 was transferred from
Ch. 601A, Civil Rights
Commission, Code 1991
Legislation initially passed in
1972
Source: Iowa Code
Annotated, Volume 10A,
1999 Cumulative Annual
Pocket Part.
Title VI Human Services,
Subtitle 1 Social Justice and
Human Rights, Chapter 216 C
Rights of Blind, Partially
Blind and Physically
Disabled Persons, Section
216C.1, 216C.2
Transferred from Ch. 601D
Rights of Blind and
Physically Disabled,
Code of 1991
In place by 1971
(public employers only)
Source: Iowa Code
Annotated, Volume 10A,
1994.

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions
Employer: state, political
subdivision board,
commission, department,
institution, or school district
thereof, and every other
person employing employees
within the state
Disability: physical or mental
condition of a person which
constitutes a substantial
handicap; extends definition
of disabled to include HIV /
AIDS person
Exclusions: employers with
fewer than 4 employees,
family employment, personal
service to person of the
employer and religious
entities
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Table D.1 (continued)

State
Kansas

Legislation
Chapter 44 Labor and
Industries, Article 10 Kansas
Acts against Discrimination
Included physical handicap in
1974
Source: Kansas Statutes
Annotated, Volume 3A
(1993).

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions
Employer: any person in the
state employing four or more
persons, includes any person
acting directly or indirectly
for an employer, labor
organizations, nonsectarian
corporations, organizations
engaged in social work and
the state and political and
municipal subdivisions;
excludes nonprofit fraternal
or social associations or
corporations
Disability: a physical or
mental impairment that
substantially limits one or
more of the major life
activities of an individual, a
record of such or being
regarded as having such an
impairment
Exclusions: family
employment and domestic
service
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Table D.1 (continued)

State
Kentucky

Legislation
Title 27 Labor and Human
Rights, Chapter 344 Civil
Rights
Disability provision effective
in 1992
Source: Michie’s Kentucky
Revised Statutes, Volume
12A, 1997 Replacement.
Title 17 Economic Security
and Public Welfare, Chapter
207 Aid to the Needy
Blind—Equal Opportunities,
Section150 Prohibited
Employment
Practices—Exceptions
Disability section added in
1976
(public employers only)

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions
Employer: person engaged in
an industry affecting
commerce who has 15 or
more employees, at least 20
weeks per year for purposes
of disability discrimination
and any agent of that person;
otherwise 8 weeks
Disability: physical or mental
impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the
major life activities of an
individual, a record of such or
being regarded as having such
an impairment
Exclusions: U.S. government,
U.S. government corporation,
Indian tribe, bona fide private
membership club

Source: Michie’s Kentucky
Revised Statutes, Volume 8B,
1998 Replacement.
Louisiana

Title 23 Labor and Workers’
Compensation, Chapter 3-A
Prohibited Discrimination in
Employment, Part III
Disability
Legislation initially passed in
1980
Source: West’s Louisiana
Statutes Revised Annotated,
Volume 15D (1998).

Employer: employs 15 or
more employees, 20 or more
calendar weeks; refers to
person, association, legal or
commercial entity, state and
its agencies receiving services
from an employee and giving
compensation in return
Disability: any person with
physical or mental
impairment limiting one or
more of the major life
activities, or has record of
such, or is regarded as having
such an impairment
Exclusions: family or
domestic employment
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Table D.1 (continued)

State
Maine

Legislation
Title 5, Administrative
Procedures and Services, Part
12 Human Rights, Chapter
337 Human Rights Act,
Subchapter 3, Fair
Employment
Physical handicap language
in place in 1973
Source: Maine Revised
Statutes Annotated, Volume
2A, Title 5, 1998
Supplementary Pamphlet.

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions
Employer: includes any
person in the state employing
any number of employees,
whatever the place of
employment, and any person
outside this state whose
employees’ place of
employment is within the
state; labor organization
Disability: has physical or
mental disability, has a record
of or is regarded as having a
physical or mental disability
Exclusions: none for purposes
of disability

Maryland

Article 49B Human Relations
Commission, Discrimination
in Employment
Disability language added in
1974
Source: Michie’s Annotated
Code of Maryland 1957,
Volume 4, 1999 Supplement.

Employer: a person engaged
in an industry or business
with 15 or more employees,
20 or more calendar weeks,
includes state
Disability: any physical
disability, infirmity,
malformation or
disfigurement, and any
mental impairment or
deficiency
Exclusions: bona fide private
membership club; elected
public officials, their chosen
personnel staff, appointee, or
immediate advisor (as
employees)
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Table D.1 (continued)

State

Legislation

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions

Massachusetts

Chapter 151B Unlawful
Discrimination because of
race, color, religious creed,
national origin, ancestry or
sex
In 1983 added language and
section to include
discrimination against
handicapped
Source: Massachusetts
General Laws Annotated,
Volume 22A Chapter
151–151E (1996).

Employer: employs six or
more persons, the
commonwealth and all
political subdivisions, boards,
departments and
commissions thereof
Disability: physical or mental
impairment which
substantially limits one or
more major life activities of a
person, a record of such or
being regarded as having such
impairment
Exclusions: social clubs,
private nonprofit
organizations, religious
organizations, family and
domestic employment

Michigan

Chapter 37 Civil Rights,
Persons with Disabilities
Civil Rights Act, Article 2
Employment
Act passed in 1976
Source: Michigan Compiled
Laws, 1999 Cumulative
Annual Pocket Part.

Employer: any person who
has one or more employees,
includes contractor/
subcontractor to state/
government entity
Disability: a determinable
physical or mental
characteristic of an individual
substantially limiting one or
more of the major life
activities of that individual
and is unrelated to the
individual’s abilities to
perform the duties of a
particular job or position,
qualifications for employment
or promotion; a history of
such or being regarded as
having a determinable
physical or mental
characteristic
Exclusions: domestic
employment
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Table D.1 (continued)

State
Minnesota

Legislation
Human Rights Chapter 363
Division 03 Department of
Human Rights
Disability language added in
1973
Source: Minnesota Statutes
Annotated, Volume 22B
(1991).

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions
Employer: a person who has
one or more employees
Disability: a physical, sensory
or mental impairment which
materially limits one or more
major life activities, has
record of or is regarded as
having such an impairment
Exclusions: family
employment, domestic
employment, religious and
certain other associations

Mississippi

Title 43 Public Welfare,
Chapter 6 Rights and
Liabilities of Blind and Other
Handicapped Persons, Article
1 General Provisions, Section
15 Employment
Discrimination
Act passed in 1974
(public employers only)
Source: West’s Mississippi
Code Annotated, Volume 14
(1999).

Employers: state service,
political subdivisions, public
schools, employment
supported whole or in part by
public funds
No other definitions available
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Table D.1 (continued)

State
Missouri

Legislation
Title 12 Public Health and
Welfare, Chapter 213, Human
Rights
Language to include handicap
added in 1978.
Source: Vernon’s Annotated
Missouri Statutes, Volume
12B 1999 Cumulative Annual
Pocket Part.
Title 12 Public Health and
Welfare, Chapter 209 Aid to
the Blind—Rights of Persons
With Visual, Hearing or
Physical Disabilities, Section
180
Section added in 1977
(public employers only)
Source: Vernon’s Annotated
Missouri Statutes, Volume
12A 1996.

Montana

Title 49 Human Rights
Enacted in 1974 with
handicap provisions in place
Source: Montana Code
Annotated 1991, Volume 8.

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions
Employer: includes state,
political division, any person
employing six or more
persons within the state and
any person acting directly in
the interest of an employer
Disability: physical or mental
impairment which
substantially limits one or
more of a person’s major life
activities, being regarded as
having such an impairment or
a record of such impairment
which with or without
reasonable accommodation
does not interfere with
performing the job
Exclusions: religious or
sectarian corporations and
associations

Employer: an employer of
one or more persons or an
agent of the employer
Disability: physical or mental
impairment, a record of or a
condition regarded as such an
impairment
Exclusions: associations for
nonprofit or those providing
exclusive membership
services
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Table D.1 (continued)

State

Legislation

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions

Nebraska

Chapter 48, Labor, Article 11
Nebraska Fair Employment
Practice Act
Disability provisions added in
1973.
Source: Revised Statutes of
Nebraska Annotated, Volume
12 (1995).
Chapter 20 Civil Rights,
Article 1 Individual Rights,
(B) Persons with Disabilities,
Section 131 Employment by
State and Political
Subdivisions; Policy
Act passed in 1971
(public employers only)
Source: Revised Statutes of
Nebraska Annotated, Volume
14A (1999) Replacement
Volume.

Employer: a person engaged
in an industry who has 15 or
more employees, 20 or more
calendar weeks, any agent of
such a person, any party
whose business is financed in
part or whole under the
Nebraska Investment Finance
Act regardless of number of
employees; includes state,
agencies and political
subdivisions
Disability: physical or mental
impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the
major life activities of such an
individual, a record of such or
being regarded as having such
an impairment
Exclusions: U.S.A., U.S.
government corporations,
Indian tribe corporations,
bona fide private membership
clubs exempt from taxation,
religious organizations,
family employment, domestic
employment

Nevada

Title 53 Labor and Industrial
Relations, Chapter 613Employment Practices, Equal
Opportunities for
Employment
Handicapped language and
provisions added in 1971
Source: Nevada Revised
Statutes Annotated, Volume
16 (1996).

Employer: any person who
has 15 or more employees for
20 weeks in current or
previous year
Disability: physical or mental
impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the
major life activities of the
person, a record of such an
impairment or being regarded
as having such an impairment
Exclusions: U.S.A., U.S.
government corporations,
Indian tribes, tax exempt
private membership clubs,
religious organizations
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Table D.1 (continued)

State
New Hampshire

Legislation

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions

Title 31, Trade and
Commerce, Chapter 354A
State Commission for Human
Rights, Equal Employment
Opportunity

Employer: employs six or
more persons, all state,
political subdivisions, boards,
departments and
commissions thereof

Law against discrimination
regarding physical or mental
handicap approved June 23,
1975

Disability: physical or mental
impairment which
substantially limits one or
more of such person’s major
life activities, a record of
having such an impairment or
being regarded as having such
an impairment

Source: New Hampshire
Revised Statutes Annotated
1995, Title 31.

Exclusions: social clubs,
fraternal, charitable,
educational or religious
associations, and nonprofit
corporations
New Jersey

Title 10 Civil Rights, Chapter
5 Law against Discrimination,
Section 29.1
Last amendments effective
March 2, 1978
Source: New Jersey Statutes
Annotated, Title 9–11A
(1993).

Employer: all corporations
and organizations including
the state, any political or civil
subdivision thereof, and all
public officers, agencies,
boards, or bodies
Disability: suffering from
physical disability, infirmity,
malformation or
disfigurement etc., includes
HIV/AIDS sufferers
Exclusions: domestic servant
and family employment
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Table D.1 (continued)

State
New Mexico

Legislation
Chapter 28 Human Rights,
Article 1 Human Rights
Handicap language added in
1973. Act effective until July
1, 2000
Source: New Mexico Statutes
1978 Annotated, Volume 5,
1996 Replacement Pamphlet.

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions
Employer: any person
employing four or more
persons and any person acting
for an employer
Disability: physical or mental
impairment that substantially
limits one or more of an
individual’s major life
activities, has record of or is
regarded as having such
Exclusions: no exclusions
available

New York

Article 15 Human Rights Law
Disability language added in
1974
Source: McKinney’s
Consolidated Laws of New
York Annotated, Book 18,
Executive Law (1993).

Employer: minimum four
employees
Disability: physical, mental
or medical impairment, a
record of such impairment, or
a condition regarded by
others as such an impairment
Exclusions: family or
domestic employment

North Carolina

Chapter 168A Handicapped
Persons Protection Act
Act passed in 1985 with
provisions in place
Source: General Statutes of
North Carolina Annotated,
Volume 21, Chapters
160–168A (1944–1999).

Employer: any person
employing 15 or more fulltime employees within the
state
Disability: any person who
has a physical or mental
impairment which
substantially limits one or
more major life activities, has
a record of such an
impairment, or is regarded as
having such an impairment
Exclusions: domestic or farm
workers at that person’s home
or farm
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Table D.1 (continued)

State
North Dakota

Legislation
Title 14 Domestic Relations
and Persons, Chapter 14–02.4
Human Rights
Initially passed in 1983
Source: North Dakota
Century Code Annotated,
Volume 3A, 1997
Replacement.

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions
Employer: person within the
state who employs one or
more employees for more
than one quarter of the year
within the state and a person
wherever situated who
employs one or more
employees whose services are
to be partially or wholly
performed in the state
Disability: physical or mental
impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life
activities, a record of
impairment, or being
regarded as having
impairment
Exclusions: elected public
officials, person chosen by
the officer/an appointee, or
advisor (as employees)

Ohio

Title 41 Labor and Industry,
Chapter 4112 Civil Rights
Commission
Language in place in 1976
Source: Page’s Ohio Revised
Code Annotated, Title 41
Labor and Industry, 1998
Replacement Volume.

Employer: includes state, any
political subdivision of the
state, any person employing
four or more persons within
the state, and any person
acting directly or indirectly in
the interest of an employer
Disability: physical or mental
impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life
activities, has record or is
regarded as having such an
impairment
Exclusions: domestic service
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Table D.1 (continued)

State
Oklahoma

Legislation
Title 25 Definitions and
General Provisions, Chapter
21 Discrimination, Article 3
Discrimination in
Employment
In 1981 language added
definition and prohibited
handicap discrimination
Source: Oklahoma Statutes
Annotated (1987).

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions
Employer: person who has 15
or more employees, 20 or
more calendar weeks,
includes contractor/
subcontractor for the state or
a government entity or
agency of the state and
includes agent of such a
person
Disability: physical or mental
impairment which
substantially limits one or
more of such person’s major
life activities, has a record of
or is regarded as having such
an impairment
Exclusions: Indian tribes,
nonprofit bona fide
membership club, family,
domestic and religious
employment

Oregon

Title 51 (Part 2) Labor and
Industrial Relations, Chapter
659 Enforcement of Civil
Rights; Unlawful
Employment Practices, Civil
Rights of Physically and
Mentally Handicapped

Employer: any person that
employs six or more persons
and includes the state,
counties, cities, districts,
authorities, public
corporations and entities and
their instrumentalities

Language added in 1973

Disability: physical or mental
impairment which
substantially limits one or
more major life activities, has
record or is regarded as
having such an impairment

Source: Oregon Revised
Statutes Annotated (1989).

Exclusions: Oregon National
Guard
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Table D.1 (continued)

State
Pennsylvania

Legislation
Title 43 Labor, Chapter 17
Human Relations
1974 amendment included
disability
Source: Purdon’s
Pennsylvania Statutes
Annotated, Title 43–45
(1991).

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions
Employer: includes
commonwealth and any
political subdivision, board,
department, commission,
school district thereof and any
person employing four or
more persons, includes
religious, fraternal, charitable
and sectarian corporations
and associations
Disability: No definition of
disability
Exclusions: corporations or
associations supported in
whole or part by
governmental appropriations

Rhode Island

Title 28 Labor and Labor
Relations, Chapter 5 Fair
Employment Practices
In 1973 initially added
language of physical
handicap
Source: General Laws of
Rhode Island 1956,
Reenactment Code of 1995,
Volume 5.

Employer: includes the state
and all political subdivisions
thereof and any person in the
state employing four or more
individuals and any person
acting in the interest of an
employer directly or
indirectly
Disability: physical or mental
impairment which
substantially limits one or
more major life activities, has
a record of or is regarded as
having an impairment
Exclusions: family and
domestic employment,
religious organization
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Table D.1 (continued)

State
South Carolina

Legislation

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions

Title 1 Administration of the
Government, Chapter 13
State Human Affairs
Commission

Employer: any person who
has 15 or more employees, 20
or more calendar weeks, any
agent of such a person

July 6, 1996, amendments
included prohibition of
discrimination based on
disability, declaring it an
unlawful employment
practice

Disability: physical or mental
impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life
activities, has a record of or is
regarded as having an
impairment

Source: Code of Laws of
South Carolina 1976, Volume
1, 1998 Cumulative
Supplement.

Exclusions: Indian tribes and
bona fide private membership
clubs, elected public officials,
or any person chosen by such
officer

Title 43 Social Services,
Chapter 33 Rights of
Physically Disabled Persons,
Article 1 In General, Section
60 Policy regarding
employment of blind and
other physically disabled
persons
Article in place in 1972
(public employers only)
Source: Code of Laws of
South Carolina 1976, Volume
15.
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Table D.1 (continued)

State
South Dakota

Legislation
Title 20 Personal Rights and
Obligations,
Chapter 13 Human Rights
Previous act regarded
employment discrimination
based on blindness or partial
blindness in 1984. General
term ‘‘disability’’ added in
1986
Source: South Dakota
Codified Laws, Volume 7A,
1995 Revision.
Title 3 Public Officers and
Employees, Chapter 3–6A
Career Service Personnel
Management System, Section
15 Discrimination
Prohibited—Violation
Misdemeanor

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions
Employee: any person who
performs services for any
employer for compensation,
no minimum number of
employees
Disability: physical or mental
impairment which
substantially limits one or
more of the person’s major
life functions, having record
of such or being regarded as
having such an impairment
Exclusions: qualifications
based on religious purpose

Act established in 1973
(public employers only)
Source: South Dakota
Codified Laws, Volume 2B,
1994 Revision.
Tennessee

Title 8 Public Officers and
Employees, Chapter 50
Miscellaneous Provisions,
Part 1 General Provisions
Legislation initially passed in
1976
Source: Tennessee Code
Annotated Volume 3, 1993
Replacement.

No definitions available
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Table D.1 (continued)

State
Texas

Legislation
Title 2 Protection of
Laborers, Subtitle A
Employment Discrimination,
Chapter 21 Employment
Discrimination, Subchapter B
Unlawful Employment
Practices
Language added in 1989
Source: Vernon’s Texas Code
Annotated, Labor Code,
Volume 1 (1996).

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions
Employer: a person who is
engaged in industry affecting
commerce and who has 15 or
more employees, 20 or more
calendar weeks; an agent of,
or an elected public official;
includes a county,
municipality, state agency, or
state instrumentality,
including public institution of
education, regardless of the
number of employees
Disability: physical or mental
impairment which
substantially limits at least
one major life activity of an
individual, a record of such
impairment, or being
regarded as having such
Exclusions: elected public
officials (as employees)

Utah

Title 34A Utah Labor Code,
Chapter 5 Utah
Antidiscrimination Act
Language added in 1979
Source: Utah Code Annotated
1953, Volume 4B, 1997
Replacement.

Employer: the state or any
political subdivision or board,
commission, department
institution, school district,
trust, or agent thereof, and
every other person employing
15 or more employees, 20
calendar weeks
Disability: physical or mental
impairment which
substantially limits one or
more of a person’s major life
activities
Exclusions: religious entities
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Table D.1 (continued)

State
Vermont

Legislation
Title 21 Labor, Chapter 5
Employment Practices,
Subchapter 6 Fair
Employment Practices
Language added in 1981
Source: Vermont Statutes
Annotated 1987.

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions
Employer: any individual,
organization, or governmental
body including partnership,
association, trustee, estate,
corporation, joint stock
company, insurance
company, or legal
representative, whether
domestic or foreign, or the
receiver, trustee in
bankruptcy, trustee or
successor thereof, and any
common carrier by mail,
motor, water, air or express
company doing business in or
operating within the state
which has one or more
individuals
Disability: any person who
has a physical or mental
impairment which
substantially limits one or
more major life activities, has
a history or record of such or
is regarded as having such
Exclusions: no exclusions
available

Virginia

Title 51.5 Persons with
Disabilities

Employer: the state or entity
funded

Previous title passed in 1972
(public employers only)

Disability: any person who
has physical or mental
impairment which
substantially limits one or
more major life activities, or
having record of such

Source: Code of Virginia
1950 Annotated, Volume 7A,
1998 Replacement Volume.

Exclusions: employers
covered by the Federal
Rehabilitation Act of 1973
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Table D.1 (continued)

State
Washington

Legislation
Title 49 Labor Regulations,
Chapter 60
Discrimination—Human
Rights Commission
Added disability section in
1973
Source: West’s Revised Code
of Washington Annotated
Titles 49–50 (1990).

Washington, D.C.

Title 1 Administration,
Chapter 25 Human Rights
Subchapter II Prohibited Acts
of Discrimination
Effective 1994
Source: DC Code Annotated,
1981 Edition, Volume 2A,
1999 Replacement.
Title 16 Health and Safety,
Chapter 17 Rights of the
Blind and Physically
Disabled Persons, Section 5
Discrimination in
Employment Prohibited
Likely in place in 1972
(unable to verify)
(pubic employers and
employers receiving
appropriations for D.C. only)
Source: DC Code Annotated,
1981 Edition, Volume 4, 1995
Replacement .

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions
Employer: any person acting
in the interest of the
employer, directly or
indirectly, who employs eight
or more persons
Disability: no definition of
disability
Exclusions: nonprofit
religious or sectarian
organizations, family and
domestic employment
Employer: any person who,
for compensation employs an
individual, any agent of such
an employer and any
professional association
Disability: a physical or
mental impairment that
substantially limits one or
more of the major life
activities of an individual
having a record of such an
impairment or being regarded
as having such an impairment
Exclusions: family and
domestic employment
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Table D.1 (continued)

State
West Virginia

Legislation
Chapter 5 General Powers
and Authority of the
Governor, Secretary of State
and Attorney General, Board
of Public Works;
Miscellaneous Agencies,
Commissions, Offices,
Programs, Etc., Article 11
Human Rights Commission
Handicap provisions added in
1981
Source: Michie’s West
Virginia Code Annotated,
Volume 2, 1999 Replacement
Volume.

Wisconsin

Chapter 111 Employment
Relations, Subchapter II Fair
Employment
Section amended to include
the word handicap in 1965
Source: West’s Wisconsin
Statutes Annotated (1997).

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions
Employer: the state, any
political subdivision thereof,
and person employing 12 or
more employees, 20 calendar
weeks
Disability: physical or mental
impairment which
substantially limits one or
more of such person’s major
life activities, a record of such
impairment, or being
regarded as having such
Exclusions: private clubs and
family employment

Employer: the state and each
agency of the state, and any
other person engaging in any
activity, enterprise or
business employing at least
one individual
Disability: physical or mental
impairment which makes
achievement unusually
difficult or limits the capacity
to work, has a record of such
impairment, or is perceived as
having such
Exclusions: social club or
fraternal society, family
employment
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Table D.1 (continued)

State
Wyoming

Legislation
Title 27 Labor and
Employment, Chapter 9 Fair
Employment Practices
Language added in 1985
Source: Wyoming Statutes
Annotated, 1999 Edition
Volume 6.

Current covered employer,
definitions of disability, and
exceptions
Employer: the state or any
political subdivision or board,
commission, department,
institution, or school district
thereof, and every other
person employing two or
more employees
Disability: no definition of
disability
Exclusions: religious
organizations or associations

NOTE: It is typical for legislation to allow for discrimination based on ability to perform the job and to define a qualified disabled person as one who can perform the job
with reasonable accommodation.
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